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INTRODUCTION

The amnesty of 1846, the first political act of Pope Pius IX, created a
sensation in its age.

Today, however, it receives only perfunctory men-

tion in most histories, and very little attention beyond that.

What

originally looked like the new beginning of a "Liberal" Pope is now seen
as just a false start for a famous conservative.
This sudden change of opinion is no doubt strongly conditioned by
the events of

th~

Roman Revolution of 1848.

It is fairly well known

that some of the most visible leaders of that revolt had also received
pardon for their previous offenses a mere 2 years before.

It is even

better known that the Pope himself, following his restoration, retreated
from enlightened political reforms into religious conservatism and bitterness for the rest of his days.

His subsequent unwillingness to con-

tinue political programs which had only recently made him the toast of
the Italian nation appear to be rooted in suspicion and hurt - he acted
on the belief that his own subjects had violated his kindness and trust.
There were, to be sure, several recipients of the amnesty who had
turned against their erstwhile benefactor.

Among the best known were

Pietro Sterbini, sincere democrat and arch-promoter of the Roman Republic, Giuseppe Galletti, a gentle Mazzinian, and the young firebrand Felice Orsini, who would later die for his attempt to assassinate Napoleon
III.

We can identify other names of high-profile plotters who came home

in 1846 to continue their former activities: Pietro Beltrami, Raffaele

vii

Pasi, Livio Zambeccari, and several members of the Caldesi and Muratori
families.

Whatever each of these men intended in his inmost self, loyal

or not, Pius certainly could not know.

We can easily forgive him for

concluding that they had been "poor risks" - that reconciliation for
them was probably a bad idea.

Thus we are left with the impression that

the amnesty was an act of folly and political naivitee'.
State of the Question
Until now, those authors who mention the amnesty at all usually do so in
some larger context; either of the Revolution of 1848, or of the person
and reign of Pius IX.

Hence the amnesty is typically treated as an iso-

lated event, and often a mistake at that.

What I propose to do in this

investigation is to focus on the valuable data generated by the amnesty
itself.

Two distinct archival fonts contain a rich lode of information

on the individuals who first applied for it in 1846, as well as those
who were later indicted for violating its conditions.

This neglected

information will clearly show that the amnesty was not only a just and
generous political action, but that it was an act of mutual trust which
was generally respected and honored by those who benefited from it.
Even in the context of 1848, the amnesty and the Revolution which came
after it are unique.

Those who led and those who followed were cer-

tainly not cast in the mold of 1830.
Those writers tend to follow several variations of a single theme.
Pius IX represents an important element of the Old Regime, as he fights
frantically to hold back the tide of the modern world, which is variously interpreted in terms of nationalism, liberalism or social justice.

viii

Writing within 20 years.of the event, authors like Alphonse Balladier and Giuseppe Spada promoted the rather conservative image of a
legitimate and moral government overthrown by mindless democrats, or by
anarchists who threatened the very foundations of civilization.
Carlo Farini moderated this vision somewhat:

Luigi

he saw Pius' regime as

anachronistic, yet holding the middle ground between clerical reactionaries and qoctrinaire nationalists, and still fighting the same lost
cause.

At the opposite end of the spectrum are authors like Raffaele

DeCesare,

Gius~ppe

Leti, and George

M~

Trevelyan.

Writing during the

early decades of this century, they interpreted the revolution in terms
of heroic patriots fighting to overthrow an outdated rule of superstition, clericalism, and medieval relics so that the New Italy could
emerge.

Still more recently, works of George F-H. Berkeley (1932-40),

E. E. Y. Hales (1954-60), and Frank J. Coppa (1974-85) have presented a
less stereotypical portrait of the Pope.

Like Farini, they have shown

Pius and his advisors as attempting to steer a middle course between
extremists.

They are drawn as well-meaning individuals who were eventu-

ally overcome by forces beyond their understanding and control.

In each

of these several interpretations, 1848 in Rome is essentially the same
as other revolutions since the Restoration.
Three works of Domenico Demarco from the 1940 1 s present another
sort of interpretation.

He pointed out in great detail that the 3-month

Provisional Government of 1848 gained very broad support among nearly
all Roman citizens by responding to bread-and-butter issues more effec-

tively than any papal government ever had.

ix

Although doomed from the

start by the international situation and by financial chaos, the interim
government had established a spirit of sympathy and good will which was
passed on to Mazzini.

This legacy,

in part, helped to explain why so

many people made heroic sacrifices during the siege.

For Demarco, the

Roman Revolution is a new thing in Italy because of its social basis and
broad support.
This

study will

fall somewhere between these

interpretations.

Some of the leaders of the revolt against Pius were veterans of the former troubles:

1831, 1843 and 1845 - traditional "carbonari against man-

archy" conflicts.

But the vast majority of the amnesty recipients did

NOT support the new rebellion.

Indeed some of them actively opposed it

and died in the process. The obvious conclusion, with data to back it
up,

is that the 1848 revolt resulted from new leadership and issues;

those who supported the Provisional Government and Mazzini's Republic
were not the same as the old veterans pardoned in 1846.
In one of the most recent works on the Risorgimento, the author
states that "something like 2000 (sic) potential revolutionaries were
thus once again walking the streets of Rome, Bologna and the rest of the
state".

1

The implication is all too clear that the former exiles and

prisoners anxiously returned to their former plotting.
resumes only a few pages later:

The same theme

"The coming revolution thus had paten-

tial leaders as a result of the amnesty of 1846. 112 This - author is typical of most;

a handful of leaders are allowed to represent the entire

1

Harry Hearder, Italy in the Age of the Risorgimento,
(London: Longman, 1983), p. 109.
2

Hearder, Italy p. 112.

x

1790-1870

group.

If this proves to be true, then 1848 is merely a larger

of the previous revolutions.

But if not, then we must conclude that

l848 attracted new people, motivated by newer issues, concerns and circumstances.
So what about all of those others?

Over 1000 prisoners and exiles

applied for the amnesty, and most of them received it.

But apart from

the best known among them - those already mentioned - there has never
been any systematic attempt to study the entire group.

It seems strange

for the remaining prisoners and exiles have been neglected for so long.
After all, most of them had been courageous enough (at least once) to
put their lives and fortunes at risk.

Then, as now, overt opposition to

Pius 1 amnesty

one 1 s government is dangerous.

them a chance to

return home and attempt a fresh start; most of them were only too happy
to accept the opportunity.

But did the allure of politics during the

exciting 1848 period grow too strong for them?

Did the passion for

reform and change re-ignite the old fire to sweep away the venerable
Papal States in favor of a modern, united Italy?

Let us find out.

Objectives
The objective of this study is to complete that investigation.
are three fundamental questions:

There

Exactly who took part in the subse-

quent Revolution, and who did not?

What significant patterns are there,

if any, in the background of those individuals (place of origin, social
class, and places of exile or imprisonment), and what do the patterns
mean?

What connection is there, if any, between this background and the

type of participation (political or criminal)

xi

in the

revolution'?

Instead of using one statistical sample, the entire group of such
oners and exiles who benefitted from the
the raw material for the study.

of 1846 will provide

In this way, the somewhat vague argu-

• lt assume a more f ac t ua 1 b as1s.
.
ment over "l oya 1ty fl mig1

Method
The investigation consists of a comparison between two lists of names:
a "Long List" of all exiles and prisoners who profited from the amnesty
of 1846, and a

II

, 1ate d its terms b y
Sh ort L'1st I! o f t h ose wh o may h ave v10

what they did in the next three years.
Principal sources for the Long List are the records of the Secretariat of State, preserved today in the Vatican Archives.

There were

contemporary printed lists of the amnistiati, but they are full of
errors and omissions.

The

11

Long List" used here was composed from

scratch, using the original correspondance which applied the global
amnesty to individual prisoners and exiles.
The Short List will then be drawn from

"sample of the whole"

by determining which individuals allegedly violated the promise to
behave themselves after 1846.

The best sources for this material are

found in the State Archives in Rome among the court, police and mil
records for the restoration years.

There is a great abundance of mater-

ial in these fonts, most of it badly neglected by scholars.
Even allowing for inevitable gaps and deficiencies, the results of
this study are truly startling.

This unified profile of large numbers

of former revolutionaries has an obvious interest for scholar and diletante alike.

The result

insights not only puncture several myths

xii

about the amnesty itself, but cast a whole new light on Pius IX and his
government.
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CHAPTER I

THE PAPAL STATES TO 1846
When Pius IX was elected Pope in 1846, his Temporal Dominions, the Papal
States, extended from Venetia in the north to Naples in the south.
total area, the state was about 41,400 square kilometers.

In

Its greatest

length was about 435 kilometers, and its average width was about 130.

1

Its population·numbered almost three million inhabitants, of whom a mere
14 to 17 percent lived in towns of a thousand or more. 2 The remainder
(at least 2,400,000 people) lived in isolated houses or tiny rural communities, whether they were farmers or not.

Rome, the capital, was the

largest city with about 150,000 inhabitants at the time.

The second

city, Bologna, lay at the far northern end of the country with a population less than half the size of Rome's.

3

Even though it occupied an important slice of central Italy, the
domains of the Pope had the reputation of being one of the worst governed and most backward of all European states.

The root causes of this

1

George Fitz-Hardinge Berkeley, Italy -in the
Cambridge University Press, 1932-40), I, 47.
2

Italia: Ragioneria generale dello Stato,
Contabili e di Controllo
Stato Pontificio
(Roma: Istituto Poligrafico del
Stato, 1961), table
3

Gabriello Rossi, Sulla
Economica e
dello Stato
Pontificio (Bologna: Societa Tipografica Bolognese,
)~table
"R". Rossi gives the total population for 1844 as 2, 929, 807. Berkeley
(I, 37) gives the 1848 population as 2,898,115, with Rome at 170,199 and
Bologna at 80,000. Rossi's more specialized work appears to be more
reliable.
1

2

condition lie deep in history and local customs.

But bad policy alone

does not explain· how an individual might become a political exile or
prisoner.

In order to fill in necessary background, this chapter will

briefly discuss social and economic conditions, then local government
structures and the court system, and finally, a history of revolutionary
activity, as it applied to the Roman state.
in the Papal

~~~

The Papal States exhibited one unique characteristic among European monarchies:

the dominant class was not the nobility, but the clergy.

In

other states, the church was one social element among many; but in Rome,
the church was considered to be the very reason for the state.

Practi-

cally speaking, the existence of a papal state was supposed to enable
the Pope to govern the church freely - without owing any special loyalty
or favor to another prince.

This singular rationale also meant that the

Papal States would not conform to neighboring states in several ways.
Most states of the time accepted constitutional limits on the sovereign,
civic officials drawn from the nobility or educated classes, tax revenue
for public good, etc.

The government in Rome assumed no such things.

The nature of traditional church government made the state, as well as
the church, a virtually absolute monarchy.

Revenue was not considered

pu,lilic wealth, but benefice: income to be used for char.itable purposes
or to support clerics engaged in church-related work.

By reason of both

law and custom, the church often held the best lands, prelatures, prebends, abbeys and monastic property, all of which were also considered
benefices.

During the middle ages, donations had flowed to Rome freely;

3

local taxes remained very low, and sometimes were not even collected.
But the experience of centuries had taught Rome that free will offerings
and donations could be unreliable, especially when other European states
restricted money sent abroad.

Even before the French Revolution, unin-

terrupted support of schools, seminaries, hospitals and missions was
possible only because benefices in central Italy were able to defray the
cost with local money.

Churchmen were also assured of the top positions

in state government and directed the disbursement of the lion's share of
state revenue.

Clerics made laws, passed judgement, directed education

and controlled the police, always with an eye to the establishment of
the Kingdom of God on earth.

They saw themselves, not as civil servants

or public trustees, but as lords who exercised sovbreignty in the name
of the church.

In other words, the state did not exist for any reason

of its own, but to provide a steady base for the operation of the
church.

4

Except for its dominant clerical caste, the society of the

Papal States was similar to that of most Italian states in nearly every
way.

Agriculture was the most important occupation, but there were many

other goods and services as well.

A simple division of the population

by profession would look something like the table on the following page.

Domenico Demarco, !l
dello Stato
lio Einaudi editore, 1949), pp. 25f.
4

4

2.0%

Clergy (all levels)

10.2

Nobility and untitled landowners
Professionals (doctors, magistrates, teachers)

1.8

Commercial people

4.5

Artisans, tradesmen and skilled workers

13.0

Servants, unskilled workers and unemployed

16.2

Peasant-owners, sharecroppers and tenants

so.a

Soldiers

1.0

Students

1.3
total

100.0%

Each of these major categories corresponds to those used in the present
study.

5

The whole concept of a church-state seemed anachronistic to many
nineteenth century people.

But to most of the clergy of that time, the

Papal States promised a freedom of action which they considered both
necessary and good.

In the person of Pius VII, the Papacy itself was

seen as one of the principal conquerors of Napoleon's tyranny.

It was

living proof that God had not allowed his church to fall under the domination of any one secular prince.

The church which emerged after the

trials of the French Revolution had certainly lost much of its social
influence and privileged position, together with immense property holdings which would never be recovered.

5

But in the process, many of the

This table is the author's own creation, based on statistics quoted
by Demarco (Tramonto, pp. 22~4), and intentionally regrouped and simplified to match the statistical tables used later in the paper.

5

old evils had also been purged.

Great wealth had never been wholesome

for those who preached such virtues as temperance and justice.

Nearly

everywhere in Europe, there was a flowering of vocations and a great
expansion of religious orders.

The church they served was more unified,

disciplined, and worthy of gospel values than it had been in centuries.
Clerics, frequently poor, were now more ascetic and virtuous.

Bishops

were now better educated and better motivated than the worldly prelates
of a century before.

It was generally accepted that they were to be

pastors first, and princes ·afterward.
But what was true of the church at large came more slowly in Rome
itself.

It is genuinely unfortunate that this newly purified clergy was

not as well represented in the Roman government as it was in the countryside.

Administrative offices were often filled by so-called ''politi-

cal clerics."

These sought advancement through their personal connec-

tions and talents, but otherwise showed few of the virtues expected of
churchmen.

6

Although not necessarily evil men, they tended to be short

sighted and opportunistic,

like bureaucrats found elsewhere.

Other

highly motivated prelates kept themselves close to the seat of papal
power, but honestly feared the modern world and were unable to compromise with such ideas as constitutional monarchy and liberty of conscience.

For most of the clerics found in the curial offices, scienti-

fic progress, economic success and modernity were not the controlling
norms.

Quite the contrary, they represented everything that had to be

opposed.

6

Demarco, Tramonto, p. 28.

6

The nobles of the Papal States found themselves in a somewhat
equivocal position.

On one hand, their landholdings and overall wealth

steadily increased, and their prestige and social position remained
unchallenged.

On the other hand, there were few opportunities for them

to enter government service because of the clerical monopoly.

In Rome

and Lazio, noble families were one of three types: feudal (ancient clans
such as the Orsini, Colonna and Savelli), financial (self-made dynasties
like the Torlonia or Grazioli) and nepotistic (beneficiaries of previous
popes, such as the Doria, Corsini, Borghese and Chigi).

Most Roman fam-

ilies remained :fairly loyal to the Papacy in principle, since any
changes in the papal monarchy could threaten their own social standing
as well.

Yet they had little sense of duty or purpose.

Those who might

wish to serve the state as urban or provincial governors had to begin by
becoming clerics themselves.

Some were willing to receive tonsure and

promise celibacy, but most were not.

Younger sons, especially, had a

difficult time, since primogeniture favored the eldest as heirs to both
lands and title.

Unless they managed to carve out careers for them-

selves in the army, the church, or the bureaucracy,

they frequently

withdrew to their villas, mistresses and art collections to pass their
time as petty princes within a narrow social circle.

Although they con-

tinued to exert some influence on government by what they said and did,
they were always able to claim that they were not responsible for its
mistakes.

7

7

Demarco, Tramonte, pp. 29-34.

7

Elsewhere, the provincial nobility found themselves in a similar
quandary, al though their psychological ties to Rome were relatively
weak.

Especially in the Romagna and the Marches, hard working nobles

found themselves frustrated at every turn.

Families like the Manfredi,

Bentivoglio, Malatesta and Della Rovere possessed education,

landed

wealth, and a tradition of leadership, but few practical opportunities
to lead or contribute to their society.

The provincial nobles, even

those with feudal roots, had also retained an interest in commerce and
local politics which the more ornamental Romans would have scorned.
Those who had estates in the Po valley often busied themselves with
intensive agriculture,

like their Lombard cousins.

Others invested

their wealth in commercial or manufacturing enterprises, sumetimes with
disappointing results because of the general commercial stagnation.

In

desperation, many resorted to political writing or debate, sometimes
through secret societies.

Such a profile fits many individuals in

this study. 8
For the commercial and professional classes, life in the Pope's
dominions could be especially frustrating, though certainly not because
of any lack of talent or creativity on their part.

Especially in the

north, life in the towns depended very much on .agricultural conditions.
The most important exports were hemp, wool and silk, although meat and
leather products were also significant.

Grain was largely produced for

domestic consumption, and was not considered an export.

Since most man-

ufacturing and commerce focused on the processing of food and fibers, a

8

Giuseppe Spada, Storia del
Rivoluzione di Roma, (Firenze: Stabilimento di G. Pellas, 1869), I, 45ff.

8
bad growing season could have a disastrous impact on the availability of
work and trade.

But even under the best conditions, foreign trade was

not encouraged.

The principal interest of the central government seemed

to be taxing what was produced, rather than stimulating production.
Those who planned to trade or to invest found their efforts blocked by
tariffs, monopolies, privileges and a bewildering variety of other regulations designed to prohibit and to protect.

Use of modern machinery

was actively discouraged (or forbidden outright in state-owned factories) because workers would be displaced.
all, and almost no merchant fleet.

There were no railroads at

Even the roads were in poor repair

except near the customs posts. 9 Some merchants did prosper because of
hard work and a bit of luck.

But most felt their efforts would produce

much better results under a more friendly regime.
For those engaged in any form of agriculture, life could be much
worse.

Throughout Italy, the population growth (about 60% from 1700 to

1840) was mainly rural.

Farmer~

met the greater demand for food by

bringing more land under cultivation, rather than increasing their yield
with better methods.

The various systems of cultivation depended not so

much on the crops or the size of the farms, but on the type of labor
contract in use.

In addition to direct farming by a peasant-owner, sev-

eral systems of rent and sharecropping were used in central Italy.
Smallholders were able to survive if their farms were big enough, but
they faced falling prices as the century progressed, due largely to competition from cheap Russian grain.
and renters to the level of tenants.

9

Demarco, Tramonto, pp. 113-38.

Increasing debt often reduced owners
The mixed farming used most often

9

by sharecroppers produced wheat, maize and other grains, olives, vines
and fruit trees. , But while this system took care of the needs of a family, it rarely produced enough of any cash crop for a genuine profit.
Creeping debt and close supervision by the landowners with constant
demands to produce more were also unpleasant realities of a tenant's
life.

In far too many cases, agriculture alone could not assure a fami-

ly's survival.

The difference had to be made up by cottage industry or

seasonal migration by family members with other skills, like blacksmithing or carpentry.

10

Immediately outside the gates of Rome, was an intensively cultivated belt of small farms where the peasants did relatively well, due
largely to their specialization and their
kets.

clos~ness

to the Roman mar-

Most of the sharecroppers in Lazio also shared in this good for-

tune, unless their contracts were for only a year at a time, as they
commonly were in the Romagna.

Beyond this fertile belt was the Agro

Romano,. a huge and very productive region.

At that time, about 1/3 of

the land was owned by only four families (Sforza-Cesarini, Borghese,
Fabrizi and Chigi), another 1/3 by other nobles, usually in vast unbroken tracts, and the final 1/3 by religious corporations, chief among
whom were the chapters of St. Peter and St. J.ohn Lateran, the Santo
Spirito Hospital, the Holy Office and the Bishopric of Ostia.

Although

ideally suited for grain production, 85% of the Agro was devoted to pasture for domestic animals.

Grazing was not heavily regulated by the

courts, as cereal farming was, making it attractive to those whose main

10

Stuart Joseph Woolf, A History of Italy 1700-1860,
Methuen, 1979), pp. 275-81.

(London:

10

interest was a steady income.

Grazing was also relatively easy work, as

it required neither efficient management nor extensive J.abor costs.

As

a result, the grain produced in the Agro could only feed 90,000 people half of what Rome required.

Even the meat production fell short,

because of the easy going methods of the landowners.

Over 6000 cattle

per year had to be transported from other provinces to feed the capital.

11

with

Thousands of land-hungry peasants looked on this inefficiency
disgust.
Although the farms outside of Lazio were usually small and com-

pact, there remained one other group of very

landholdings.

These

were found along the low-lying coastal plains of Ferrara, Ravenna and
the Marches, as well as the district known as the Maremme, west of Rome.
Life there was dangerous because of malaria, and whatever farming and
herding took place was done with hired labor from nearby hill towns.
Hired hands there and elsewhere on the largest estates were among the
poorest of the farm workers, not so much because they were badly paid,
but simply because they had no claim on more than one day's work at a
time.

The ones who had other skills or jobs were usually able to make

ends meet - those who had no other income could starve, especially in a
famine year.

Despite all their troubles, most peasants remained solidly

loyal to the government, al though most would complain that they "paid
too much" for their rents or contracts.
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11

But far from being concerned with helping peasants, increasing
food production

br

encouraging trade, the Roman administration had a

very different agenda of its own.

Understanding this extremely unique

philosophy of government helps to explain why the Papal States was
nearly impossible to govern by the mid-nineteenth century.
Local Administration
Unlike the systems of government found in textbooks which are simple,
rational and unified, the papal administration retained the marks of
several different (and sometimes contradictory) attempts to change or
reform it.

Its most serious flaw was that institutions tended to

reflect several different and competing concepts of what the state ought
to be or do.

Much like the Bourbon state in France before 1789, the

eighteenth century concept of the Papal States envisioned a union of
several organic communities or entities.

These were the Comarca (a

40-mile capital district), together with a duchy (Urbino), and five
other historic provinces:

the Romagna, the Marches, Umbria, the Patri-

mony, and the Roman Campagna.

13

Each of these provinces had a network of

centuries-old customs and practices which made it a unique social and
political 'organ unlike anything else.
Napoleon's conquest of Italy quickly swept away these institutions.

His occupation government was based on systems used in Imperial

France, rather than on any precedent in Italian history.

Each province

was governed by a prefect responsible directly to Paris.

In theory, the

prefect was a representative of the French Revolution to oppressed pea-
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ple, who were being prepared for self-government; in practice, he was
largely concerned with efficiency in collecting taxes and conscripting
troops for Napoleon's war effort against other European monarchs. Yet
the prefects often found the need to maintain an image of popularity,
and did so by promoting economic development and quick, honest enforcement of justice.

For many citizens, especially in the Legations, this

was a type of good government they had never known or expected from the
former clerical-dominated regime.
Following the defeat of Napoleon in 1815, the restored government
of Pius VII

adop~ed

some of these features.

His Secretary of State,

Cardinal Ercole Consalvi, had already assured restoration of the entire
state to its pre-revolutionary boundries.

Now in the hopes of preserv-

ing that state from revolutionary instability and popular discontent, he
issued an edict in 1816 which retained a relatively modern administration.

Consalvi had to endure a great deal of criticism from those who

wanted to restore all aspects of the old regime, but he was encouraged
to persist by the Austrian chancellor Metternich.

Although Consalvi

believed strongly that the Pope had to remain free of any political or
institutional limits, he also felt that the best guarantor of this freedom was efficient and humane government.

A Pope could never exercise

his spiritual missicn in true freedom if he found himself simultaneously
at war with his own subjects because the institutions of his state
worked so badly.
According to Consalvi's program, most offices would now be open to
laymen, although the highest were still reserved for clerics.

Consul-

tive advice to local administrators was supposed to moderate the rigid-

13
ity of absolutism.

But in practice, many of the potential benefits of

this structure were never realized, due largely to opposition and delaying by a faction of ultra-conservative prelates known as the Rigorists
(zelanti) to their political contemporaries.

14

Since Consalvi's plans

provoked more hostility than support within the college of cardinals,
his only hope was to convince Pius VII to decree reforms from the
throne, and gently push his critics aside.
reforms might end when the Pope died.

He knew, of course, that his

Thus he felt driven by a sense of

urgency, and attempted to enact sweeping changes in a relatively short
time.

The very speed of his work provoked a sharp reaction on the part

would outlast him, and each successive reform, in their minds, was earmarked for revision or elimination at the earliest possible opportunity.
Ironically, the plan of Metternich and Consalvi to reform the Papal
States would eventually fail, not because it was too conservative, but
because it was too advanced.
these

~~~-'

15

After the death of Pius VII in 1823,

succeeded in electing one of their leaders, Cardinal Ser-

mattei della Genga, who took the name Leo XII (1823-9).

He promptly

dismissed Consalvi and spent much of his reign undoing the effects of
his laws.

Leo, in turn, was succeeded by the moderate Cardinal Casti-

glioni who, as Pius VIII, hoped to return to a more enlightened policy.
Sadly, he died without doing so after only a year.

Before they elected

the very conservative Gregory XVI (1831-46), the cardinals were dead-
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locked for two months.

The resulting power vacuum was one of several

factors which helped precipitate the revolt of 1831.

16

According to Consalvi's reform edict of 1816, the state was re-divided into a capital district and 17 "delegations," similar to the
French " departemen t s. "

For administrative purposes, each delegation was

•
"d is
• t ric
• t s, II th en
sub-divi d e d into

II

governmen t s II an d

II

communes. II

Except

for their uniform name, delegations were unequal in nearly every way.
Some were poor and barren, with barely 15,000 inhabitants; others were
quite prosperous, with well over 300,000 people engaged in a great variety of economic activity.

17

Each was administered by a governor known as

an "apostolic delegate, 11 similar to a French prefect in function.

Five

of these delegations were classified as "first cl.ass": Urbino & Pesaro,
together with Bologna, Ferrara, Ravenna and Forli', the four traditional
"Legations 11 of the Romagna region.

Seven others were rated usecond

class": Ancona, Macerata, Fermo, Perugia, Spoleto, Viterbo and Frosinone, and five were "third class 11 :
chia and Benevento.

Camerino, As coli, Rieti, Civitavec-

Because of their commercial significance, a first

class delegation was always administered by a cardinal known as a
"legate. 11

All other delegates had to be bishops.

18

A delegate, in his capacity as provincial governor, was the chief
politiGal, administrative and judicial official in his delegation.
Despite the image of a delegate a local representative of the central
government, he was often considered (and sometimes saw himself) as more
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of a feudal lord, who acted very much on his own.

In theory, a bad

administrator could always be removed from his duties; but in practice,
few ever were, since they formed an important part of the shifting web
of political factions.

All too frequently, a Pope might not live long

enough to discover who his worst administrators were.

And even if he

knew, he might need today's foe as tomorrow's ally against a newer foe.
Pellegrino Rossi, a future prime minister of Pius IX, was quoted as saying that a cardinal is "a prince in Rome, a pasha in his province." 19
Especially in the administration of justice, a delegate retained a
semi-feudal function as judge.

His charity or integrity might enable

him to judge well and fairly, but professional training almost never
did; few lawyers or jurists ever reached this rank.
In an effort to broaden a delegate's ability, he was assisted by
two judicial aides (' 1 assessori 11 ) , one for civil affairs, the other for
criminal cases.

He also received the consultive advice of a "governor's

council," which met three times per week.

This counci 1 had a delibera-

tive vote on all budgetary matters, and a consultive vote on everything
else. 20 At first, the council consisted of a secretary general, with
two, three or four members, depending on the class of the delegation.
After 1824, membership was simplified to include only a mayor and two
aldermen (''gonfaloniere" and "anziani 11 ) .

In his capacity as sovereign,

the Pope named all these officials from lists periodically drawn up by
his ministers. 21 To further simplify administration, the same directive
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of 1824 reduced the number of delegations from 17 to 13 by combining
Macerata-Camerino, Fermo-Ascoli, Spoleto-Rieti and Viterbo-Civitavecchia. 22 A less fortunate result of this directive was the revival of the
ecclesiastical monopoly among top level administrators, with a simultaneous increase in inefficiancy and corruption. 23
Following the revolution of 1831, a Memorandum (May 21, 1831) from
the five major powers had proposed a much more dramatic reform.

This

document provides a sharply contrasting view of what should have been
happening in Rome, at least in the opinion of some of Europe's leading
statesmen.

Although never implemented, it became somewhat of a focal

point whenever reform was discussed.

Because it had its origins in the

international forum, Roman liberals were able to point to it as a sort
of "charter" for the changes they wanted to see.

The chief elements of

this Memorandum of 1831 are:
1.

an administration based on elected municipal and provincial
councils which would control local affairs, and send members
to a fiscal giunta in Rome to set financial policy, together
with an appointed Council of State.

2.

opening all civil posts to laymen.

3.

reform of the legal system according to Consalvi's 1816 directive, and

4.

an organic law to protect these reforms against tampering by
subsequent governments.

22
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Cardinal Bernetti, the new Secretary of State, accepted the Memorandum
politely, but still resented what he considered interference by outsiders in the affairs of his unique state.

Bernetti was a clear headed

organizer and a competent administrator, at least according to the Roman
understanding of that skill.

He was passionately dedicated to the cler-

ical regime and its need to remain free of entanglements with any foreign power, including Austria.

He was prepared to accept help from any-

one, but made i t clear that he owed them no favors

in return.

Metternich often found Bernetti to be a difficult partner, but admitted
a certain grudging admiration. 24 After the Memorandum, Bernetti submitted his own reform proposal on July 5, 1831.

Most recommendations of

the Memorandum were quietly pushed aside. Perhaps the only

signif~cant

exception was a weak attempt to broaden the local administration.
legation (=first class de

Each

ion) had its council expanded to four mem-

hers, one of whom acted as president and pro-

Any or all of

these members could be laymen, although clerics continued to function in
many cases, simply because they were the administrators with more experience.

25

When Bernetti was succeeded by Cardinal Lambruschini in 1836,

the papal government became more tactful, but remained essentially the
same.

Metternich gave up his serious hopes of .reform in Rome. 2 6
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Administration of
The Napoleonic regime had granted the first modern codification of lar_,s
in the Papal States.

Even after the suppression of the French legal

codes, Pius VII named three commissions to revise civil, criminal, and
commercial codes so that they were no longer founded on just canon or
Roman legal principles. 27 Cardinal Giuseppe Antonio Sala had told Pius
VII in 1814 that the greatest weakness of the judiciary was a combination of too many tribunals with too much overlapping or doubtful jurisdiction.

He proposed that legal forums be limited to two (clerical and

lay), that uniform procedures and a single code be used everywhere, that
judges replace governors in all courts, and that court officials be
fewer, but better educated.

Courts of first instance, appeal, and revi-

sion should hear all cases except those dealing with agriculture or commerce.

28

Nevertheless, after the Restoration,

each legate or delegate

retained his function as president of the penal (criminal) tribunal.

29

The reform edict of 1816 began the rational simplification of the judicial system by revising the existing codes and tribunals.

Ecclesiasti-

cal tribunals survived, but without any jurisdiction in civil affairs.
The edict introduced the principle of equality before the law, and prohibited torture, as well as arbitrary arrest and punishment.

30

It also
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abolished the special jurisdictions of the barons and the municipalities, and restricted the jurisdiction of the delegates to only minor
offenses (those punishable by fines, or by one year of labor).

Each

province was to have a criminal tribunal with five judges in addition to
the delegate.

These provincial tribunals would hear appeals from the

local courts (the Governo) they in turn could have cases reviewed by the
superior courts at Bologna, Macerata, or two in Rome (Governo
~).

Pope.

~

Con-

Trained defenders and procurators were to be nominated by the
As modest as these measures may seem today, and notwithstanding

those still to be implemented, this 1816 directive gave the Papal States
the best administration and judicial system it had ever had.

But wel-

comed as they were by some, these procedural reforms were frequently
watered down or ignored by those closest to the heart of power: the
judges and prelates of the zelante faction.

31

The special tribunals still continued to hamper the efficiency of
the court system, even after several of them were abolished in the 1816
reform.

Most of those which survived did so because of special needs,

such as Rome's food supply. From an economic standpoint, the capital was
almost exclusively a governmental center and a place of pilgrimage.

It

had little manufacturing and no industry at all, but still had a huge
appetite.

Since Rome required a steady and substantial flow of food-

stuffs, the ordinary market forces were not considered reliable enough
to meet the demand.

Tight regulation was considered the only way to be

sure farmers would sell their products, even at prices below market
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value.

According to the spirit of the times, special courts and judges

seemed to be the best manner to safeguard a stable food supply.
Those

institutions

which retained

special

judicial

powers

included:
1.

The Congregazione di Buon Governo, the result of a much earlier reform, was an attempt to provide the communes near Rome
with officials who were concerned more with efficient government than with political appointments.

2.

The Uditore del Camerlengo, specializing in commercial law,
helped

fi~

prices and regulate markets in the Piazza Navona

neighborhood.
3.

The Presidenza di Grascia existed to ensure the supply of oil
and cooking fats by supervising the merchants who sold them.

4.

The Prefettura di Annona, concerned with the supply of bread
and pasta, held regulatory powers over mills, ovens and some
grain stores.

5.

The Tribunal for Agriculture settled disputes between consumers and merchants dealing in meats and vegetables.

6.

The Tribunal of the Cardinal Vicar, among many other functions, helped regulate supplies of other foodstuffs and their
prices.

7.

The Giudice del Mercede was charged with supervising salaries
for all workers engaged in agriculture.

Needless to say, many people saw the need to consolidate and streamline
the judicial system further.

But for the time being, these institutions

survived because of the degree of upset that might take place if too

21
hings were reformed at once.
many t

In the meanwhile, uncertainty as to

who had jurisdiction continued to cripple the efficiency of the court
sys t

em

'

to the surprise of no one.

32

The administrative reform of 1824 attempted to do two things:
streamline the efficiency of the courts, and eliminate the need for
administrators to function also as magistrates.

As a result, Leo XII

suppressed or transferred several tribunals: Urbino to Pesaro, Camerino
to Macerata, Ascoli to Fermo, Rieti to Spoleto and Civitavecchia to
Viterbo. 33 By allowing fewer courts to exist, all attempts to make them
more efficient could hopefully be implemented more quickly.

In the same

reform, first steps were taken to remove provincial governors from the
courts.

The four cardinal legates of the Romagna retained both civil

and criminal jurisdiction, but the delegates for the other thirteen
provinces lost their authority in criminal cases.

Tribunals were

reduced to include only four professional judges (not including the
legate or delegate), and henceforth there would be only two Courts of
Appeal: Bologna and Rome.

All local laws or statutes not in harmony

with the general code were abolished.

34

By the time the reform of 1831

was decreed, sufficient judges had been trained to allow a complete separation of political and administrative powers .from the judicial.

For

all practical purposes, the delegate had now lost his function as even a
civil judge. 35
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Each ordinary tribunal had one or more processing judges, a public
defender, and a public procurator.

In addition, the much larger courts

in Rome had a Public Procurator General, a Prosecutor Advocate, and an
Advocate of the Poor.

36

At the top of the scale was the Tribunal of the

Holy Consulta, which served as criminal court of appeal.

The entire

Consult a was composed of a Cardinal Prefect, several "presiding prelates" and a prelate secretary, but very rarely functioned as a whole.
It was commonly divided into two shifts or sections, known as "turni, 11
which functioned separately and heard different cases, sometimes in different cities.

The eldest of the judges (called the dean) presided over

the first turno, the secretary over the second.

Each turno judged capi-

tal cases appealed from the various Roman courts (Governo, Senatorial,
Auditor Camerale and Apostolic Palace), as well as all provincial
courts, except those in the Marches or the Legations.

Each turno could

also review sentences imposed by other courts (including the opposite
turno), and quite significantly, ALL POLITICAL CASES which came to
trial. 37 For the purposes of the present study, it is important to keep
this judicial monopoly in mind.

In essence, it means that a study of

the Consulta records will yield a relatively complete list of political
cases, except those which were so weak that they could be dismissed by
even a local tribunal.
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The Political Opposition
Although relative peace returned to Europe after the Congress of Vienna,
partisans of reform or political change continued to press, sometimes
violently, for the acceptance of their ideas and the destruction of
their rivals.

There are two chief forms which liberal 38 political oppo-

sition followed.

One was open, legal criticism of government ministers

and policy by members of the opposition.

The other was plotting against

a government by members of secret societies.

Among the members of this

second group, there were two main tendencies, both of which had their
roots in the French Revolution and before.

The first tendency is best

represented by the Marquis de Lafayette and the Philosophes of the
Enlight.enment.

They preached a cosmopolitan ideology of progressive

economic development, with an increase in production, markets and jobs,
all led by an educated elite.

Political reform was emphasized; there

was a general assumption that social conditions would improve as a natural result, and need not be considered separately.

Organizations formed

by people of this mind-set were both hierarchical and secret.

They

looked on nationalist movements as divisive, and ultimately self-defeating.

Though widely different in most other ways, members of this group

were collectively known as "moderate liberals" to .their contemporaries.

38

For the purposes of this study, the term "liberal" will be used in
the "classic" nineteenth century political sense. It denotes one who
favors individual freedom of thought, religion, speech, and activity,
and the removal of any controls not required for the protection of the
most basic human rights. Liberals in the Papal States, therefore, would
tend to favor elimination of clerical influence in education and in the
courts, an end to feudal or clerical privileges, and public control of
tax revenues. They should not be confused with "economic liberals, 11
although this latter group may still share some common principles.
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By contrast, followers of the other tendency are frequently called
11

ra d.1cal or democratic liberals.

11

This other group is best represented

by Filippo Buonarroti, still active and incorruptible in his old age.
As

8

living symbol of the Jacobin movement, he retained his faith in the

ultimate victory of an egalitarian society, which would flow from a fundamental social, as well as political realignment.

Although his follow-

ers also constituted a de facto elite, Buonarroti favored incorporation
of the lower classes into the revolutionary movement as soon as they
could be won over and properly motivated.

These Jacobin-democrats cer-

tainly intended to act in favor of the working masses, but did not neeessarily trust them to know the best path to their own salvation.

Until

they were enlightened, emotional issues such as nationalism and radical
social reform might be useful tools to gain and hold the loyalty of this
popolo minuto, the ordinary working people.

39

Some of the earliest sects, most of them following the
pattern, had strong links to freemasonry.

11

Lafayette 11

One of these, the Adelphia,

gained a substantial following among officers in the pre-1815 army.
Similar and better known was the somewhat shadowy organization known as
the Carbonari, who also retained masonic trappings.

Their demands

focused more on political, rather than social.change, but were frequently difficult to pin down.

They included such standard liberal

reforms as the opening of offices to laymen, laicization of the courts,
a written constitution, and possibly the separation of the Marches and
the Romagna from Rome. 40 Although not well organized, they existed in
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nearly every corner of pre-unification Italy.

The Carbonari never had a

single political program, but several at once.

Their vagueness and

respect for freedom of thought meant that all good liberals could join.
A typical local cluster might include plenty of opportunists, such as
those looking for employment or useful connections, or those who simply
joined because of peer pressure.

But the very broadness of their pro-

gram ensured that any specific proposal might be met with indifference.
Even so, there was general agreement on a basic minimal platform: the
broad ideals of "Italian unity, independence, liberty, and expulsion of
foreigners"

(wid~ly

understood to be the Austrians).

As to the most

desirable form of constitutional government, they were less unanimous;
opinions ranged all the way from constitutional monarchy, through a federal state, to a unitary state, such as a radical republic.

Evidence

presented in this study proves that each of these sub-factions was
active before 1846. 41
Although Giuseppe Mazzini'~ plans for Italy were still largely
unknown and untried in 1830, the revolutions of that year drove him to
refine his ideas with increasing urgency.
Carbonari as halfhearted and hopeless.

Mazzini saw the work of the

He tended to favor Buonarroti

over Lafayette insofar as he saw a need to involve all classes in the
movement.

But he still felt the entire movement was fatally crippled by

timid leadership, complex ritual, and the cult of secrecy.

The events

of 1831 helped Mazzini develop his own program to achieve

11

independence and union. 11

41

liberty,

He envisioned an Italian society of the future

R. John Rath, "The Carbonari: Their Origins, Initiation Rites and
Aims," American Historical Review (1964) LXIX, 366f.
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based on natural laws

and rights,

in which all aristocracy and

privileges would.be abolished in favor of a simple "organic" state based
on association between classes, and human progress attained through
cooperation.

In practice, this demanded good leadership, largely from

the middle class, supported by the masses, the poorest and most numerous
working classes.

He favored the eighteenth century proposals to place

limitations on all wills, mortmain and other institutions which removed
land from free circulation.

He also wanted to see very broad ownership

of farmland, a progressive ·tax on profits, wage control to protect workers, and many public works to provide jobs.

The material benefits of

this cooperation were to benefit everyone without exception. 42
ro promote his vision and bring it about more effectively, Mazzini
founded a new society which he called "Young Italy" (Giovine Italia).
His followers were to avoid any hint of conflict between classes, since
he felt that converting a revolution to a class war would ruin it with a
new tyranny.

He certainly favored leadership remaining with the law-

yers, proprietors and officers, but recruited heavily among the city
poor as well.

He directed that all propaganda favoring Young Italy be

restricted to literate members, but insisted that anyone should recruit
new members, and that no formality be required. beyond an oath of loyalty. 43
In the years that followed, both the earlier sects and Mazzini's
Young Italy would exist side by side, sometimes at odds with one
another, sometimes combining their efforts.
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But judged both by numbers

27
and by influence exerted, time and circumstances seemed to favor the
latter.
The Revolution of 1831
The thirty years following the Congress of Vienna were characterized in
all Italian states by an underlying struggle between political opposites.

A marriage of strange bedfellows labored to change the institu-

tions of Metternich's Europe:
Italy and others.

Moderate Liberals, the Carbonari, Young

The Papal States remained relatively quiet during the

early years of Consalvi's reform, although an Austrian army crossed the
frontier in 1821 to defeat Neapolitan rebels near Rieti. 44
Most potent::_a1 rebels recognized that the major powers of Europe
supported the Austrian domination of the Italian states.

But in 1830,

the new French government of Louis Philippe declared that France would
no longer tolerate Austrian intervention in Italian affairs.

The Carbo-

naro rising of 1831 could never have occurred without this manifesto.
Revolutionary leaders in Lyons, as well as in the Legations, hoped that
now they might not have to contend with Austrian troops. 45
The slowing of reform, and the two-month long conclave following
the death of Pius VIII on November 30, 1830 did contribute to the revolt
of 1831, but were certainly not its causes.
and little popular unrest to speak of.

There was no food shortage,

The genuine causes were the lin-

gering ones: economic stagnation, governmental inertia, and loss of hope
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among upper-class leaders.

The successful July Revolution in France in

1830 may well have served as an encouragement.

But the only immediate

occasion for activity at this time may have been the revolt in neighboring Modena, and consequet fear of possible crime and disorder in the
Romagna.

Local leaders appear to

have decided to take matters into

their own hands.
The earliest leaders were a relatively conservative combination of
"old liberals" together with students and young professionals. The

11

old 11

faction were landowners and merchants who hoped to restore the historic
liberties of Bologna and free themselves from the hopeless misgovernment
of Rome.

They remembered the old Jacobin and Italic governments as mod-

els for imitation, but were largely anti-democratic.

The newer leaders

(who are the only ones of real interest here) drew their support almost
entirely from provincial nobility, property owners, and leading families
in the major cities.

Although this second group was almost as conserva-

tive as the first, there were two important differences:

they were more

open to considering a newer society of a "Buonarrotian" type, and they
were more strongly nationalistic than their fathers had been.

Thinking

of themselves as "Italians" rather than mere French clients, they were
more willing to experiment with political reforms? as long as no explosive social changes threatened their foundations.

It is also signifi-

cant that they had enough idealism or optimism to risk prison or exile
for their cause.

These conspirators were able to use the network

already built by the carbonari, as well as their plans and foreign connections. 46
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Among these new leaders were several who were to figure prominently in subsequent events.

Count Terenzio Mamiani della Rovere of

Pesaro would be prime minister for Pius IX, and later for Victor Emmanuel II.
forces.

47

Colonel Pier Damiano Armandi had helped lead rebel military
Physics professor Francesco Orioli, Count Carlo Pepoli and Mar-

quis Daniele Zappi were significant leaders of the expatriate community
irt France.

Tiberio Borgia of Perugia, Filippo Canuti, Sebastiano Fus-

coni and Federico Pescantini of Lugo would emerge as strong moderate
leaders even after years of exile. 48 Each of these was excluded by name
from the amnesty, of 1831, which allowed most other exiled rebels to
return home.
By timing their revolt to take place during the conclave, the rebels assured that the Cardinal Legates
residing in their provincial capitals.
threats by respected families

wo~ld

all be in Rome, and not

Well planned agitation and

successfully convinced the temporary

administrators that a general insurrection was about to take place.
Most of this pressure focused on Monsignor Nicola Parsciani-Clarelli,
substituting for Bernetti as the pro-legate of Bologna.

On February 4,

he authorized a committee of local leaders to maintain order, and
departed the following day.

This action ensured both a peaceful tran-

sition and a strong semi-legal appearance for the new committee, which
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quickly became a Provisional Government.

These leaders appealed to

other communes for support, raised the tricolor flag, and declared their
independence as the United Provinces of Italy.

49

The 1831 Provisional

Government quickly and peacefully changed the controlling hand of the
government without loosening its grip.

Their only dramatic act came on

February 8, when they declared that the Temporal Power of the Popes was
abolished forever in the northern provinces.

In spite of their rela-

tively conservative position, most contemporaries saw few differences
between these rebels and any others.

In Metternich's Europe, even a

change in theory or principle could be considered an intolerable
threat.

50

The same leaders showed enough tactical skill to control the

mob, call a constitutent assembly, change the government and decree the
fall of the Temporal Power, all without spilling a single drop of
blood. 51
The pre-arranged movement was so successful that it spread as far
south as Senigallia by February 9, always by legal and peaceful means,
except at Forli' where a minor clash took place.
resistance.

There was no sanfedist

Troops and administrators either ran away or joined the

rebels, apparently because they felt only a weak attachment to Rome, or
because they saw more promise and talent in the Provisional Government.
The very weakness of any sentiment in favor of the central government
was a potent weapon which the rebels used to their advantage.
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Ancona garrison joined the rebels to a man, even though they had been
offered an honorable withdrawl to Rome.

It appeared that nearly every-

where, the governors, judges, officers and magistrates were supporting
the rebellion, or leading it.

52

But this was not in any sense a univer-

sal rising of the population; it was a very good example of how well a
handful of skillful leaders could organize and communicate among themselves and their towns.

53

Though artisans and peasants were not active in this initial
stage, they tended to go along with the new government in the hopes that
a more efficient. local administration might stimulate the economy and
bring them more and better jobs.

The rest of the Marches and the region

of Umbria joined the revolt within 15 days.

In addition to good coordi-

nation among municipal governments, a key factor in spreading the revolt
was the advance of a military column under General Sercognani, who led a
mixed force of some 3000 rebel troops and volunteers from Ancona toward
Rome.

They reached Rieti, on the edge of Lazio, where for the first

time a local force fired back at them.

Sercognani halted to wait for

support before continuing his march on Rome.

As none was forthcoming,

this advance through Umbria marks the high-water mark of this first
stage of the revolt.

Sercognani eventually decided to surrender to

Archbishop Mastai-Ferretti of Spoleto, the future Pius IX.
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The Austrians finally intervened when Gregory XVI asked for help.
Their army entered Bologna on March 21, and forced Ancona to surrender a
week later, despite a delaying action by rebel troops under the leadership of General Zucchi.
functory.

55

Resistance was generally light and almost per-

Once the rebellion seemed to be contained, the ambassadors

of the major powers issued their Memorandum of 1831.

Cardinal Bernetti

sensed the fundamental rivalry between French and Austrian policy, and
set out to play off one against the other.

He promised reform in good

time, but insisted that the powers "did not understand" the Church
interests which were his own priority.

In the meantime, he used French

support to help get Austrian troops withdrawn by mid-July.

56

Once the

Austrians were gone, the Legations promptly rebelled again.
This second revolt was not as peaceful as the first had been, but
the influence of the moderate leaders remained strong.

The Austrian

intervention and the belated activities of some sanfedist groups supported by Cardinal Albani had radicalized supporters of the Provisional
Government.

The result was scattered, if savage, factional fighting in

the Legations and elsewhere.

It is worth noting that nearly all cases

of political murders and other crimes, and warfare over social issues,
like land seizure, were confined to this second

~hase

of the revolt.

Bernetti was now determined to use force, but waited six months before
doing so.

He made minor adjustments in the command structure of the

army, as well as enough administrative and judicial reforms to placate
foreign opinion.

When the papal army finally advanced in January of
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lB32, their march northward was so undisciplined that atrocities and
civilian casualties were very high.

It required six hours to crush the

rebels near Cesena, despite a three-to-one superiority.

On January 28,

the Austrians again returned to Bologna to restore order; this time they
were welcome d as protectors. 57
The second Austrian intervention proved to be too provocative for
the new French government, which styled itself as defender of the Rights
of Man.

A month later, the French navy landed troops at Ancona to

counter what they considered Austrian encroachment.

(Both foreign con-

tingents would remain until 1838, when they were withdrawn by mutual
consent.)

The earliest French commanders, Combes and Galloy, were

republican in sentiment.

They won over local leaders by proclaiming

liberty for all and hostility to the papal government.

Since their own

forces were small and largely symbolic, they decided to enlist local
help to keep order.

They organized and armed a so-called "mobile col-

umn" of former soldiers and others who had fled the Austrians.
11

58

This

colonna mobile" was a secret organization composed largely of lower

class (sometimes criminal)

types, who had little organization or disci-

pline, but a great deal of hatred.

They took advantage of the temporary

power vacuum to set themselves up as a sort of special revolutionary
police force.

The result was five months of disorder and terror in

Ancona, until the French officers themselves were replaced.

59

Although

it was eventually disbanded, the mobile column destroyed the hitherto
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peaceful image of the revolutionary government, and associated revolution with terror-in the minds of many conservatives.

Among those asso-

ciated with this violence were Camillo Melani and Adamo Mancini, as well
as Matteo Costantini, who would figure in several murder trials after
the restoration of 1849. 60 The same period saw the first organization of
Young Italy in the Marches, among whose leaders was Lorenzo Lesti, a key
· thi's study. 61
person in
Behind his shield of foreign troops, Bernetti worked to improve
the notoriously poor quality of the papal armed forces.

He hired two

splendid Swiss regiments, recently in the service of Charles X of
France.

He also enlisted large numbers of native troops, until the

ular army numbered 13,500.

~eg-

In an effort to bolster these expensive pro-

fessionals, Bernetti authorized the formation of a body of auxiliary
troops called Pontifical Volunteers.

A closer look at the Volunteers is

in order, since they became an important counter-revolutionary force.
At the time of the Restoration, there had been several reactionary
bodies known collectively as "sanfedists" or

11

centurions. 11

They quickly

made their presence felt by clandestine violence against liberal leaders, and people they considered to be pro-French.

Although dangerous to

real or perceived enemies immediately after 1815,. these groups rapidly
lost strength because of their weak organizational structure, the superficiality of their doctrine, and their reliance on spontaneous anger as
motivation.

Their descendents, the Volunteers, were more disciplined,

and far more formidable for that reason.
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Bernetti knew he was taking a

35
political gamble, but allowed Giovanni Battista Bartolazzi to organize
government sympathizers into paramilitary militia units.

Large numbers

eventually enlisted to help put down the rebellion and prevent further
outbreaks.
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The first unit of Volunteers was raised in the province of

Fermo toward the end of 1831 to assist Cardinal Albani's troops in suppressing the second revolt.

By some accounts, there were presently

about 50, 000 of them under 30 distinct commands. 6 3 Most recruits were
men from peasant stock or villages known for their loyalty to the Pope.
Some of these tended to blame the slightly more prosperous townsmen for
their own poverty and unemployment, and took out their hostilities on
them accordingly.

Volunteers received no pay, but were exempt from cer-

tain municipal taxes and allowed to bear arms.

Many of these militiamen

were badly disciplined and widely hated for the murders and other crimes
which took place once they began to view their political opponents as
criminals with no rights.

Pitched battles were recorded in places where

most townsmen were liberals and many peasants living nearby were Volunteers.

Faenza, for example, was strongly liberal, while the Borgo, or

sub-town, of Urbecco was a Volunteer stronghold.

There alone, those

killed and wounded in sectarian violence numbered several hundred within
just a few years.
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The danger of setting one.part of the population

against another was obvious to the better administrators.

As early as

July of 1832, provincial authorities in the Marches expressed serious
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doubts about the value or desirability of such units.

The stern Cardi-

nal Spinola saw value in their use as a sort of rural guard for the
Legations, but only if there was no expense to the central government.
Sebregondi, the Austrian advisor, did not like the idea of leaving law
enforcement in the hands of non-professionals.

He eventually prevailed

on Bernetti to increase their accountability by forcing them to wear
black uniforms and demanding a visible command structure.

65

So bitter were feelings against the militia, that Mazzini's directives make special mention of them.

In the series of revolts planned

for 1833-4, Society members were told to "attack and kill all known centurians and enemies of the Federation, 11 to burn their houses, take government representatives into custody, and disarm military posts. 66
Before Bernetti tightened their discipline, the Volunteers exhibited characteristics of both secret societies and auxiliaries.

Although

genuinely secret, they took an oath and had a paramilitary structure.
From 1833 until their disbanding in 1847, they were a true auxiliary
force, with their uniforms and recognized duties.

By the time they were

disbanded, they had reached a strength of 75,000 in the Legations and
the Marches.

In spite of their numbers, the Volunteers received very

little help from Rome ... and very little control.

Both Consalvi and Met-

ternich had opposed the formation of such groups as costly, dangerous,
and largely useless.

More importantly, they both recognized that to

65

Emilia Morelli, La politica estera di Tommaso Bernetti, Segretario
di Stato di Gregorio XVI.
(Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura,
1953)' pp. 149-51.
66

Hales, Mazzini, pp. 98f.

37
link force to policy was to admit the failure of that same policy. 67 For
the purposes of the present study, Pontifical Volunteers were especially
significant because of the large amount of violence which was directed
against them, or provoked by them.
Plots of

early 1840's

After more than a decade of Gregory XVI's inert regime, there were several attempted revolts in short succession.

Most of these seemed to be

motivated by the same combination of factors seen in 1831, but now with
greater participation of Mazzinians.

Since these revolts were not

broadly based or even widely known among the population at large, the
police were somewhat justified in their assumption that the plotters and
revolutionary societies themselves were the reasons for the continued
unrest.

Yet there seemed to be no end to the willingness to challange

the government on the part of citizens, especially in the Legations.
One such plot had been uncovered in the planning stages in 1836;
Tomasso Galletti and Camillo Melani were exiled to Brazil with several
other leaders. 68 Of much greater importance, in the Papal States and
elsewhere, were the better planned revolts organized by Mazzini's followers:

Calabria (1839), Aquila (1841), Savigno (1843), the Bandiera

expedition (1844), and Rimini (1845).

Mazzini had added the feature of

using a sort of "foreign legion" of exiles to support iocal revolutionary leadership.
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Thus the papal police often arrested conspirators from
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other states during local rebellions, and revolts in the Kingdom of the
Two Sicilies were followed by charges against papal subjects like
Achille Paggi, Nicola Marchetti and Antonio Gianelli (1843), and Carlo
Osmani (Bandiera group, 1844). 70 Mazzini also made efforts to maintain a
liaison with respected moderate leaders, such as Mamiani and Farini, as
well as with organizations not under his control, like that of Galletti
and Biancoli in Bologna.

71

The Muratori revolt at Savigno near the Modenese frontier (1843)
was only one example of this sort of combined effort.
were to take
ans.

pla~e

Several uprisings

simultaneously to confuse the police and the Austri-

But efficient work by Cardinal Spinola and the police identified

many of the planners before they were ready tu act.

Spies and agents

had little trouble learning the general plan, especially since many conspirators assumed that everyone favored their cause, and talked freely
of their plans.

Police raids forced the few surviving leaders to commit

themselves when their chances of success had dropped to nearly zero.

As

early as July 31, the humane Legate of Ravenna, Cardinal Amat, contacted
three local suspects, Count Francesco Lovatelli, Count Tullo Rasponi,
and Luigi Carlo Farini, in an attempt to head off trouble.

He offered

them passports and protection if they would simply leave the country and
forget the coming revolution.

Subsequent events would demonstrate that

his trust had been well placed.
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at savigno, in the Samoggia valley, was led by Pasquale and Saverio
Muratori.

Their attempt of August 14 was a disaster because their prom-

ised support had either been defeated, or exposed and scattered.

Within

a week's time, the police were circulating notices which promised
rewards of 300 scudi to whoever arrested the Muratori brothers or any of
their fellow leaders: Gaetano Turri, Pietro Pietramellara, Oreste Biancoli, Sebastiano Tanara or several others, all of whom were young
nobles, landowners and professionals.
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A larger but even more hopeless attempt was made on September 8-9.
Vincenzo Caldesi and other local leaders assembled a body of 200 armed
rebels at Bologna.

They were reviewed in broad daylight by Colonel

Ignazio Ribotti and a cadre of officers irom the Spanish army who had
arrived by way of Livorno.

Their objective was to march toward Imola

and capture three popular cardinals meeting at a villa at Tarrano
nearby, and hold them as hostages until their demands were met.
movement of so many armed men was·too big to keep secret.

But the

The cardinals

(including Amat and Mastai-Feretti) heard of the attempt and escaped
easily.

When the rebels learned that they no longer had a reason to

march, they broke up and melted back into the countryside.
ever captured.

Only 30 were
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These events gave the most reactionary elements in the government
an excuse to crack down hard.

They resorted to using special commis-

sions of inquiry, with powers to try and condemn political suspects by
completely bypassing the regular court system.
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Whatever rebels could be
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identified were tried by an Extraordinary Military Commission which had
been given these special powers in May to deal with the rebellion.

They

handed down three distinct judgements in 1844: one against the Imola
group (January 22), another against the Muratori band (March 11) and one
as a follow-up to both (June 26).
ing 20 condemnations to death.

Draconian sentences followed, includ-

Most of these sentences were commuted to

prison terms, but 7 rebels were actually executed.
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mission1s judgements were always harsh, summary,

and not subject to

appeal, except to the Pope himself.

The Military Com-

Even within governmental circles,

many administrators felt these special commissions were much too severe,
insofar as they were turning otherwise harmless people into implacable
foes.

Cardinal Amat had already helped some of the accused escape;

Cardinal Gizzi, Legate of Forli', refused to accept the jurisdiction of
the Commission at all in his province.
over unfairly harsh treatment.
any of it.

Still others protested to Rome

But very little good seemed to come from

At Easter, 1844, two Volunteers were killed in Rimini.

The

Commission arrested seventy men for the crime, executed two of them, and
sentenced all but one of the others to long terms in prison.

Fifty-two

of these condemned were artisans, probably just bystanders to the actual
murders.
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Since it was at Rimini that local passions were inflamed, it was
also there that a much larger attempt at revolution followed in short
order.

Simultaneous risings were planned for Cesena, Faenza and Forli',

as well as Rimini.

Large numbers of armed citizens would seize the pub-
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lie buildings, as well as police and military posts.

Great care was

taken to co-ordinate the movements at least as well as in 1831.
chief local planner was Pietro Renzi.

The

He had been in contact with the

exile community in France, specifically Livia Zambeccari, and such other
1843 veterans as Oreste Biancoli and Gaetano Bottrigari.

Renzi was

informed that three groups were ready to march to support him once the
signal was given:

one between Poretta and Vergatto, another at Bagnaca-

vallo, led by Pietro Beltrami, and the third at le Balze, near Faenza,
commanded by Count Raffaele Pasi.

Each of these columns would advance

in the direction of Rimini, gathering strength and disrupting the local
police forces along their way.
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At the same time, a carefully worded appeal to the major powers of
Europe would be published.

This so-called Manifesto of Rimini was

largely Farini's work, although he had collaboration from several others, like Giuseppe Montanelli.

Farini eloquently listed a program of

twelve .reforms, largely political, which the rebels considered essential
to the good government of their state.

Many of these had already been

proposed in Consalvi's time (but never implemented), or listed in the
Memorandum of 1831:

modern legal codes, municipal and provincial coun-

cils, opening offices to laymen, a free press, a civic guard, and a general amnesty for all political offenders. The demands and the tone of
the Manifesto were extremely moderate, intended to attract broad support
both inside and outside the Papal States.
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It was similar in many ways

to a supporting proposal issued by the Piedmontese noble Massimo D'Azeg-
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.
110.

He suggested a uniform military system throughout Italy, reformed

legal codes, liberalized press laws, railroads, a customs league, a common organization of studies, and government based on elected communal
. . 1 counc1. 1s.
and prov1nc1a

7 9

Although i t had been carefully planned beforehand, the Rimini
incident began prematurely.

Once again, the police were aware of the

plot because of the large numbers involved.

The police jailed two

suspected leaders, Giuseppe Galletti in Bologna and Mattia Montecchi in
Rome.

The Military Commission then deployed large numbers of agents and

Volunteers to raid the houses of suspects, in order to provoke an uprising before it had a chance to succeed.
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The actual rebellion grew out

of what may have been a spontaneous clasi1 between young people and carabinieri at a football game.

It is still uncertain how many people

anticipated a fight, but quite a few had brought weapons with them.

One

reason that feelings were especially strong was that the condemnations
of the Military Commission had just been handed down on September 10;
most of the 67 men sentenced were from the Rimini area.
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On September 23, an armed band attacked carabinieri and volunteers
at the entrance to the football field in Rimini.

Several officers

received gunshot or stab wounds, but held their positions.

In another

clash, a volunteer received a chest wound from which he died the next
day.

Two Swiss were attacked by a mob which killed one and wounded the

other.
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Montale, p. 33.
Farini, I, 113.
Zama, Rivolta, pp.117f.

43

the San Francisco barracks, where they captured a substantial number of
weapons.

A large number of the troops joined their ranks - those who

did not were locked in the Rocca after the other prisoners were
released.

Renzi declared himself head of a reform government, but was

unable to actually rule the city.

His regime collapsed after two

days. 8 2 The other supporting forces were even less successful.

The

bands at Bagnacavallo and le Balze gained control of local government
installations, but were easily disbanded before most ordinary citizens
knew there had even been a·revolt.

For all the high sounding rhetoric

of the Manifesto, the actual rebels seemed unable to gain the slightest
success against Gregory XVI's government.
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Although it seemed that both the Memorandum oi 1831 and the Manifesto of Rimini had gone largely unheeded by the government, both would
eventually provide the basis for the reforms later attempted by Pius IX.
What was quite certain, on the other hand, was that hundreds of men now
found themselves exiled from their state or imprisoned within it.

Many

of these were natural leaders who might profit from another opportunity,
but Gregory XVI and his government had to pass from the scene before any
such thing would be possible.
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CHAPTER II

THE AMNESTY OF 1846
The election of Pius IX (Giovanni Mastai-Ferretti) signalled a dramatic
change of political course.

Unfortunately, the sharpness of the con-

trast between Gregory and Pius led some contemporaries to assume that
the change was even more dramatic than it actually was.
humane conservative, and remained such.

Pius began· as a

But he was no "liberal pope,"

and never had any intention of becoming one.

Although his charm, good

will, and genuine charity toward his political foes might have obscured
this basic truth, they could not change it.

It may be impossible to pin

down the "political philosophy" of the new Pope.

He probably never

developed one, except for a few vague ideas or plans prior to 1846.
Once elected, he had to learn a hard lesson: that a head of state,
engaged in governmental politics and day-to-day decisions, must often
put aside his

11

philosophy 11 and watch it turn into something else.

For

Pius IX, perhaps the best description of his political journey would be
a series of "attitudes, 11 rather than objectives or goals.

He evolved

from an attitude of paternal charity, through one of self-doubt and confusion, and into one of discouragement and bitterness.
Our most specific insight to his early ideas and hopes for papal
government can be found in a short treatise which he wrote nearly a year
before his election.

This work, entitled Thoughts on the Public Admin-

istration of the State, is a rather disjointed essay written in Septem-

44
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ber of 1845.

It probably was not written for publication, and may or

may not have been inspired by the Manifesto of Rimini, although it
clearly had much in common with that document.

1

It was simply a list of

58 items, in random order, each of which leads into a brief discussion
of what the author would like to change about the administration.

He

spoke of what means might be used to encourage education, industry, jobs
for young people, better officials and policemen, rooting out corruption, and making better use of the nobility in high positions.

Through-

out the work, he frequently appealed to virtue and good will.

Essen-

tially, it is not a true political program or philosophy, but rather a
charitable and humane discussion of how to make the existing institutions work better.

The changes he envisioned in the mechanism of gov-

ernment were largely cosmetic.

He took it for granted that clerical

government would continue, that lay participation in the administration
would never be allowed to influence church policy, and that the clergy
should retain their elite status' in both social and political sectors.
Far from being the revolutionary leader he would later be considered by
some, he was fully committed to keeping the Papal States stable and harmonious. · Although he liked the idea of making his state a showcase of
good government, he never seriously accepted the thought that his subjects might challenge his sovereign rights.
11

In effect, his entire

political philosophy," as reflected in this essay, boils down to no

more than maintaining the status quo, but doing so with a sense of
decency. 2

1

Giovanni Soranzo, "'Pensieri relativi all'Amministrazione Pubblica
dello Stato, 1845' del futuro Pio IX," Aevum (1953), XXVII, 23.

46

Genesis of the Amnesty
One pivotal suggestion in the future Pope's essay was the need for some
dramatic act of clemency.

In the Papal States, as elsewhere in Italy,

granting an amnesty was solidly embedded in tradition.

A new sovereign

frequently granted pardons or paroles to the rivals of his predecessor
to give a fresh and benevolent look to his own regime.

In his Thoughts

of. September 1845, Pius specifically pointed out the need for

11
•••

a

generous pardon for political offenders, since the multiplication of
exiles also multiplies those who are plotting revolutions. n

With this

objective in view, the new pope appointed a transitional committee of
six cardinals to study several issues.

Their agenda included railroad

construction, the reorganization of the Secretariat of State, and how
best to reconcile an amnesty with public order.

The six nominees were

two former Secretaries of State, Bernetti and Lambruschini, together
with Macchi, Mattei, Gizzi and Amat, these last two being popularly considered the leading "liberals" among the sacred college.

For the pro-

ceedings of this committee, we are indebted to its secretary, the young
monsignor Giovanni Gorboli-Bussi, a close friend and confidant of the
Pope, and one of the few genuine liberal thinkers. in the new government
circle.

A study of Gorboli-Bussi's transcript gives us a detailed look

at the way in which the amnesty was organized and implemented.

More

importantly, it explodes some of the myths about the same amnesty.

3

2
3

Soranzo, Aevum pp.40-6.

Giacomo Martina, S.J.,
IX (1846-1850), (Roma: Editrice Pontificia Universita' Gregoriana, 1974), pp. 95-7. It is curious that Candeloro (II, 419) makes Gorboli-Bussi and the police chief, Monsignor Mar~
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The committee held three sessions before the amnesty was published.

Each member was encouraged to state his views freely and defend

his recommendations, which would then be used by Pius in reaching his
final decision.

Although no cardinal is identified by name in the tran-

script, it is relatively simple to trace the advice favoring a rather
"minimal" pardon to Lambruschini, occasionally seconded by Bernetti, but
opposed by everyone else in most cases.

Nevertheless, the exchange of

views was surprisingly frank and open.

The cardinals took their task

seriously and largely succeeded in reaching a balanced consensus. 4
During the.first session (July 1), everyone agreed that some act
of clemency was in order, especially to reduce the hatred which many
people felt toward their government.

Huge numbers of citizens had

signed petitions to the Pope requesting mercy for condemned prisoners,
especially those from the provinces of Ancona and the Romagna.

The car-

dinals found it easy to agree that this might be the ideal moment for a
conciliatory gesture. 5
There was, however, considerable disagreement about how it might
best be done.

Lambruschini observed that there was an inherent danger

in publishing any sweeping amnesty which might appear to be an official
condemnation of the previous government.

In addition, he pointed out

the disruptive effects of releasing genuinely dangerous people under any

ini, members of the commission, and ignores Cardinals Macchi and Mattei.
If this had been the actual membership, the meetings would probably have
been sharply polarized and reached agreement only with great difficulty.
4

~
5

Pietro Pirri, "L'Amnistia di Pio IX nei documenti ufficiali," Rividi Storia
lla Chiesa in
(1954), VIII, 214f.
Pirri, "Amnistia," pp. 207-10.
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circumstances, but especially if the release left the impression that
there was really nothing morally wrong with political machinations.

He

suggested that the pardon should not be sudden but gradual, that it be
granted on a strictly case-by-case basis, and then only after consul tation with other Italian states.

It is easy to understand why Lambrus-

chini felt that those in prison should stay locked up, since most of
them had been put there during his tenure as secretary of state.

In

short, he believed that a general pardon would be counterproductive,
since it would do more to undermine public order than to preserve it. 6
Another matter raised at this first session was the future behavior of those pardoned.

There was general consensus that good conduct in

the future was a legitimate condition of the amnesty.
gestions followed.

A variety of sug-

For example, the former offenders could have their

political rights restricted, or local governments might accept responsibility for them, or they could be placed under close supervision by the
police, or they should be forced to post cash bonds or mortgages on
their property to assure their loyalty.
out as too severe.

But these conditions were ruled

The cardinals came to see that such measures

appeared petty rather than generous, while still providing no concrete
guarantees in return.

They were also realistic enough to know that the

inefficient police force could never monitor so many people.

The only

suggestion left was that prisoners and exiles be required to give their
word of honor to be loyal citizens from now on.
appreciated the very large risk they were taking:

All of the cardinals
the security of such

an arrangement was minimal since it depended heavily on good will and

6

Reinerman, "Reform," p.545.
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vague hopes.

Yet this alternative had the one great advantage of seem-

ing far more generous and trusting than any of the other conditions.
Several cardinals agreed that distinctions were in order.

7

It was

appropriate, for example, that ordinary political offenders not be dealt
with in the same way as violent criminals.

And since greater loyalty

was expected of clerics, soldiers and government employees, these might
not be automatically treated as generously as the others. 8 Cardinal Macchi spoke in favor of a more generous amnesty than Lambruschini wanted,
excluding only policemen and military.
Mattei, also

in~isted

Two others, probably Gizzi and

that the pardon should be a general one, and

granted all at once, if Pius were to begin his reign with a strongly
conciliatory gesture. Lambruschini realized that he had not convinced
anyone to favor a gradual amnesty, but was well supported in his contention that the broadness of the act of clemency might be difficult to
reconcile with public order. 9 This issue of distinctions was left undecided, however, pending more specific information on individual cases.
Finally, it was suggested as an afterthought that more severe penalties would be in order for any relapses which might occur.
nothing was decided.

But again,

By now, most of the cardinals felt that they were

discussing a subject which required more specific information before
they could proceed.

As a preparation for the next session, they agreed

to ask Monsignor Marini, director general of police, to provide them
with lists of political offenders already condemned, those still on

1

Pirri, "Amnistia," pp. 216f.

8
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9
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trial, and those in exile both by their own will and by reason of a
judicial decree.

Each of these listings should also provide enough

information to distinguish real criminals from the rest and to identify
which were ecclesiastics, military and employees of the state.

With all

these considerations in mind, and nothing firmly decided, the first session came to an end.

10

Corboli-Bussi 1 s transcript of this meeting effectively kills the
appealing fable of Pius and the black beans, which has even been perpetuated by some of the better historians, like Farini, Spellanzon and Salvatorelli.

When asked

wh~ther

or not an amnesty was prudent - so the

story goes - the cardinals voted by placing black or white beans in a
dish.

Five out of six supposedly voted "no," with only Gizzi in favor.

Already knowing what he wanted, Pius then covered the dish with his
white skull cap, saying "Brothers, aren't they all white?"
cuteness, the story has no basis in fact.

Despite its

The transcript shows clearly

that Pius asked for advice not on "whether" to grant an amnesty, but
only "how."

Furthermore, each of the cardinals favored some form of

mercy, and their advice was distilled from prolonged discussions, with
each of them able to speak and react to others.

Finally, the device of

voting secretly with colored beans was not even used by the curia at
that time.

11

The cardinals' preparatory commission held its second meeting on
July 8.

The agenda had been drawn up assuming that the information

already requested from the police would be on hand.

10

Pirri,

11

Amnistia, 11 pp. 210-7.

11
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11

Amnistia, 11 pp. 213f.

But instead of com-

51
plete lists of prisoners, exiles and those still on trial, Monsignor
Marini sent a letter.

He regretted that he was unable to supply such a

list, due to insoluble bureaucratic difficulties and confusion over
authority.

In particular, he had no information whatever about trials

in progress, since the courts had never shared this data with him.

Of

the four processes then under way, the Consulta could supply information
on two, but the other two were still in the local courts at Ancona and
Farro.

The rest of the names were available to the police, but would

simply take a while longer to assemble in a format useful to the commission.

12

In the

m~anwhile,

he proposed a simpler solution to the problem

of distinctions, based on suggestions which Metternich had sent to Rome.
Austria had granted amnesties in 1838 and 1845, and the proposals were
the results of their experience:

dismiss all political trials in pro-

cess, commute life sentences to ten years, free all other prisoners, and
examine the conditions of the exiles on an individual basis.

The cardi-

nals decided, however, that thes'e criteria were too vague and general;
they also recalled that the Austrian pardon had not worked very well.
They repeated the request that Marini provided the essential information
as soon as possible, and returned to their deliberations as best they
could without it.

13

They agreed to exclude officers, clerics and government employees,
as well as common criminals, and to require a declaration of loyalty
instead of an oath.

They also decided that the announcement would take

the form of an address of the Pope to his subjects, according to a for-

12
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mula to be composed by Corboli-Bussi.

In an effort to maintain morale

within the ranks of the police and the army, the cardinals accepted Lambruschini 1 s suggestion to announce the amnesty only after rewards were
given to those soldiers who put down the revolt of 1845, and the members
of the political commissions had received official thanks from the government.

Following this disappointingly short discussion, the commis-

sion listed a number of items for future sessions, including measures to
reform the court system, the bureaucracy, the police and the military.
All voiced their agreement· that the matter of the amnesty had to be
dealt with first, and on that note they adjourned their meeting.
The third and final session of the cardinals'
place on July 15.
decided.

14

commission took

Most issues relating to the amnesty had already been

Only two items remained on the agenda: consideration of Mari-

ni' s information, and the final approval of the text, which had been
fairly well decided without the police file after all.

15

Whatever its

potential flaws, the amnesty had to be published without further delay
if it were to have any value as a good will gesture.

And so it was.

The final version of the amnesty was dated July 16 and actually
appeared on the evening of July 17.

The reaction on the part of ordi-

nary citizens was explosive and immediate.

Crowds. converged on the Qui-

rinal within hours to cheer the Pope, and hail what many hoped would be
the beginning of a new age.

Both the conditions set down by the cardi-

nals' commission and Corboli-Bussi's careful phrasing had their effect;
the acts of clemency were generous and obviously conciliatory.

14
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beyond the mere words of the proclamation were the overtones and the
symbolic value that accompanied it.

That very image of lavish generos-

ity and the joyous reaction to it had the effect of making the new pope
into a hero larger than life.
overnight into a

11

Simply stated, Pius appeared to turn

liberal pope" and savior of Italy merely because so

many of his subjects had a need to believe that he was those things.

16

The text of the proclamation includes not only the conditions of
the amnesty, but the motives for it.

This version was translated by

William E. Gladstone.
Pius IX - To his most faithful subjects, Health and Apostolic benediction.
During the days when the public rejoicing on our exaltation to
the Pontificate touched Us to the depth of our heart, We could not
restrain an emotion of grief, while reflecting that not a few families among our subjects were kept back from sharing the general joy,
because, in the loss of their domestic consolations, they were made
to bear a great portion of the judgement, which only some one member
of the family had deserved, by offences against the order of society, or the lawful rights of the Sovereign. We furthermore turn a
pitying eye upon the numbers of inexperienced youths, who, although
drawn by alluring flatteries into the vortex of political disorders,
yet appeared to us less as seducers than seduced. On which account,
from that time forward, We have been considering whether to stretch
out our hand, and to tender peace of mind, to those of our erring
children who might be disposed to give evidence of their sincere
repentance. The affection that our good subjects have shown toward
Us, and the incessant tokens of veneration that the Holy See has, in
our Person, received from them, have now pursuaded Us, that We may
pardori them without danger to the public at large. We accordingly
determine and command, that the opening of.our Pontificate be signalised by the following acts of sovereign clemency:
I. To all our subjects now actually in a place of punishment
for political offences, We remit the remainder of their sentences,
provided they make in writing a solemn declaration that they will
never, in any manner, abuse this favor, but that they desire faithfully to fulfill all the duties of good subjects.
II. Upon the same condition, all our subjects who have quitted our dominions for political reasons may return to them, provided
that they shall make known in a proper decree, and through the

16
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Apostolic Nuncios, their desire to avail themselves of this act of
our clemency.
III. We, in like manner, discharge those who, on account of
having taken part in any machination against the state, are either
bound by precetti
, or declared incapable of municipal
office.
IV. It is our intention that all criminal proceedings for
offences purely political, which have not yet been completed by a
formal judgement, shall abate and determine; and that the parties
under charge be set free, unless any among them should ask for the
continuation of the trial, in the hope of making his innocence
clear, and recovering his rights accordingly
V. It is not, however, our intention to comprise within the
provisions of the foregoing articles that very small number of
ecclesiastics, military officers, and civil servants who have been
sentenced, or have fled, or are under process, for political
offences. In regard to these, We reserve it to ourselves to take
other measures, as the examination of their respective cases may
show it to be advisable.
VI. Neither, in like manner, is it our will that in this
indulgence should be included ordinary crimes, with which political
culprits, refugees, or prisoners on trial may be further charged;
as, in regard to these, We intend that the existing laws shall have
full effect.
We would willingly trust that those, who shall avail themselves of our mercy, will know at all times how to respect both our
rights and their own honor. We moreover hope that, with minds softened by our pardon, they will be ready to lay down those intestine
resentments, which are always related, either as cause or as effect,
to political passions; so that all the children of a common Father
may be truly reunited in that bond of peace, in which it is the will
of God that they should be mutually joined. But should our hopes in
any degree be frustrated, We shall then, with whatever bitterness of
pain to ourselves, constantly recollect, that if mercy be the most
pleasurable attribute of sovereignty, justice is its first duty.
Given in Rome, at S. Maria Maggiore, on the 16th of July,
1846, in the first year of our Pontificate.
Pius PP IX. 17
The conditions were presented simply and.directly.

First of all,

the amnesty applied only to political offenses; no one could receive it
if he were in prison or exile for some civil crime.

For example, if a

person had been condemned by a Special Commission for taking up arms
against the police, he could benefit from the amnesty.

But if a police-

man had been shot at the time, and there was a possibility that he might

17
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have done it, then he could be excluded until the matter was cleared up.
A second condition denied the amnesty to clerics, soldiers and government employees, since greater loyalty had been expected of them.

But

even in this severe circumstance, the door was left ajar for a possible
review of individual cases.

A third condition demanded that each appli-

cant had to sign a printed declaration of loyalty, promising to abide by
the conditions of good citizenship in the future.

This formality was a

small enough price to pay for a·second chance, yet it was considered
legally binding by the courts.

Later on, it would be used as the basis

for more severe charges and sentences against those who violated their
word.
Even at the start, a few exiles resented this declaration as a
sign of bad faith on the part of Pius, and an indicator of his lack of
real trust in them.
in some exiles.

This question of the declaration provoked concern

Luigi Carlo Farini wrote to Bertini (August 2, 1846):

.... it seems to me that the condition is honorable enough, since by
requiring one to carry out the duties of a good subject, it does not
mean that he must renounce his own principles. The good subject of
a prince is one who tells him the truth, who advises him to do what
is good, and who wants him free of foreign dependence. One of two
conditions exists: either the Government intends it this way, and
everyone can sign in good conscience; or the Government is making
mental restrictions, and thus breaks the agreement and absolves the
individual from his word of honor. 18
Farini followed his own advice and signed the declaration on the next
day.

19

Most others signed the declaration without much thought, espe-

cially the prisoners.

Some exiles reflected on whether or not they

really wanted to sign such a document.

A few, like Count Carlo Pepoli,

18
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Terenzio Mamiani and Filippo Canuti insisted in composing personal formulas of their own, and were relieved to have them accepted.
three returned home only after some delay.

These

Most other exiles either

signed in good faith, or evaded the matter altogether.

20

The thought that former rebels against the state were now being
asked for their word of honor helped to make an otherwise routine measure look radical and dramatic.

21

Furthermore, the conciliatory message

which accompanied the amnesty implied that those who would benefit from
it were "victims" of youth and inexperience.

Henceforth, they would be

considered as partners of the new government, and not foes.

But the

conditions and the objectives of that partnership were never spelled
out, leaving a great deal to chance, or worse, to conflicting interpretations.

22

Even at this early stage, significant numbers of conservatives
viewed the amnesty as an affront to justice and a dangerous sign of
weakness. 23 Some said that Pius hoped to disarm potential revolutionaries with kindness because he preferred not to confront them.
allegation is difficult to demonstrate.

Such an

But as things actually turned

out, the dealings between Pope and Revolution were never very successful
for either party. 24
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One conservative with an obvious interest in Roman stability was
Klemens van Metternich.

In a letter to the new Pope, he advised him to

remember that an amnesty was not, and should not be, a statement of
innocence, but a pardon for an actual crime.

He also advised Pius to

maintain a clear distinction in his own mind between acts of "government 11 (policy originating with him as sovereign) and acts of

11

adminis-

tration" (more routine matters which could be delegated to ministers).
Finally, the Austrian chancellor added a caution against dangerous "concessions, 11 which gave up essential sovereign rights;

these should not

be confused with. exercising justice and prudence, which were a ruler's
duties, and could not in any way be considered options. 25
One contemporary author estimated that at the moment of the
amnesty, there were about 1250 individuals who might benefit, including
247 political prisoners already condemned, 303 others whose cases were
in process, and about 700 exiles.

224 prisoners were released immedi-

ately, including 19 from the Castel Sant' Angelo, 7 from the Carceri
Nuovi, 129 from Civita Castellana, 5 from San Leo, and 30 from Civitavecchia. 26 According to a list printed by the government in 1849, 894
persons eventually received the amnesty, but only 564 of these signed
the declaration.

27

A much more recent work goes so far as to say that

perhaps 2000 revolutionary leaders were allowed to live freely in the
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Papal States. 28 This number looks ·absurdly large, unless he intends to
include huge numbers of people never arrested or charged with anything,
and thus never pardoned.
One immediate result of the amnesty was increased optimism among
liberals, who became bolder in suggesting improvements for state and
society.

Throughout the remainder of 1846, a seemingly endless series

of rallies, torchlight processions and banquets honored Pius IX as the
harbinger of a new age.

Former prisoners and exiles were feted as the

heroes of the day, and lauded for their sufferings for the cause of liberty and steadfastness against the "Gregorian" regime. 2 9 On the other
hand, those who.had been partisans of the former regime became discouraged and increasingly pessimistic about the future.

The names of Greg-

ory and Pius became symbols for the two factions, something which disturbed the Pope greatly.

He had announced the amnesty and the more

progressive policy because he wanted an era of reconciliation and harmony, not merely another round of fratricide.
efforts, Lambruschini and the

11

But in spite of his best

Gregorians 11 seemed to be utterly discred-

ited and quite bitter against Pius for upsetting the society which they
had so carefully crafted.
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The Process

Amnesty

While the festivities continued in Rome and elsewhere, the cumbersome
machinery of Roman government began to process the actual beneficiaries
of the amnesty.

For obvious reasons, putting the prisoners at liberty

was much easier than clearing the exiles to return home.

According to

the custom of the time, prison officials had most of the significant
records for prisoners under their care.
his records went with along with him.

Whenever a prisoner was moved,
So in many cases, a prison warden

had not only the authority, but also the information to decide who qualified for release under the terms of the July 16 document.

Since no

further consultation or permission was required, many wardens released
prisoners the same day on their own authority.

While this was obviously

a great boon to the prisoners in question, it has made documentation of
their release more difficult.

Little or no paperwork was required for

ordinary cases, so little has survived.

About a hundred cases were

doubtful enough to make some official send an inquiry to the Secretariat
of State, asking whether or not the terms applied to specific persons.
These special cases, together with their replies, are well documented
and present no problems whatever to a researcher.

The rest, including

some actual mistakes in releasing the wrong people, continue to make
study in this area difficult.
For those in exile, there were two different ways to initiate the
process.

The applicant could write directly to Rome, where the Secre-

tariat of State was charged with overall supervision of the amnesty.

Or

wherever it was more convenient, he could contact a Papal Nuncio through
an embassy or consulate of the Papal States in the country where he
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found himself.

There were many of these consulates in major cities,

especially in the Catholic countries of Europe.

Most of the day-to-day

paperwork of the amnesty process was done by Nuncios and their secretaries as they wrote back and forth in their regular packets of correspondence with Rome.

If an exile found himself in a country with no consu-

late, he could also contact the consulate of another state friendly to
Rome, such as France or Tuscany.

These delegations were accustomed to

handle papal affairs in states like Great Britain or the Ottoman Empire.
Once the application itself was received by the Secretariat of
State, a clerk wpuld contact the central office of police in Rome, or
the local police in the applicant's province or home town.

This check

was made to be certain that the exile was not charged with other crimes
which would make him ineligible for the amnesty.

As soon as the police

had cleared the applicant for readmission (or found prohibitive crimes,
if such was the case) the results were communicated to him directly, or
to the consulate representing him.

Finally, the Secretariat authorized

the release of a passport and travel visa to him, and alerted the frontier guards to let him pass.

Although most cases were handled quite

routinely through normal channels, a few presented special problems
which might require a legal judgement.

There cases were referred for a

final decision to the Consulta, as highest court of appeal in political
matters.

If the applicant signed the written declaration of loyalty as

a part of this process, it was also returned to the Secretariat of State
and filed.
Ideally, a complete ·file on one individual would include four elements:

the letter of request, the printed declaration, the police
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report, and the final permission to return.
files are incomplete.

Not surprisingly, most

Missing elements may simply have been lost, or

never existed in the first place.

A large number of printed declare-

tions are missing, not necessarily because someone refused to sign.

In

some cases, the consul probably never had the chance to place the paper
before the applicant for his signature.

Sometimes, an overeager exile

could complicate things by beginning to travel homeward while his case
was still being processed.

In

~

few cases, applicants are traced from

one consulate to another; one individual applied in Paris, for example,
then moved to Marseilles, Livorno and Florence before finally arriving
at Bologna.

Long after he was home, secretaries in these various consu-

lates continued writing frantic notes to one another, wondering why he
had disappeared.

Such confusion could wreak havoc with a bureaucracy

which was already inefficient and overworked.

There are also more than

a few cases of applicants simply turning up at home without benefit of
passport or valid authorization; the police and the customs guards were
no more efficient than the diplomats.
Profile of the Returnees
This study is based on a list of 989 specific names.
applied for the amnesty, and most received it.

Each one of them

Even among those who

were refused at first, many were later granted release from prison .or
permission to return from exile as a result of a change or clarification
of policy.

Still others simply returned home without permission, or

were released from prison against the wishes of the central government.
Most of these cases were processed and completed within a year of the
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proclamation of the amnesty, the stated deadline. 31 In each case, there
is reason to believe that the individual did have the opportunity to
return to his home and live a normal life.

What is more important is

that he also had the opportunity to return to political activity for or
against the government, if he chose to do so.
The master list includes 550 exiles, 433 prisoners, and 6 others
who are special cases.

These 6 are people who were physically at lib-

erty within the Papal States, but who had some curtailment of their
civil or political rights as a result of earlier political activity on
their part.

On the occasion of the amnesty, they applied for restora-

tion of their former condition, which usually included a government job
or pension.

In these cases, lost jobs were not regained automatically,

but all other civil and political rights were restored.

Although the 6

cases are numerically insignificant, they are still included here for
accuracy and honesty, and because they remind us that there were cases
which do not automatically fit irito larger categories.

32

31

A few cases were allowed to continue into early 1848, by way of
exception, since they had special features which required legal judgements, or in a few instances because of distance and slow communications
from such places as Brazil and Ceylon.
32

In the statistical lists which follow, as well as those in the
appendices, consistent abbreviations are used. The letter "x" always
refers to an exile, "p" to a prisoner, and 11 0" to one of the 6 special
cases. In the appendices, where parallel columns are used, the first
group of columns always refers to those included in the original amnesty
of 1846, the second group always indicates the sub-group of those who
were considered to have violated their pledge of loyalty and good conduct.
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Division by Place of Origin
Recipients of the amnesty include men from each of the four regions of
the Papal States, but very unevenly distributed.

Fortunately for this

project, nearly every name mentioned in the archival documents includes
a place of origin.

It was a common practice of the time to list both

the place of birth and the father's first name as a means of more accurate identification.

Division by Place of Origin
g_rouping

- -x/- -p/--o

Lazio

29

52

Umbria

11

17

Marches

73 107

Legations
-unspecified

423 232

5

1

Ferrara

89

Bologna

54 103

40

Ravenna

131

22

Forli'

148

67

2

3

"Others" (= unspecified, unknown or foreign)
TOTALS (989)

1

14

25

550 433

6

Please refer to Appendix A for a more complete breakdown by province or
town.

33

33

In several cases, there are multiple places of residence. As a
typical example, a man could be born in one area (usually in the countryside), but then move to another (usually a town) to live and work,·
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To those who read Italian history, it comes as no surprise that a
large number of revolutionaries in the Papal States originated in the
Legations of the northeast.

What may be surprising, however, is just

how large the percentage actually is:

fully two-thirds of the total.

Over half of the remaining third come from those two provinces in the
Marches (Urbino-Pesaro and Ancona) which were closest to the Legation of
Forli', indicating an unmistakable geographical pattern.

Ancona was the

more important of the Papal States' two major commercial ports, and was
always strongly influenced by whatever happened in the areas to the
north.

This compined zone represents 85% of all names in this study

with a specified place of origin.

The differences between the commer-

cial northeast and the lethargic, cleric-dominated capital are obvious.
By way of sharp contrast, mountainous Umbria accounts for only 29
names (3%).

While it is true that poverty sometimes stimulates revolu-

tion, there is no support here for economic want as a single and determining factor.

If poverty alone could explain people's disenchantment

with the government, them Umbria might have been the leading region, and
not the prosperous Legations.
The relatively low number for Lazio (81) reflected its obvious
economic link to Rome's food supply, the proximity of the principal
administrative offices, and sentimental ties to the Papacy.

Added to

these factors was a long standing and systematic policy of favoratism
for the capital.

Food prices were closely regulated, in most cases

even though he may have continued to refer to himself as coming from his
old patria. In this sort of situation, the place of residence at the
time of the alledged political offense is used for one simple~reason:
political influences on a potential revolutionary are more likely to
come from his immediate environment than his place of birth.
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keeping them artifially low.

34

Charitable organizations and institu-

tional help for the poor were always stronger in Rome than in the provinces.

It is worth remembering that Gregory XVI was cheered even in the

poor Trastevere quarter of Rome at the same time in 1831 that revolt was
flaming in the north.
Another distinction should also be made.

The typical revolution-

ary from Lazio was likely to be an intellectual, not an artisan.
Lazio, over half (49 out of 81) are from the city of Rome itself.

Within
Rome

accounted for a large perecentage of the educated people in Lazio, if
not the entire state.

A further breakdown of the Roman names shows

that, at least in this sample, many came from noble or other prosperous
families, rather than artisans or working class people.

Thus whatever

impetus to revolution there may have been in Lazio, it probably originated as a result of political discussion or study, rather than demographics.

It is no surprise that the country areas here, and indeed

everywhere except the Adriatic coast, were relatively peaceful.
Within the Legations region, it appears at first glance that the
statistics show a fairly even distribution of names among the four legations.

But a map of the contemporary boundaries (see Appendix E) shows

that the legations interlock at precisely the places where some of the
largest concentrations of names are found (e.g. Lugo, Russi, Faenza and
Forli 1 ) .

The more detailed breakdown in Appendix A shows that some of

these provinces contributed far more than others.

If one looks care-

fully at the map, an interesting pattern emerges: provinces along the
Via Emilia were quite significant.

34

This ancient Roman road was still

See the reference to the special courts in Chapter I, pp. 19f.
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the principal commercial artery of the area.

It ran northwestward from

Rimini on the coast through Bologna and beyond,

In all, it crossed 10

of the 45 provinces in the Legations: Rimini, Savignano, Cesena, Bertinoro, Forli

1

Faenza, Castel Bolognese,

,

Bologna itself.

Imola, Castel S. Pietro, and

Collectively, these provinces contributed 66% of the

revolutionaries in the Legations.
A similar pattern, also comprising ten provinces, can be drawn
within a 30 kilometer radius of the town of Mangari in the province of
Faenza.

Although Mangari itself produced none of the exiles and prison-

ers in this study, it provides a convenient geographical center for the
diagram.

In common with the

11

Via Emilia 11 pattern, this circle also

includes the provinces of Cesena, Bertinoro, Forl~', Faenza, and Castel
Bolognese, then adds the provinces of Fusignano,
Russi and Ravenna.

This

11

Lugo, Bagnacavallo,

Faenza circle" pattern, also representing 10.

provinces out of 45, claimed about 47% of the Legations' names.
Most interesting of all is the combination of both patterns, 15
provinces, looking somewhat like a sausage with a bulge in the middle.
This relatively small zone produced 584 names, 88.5% of all those from
the Legations, and over 60% of those from the entire state.

While it

would be foolish to attribute such a complex thing as revolutionary
motivation solely to geography,
ignore.

The

11

the geographical pattern is hard to

clustering 11 effect in these specific areas may very well

be due to such things as local leadership, peer pressure, cultural traditions of opposition to Rome, regional economic grievances, or the
organizational infrastructure of the Carbonari or Young Italy.

Whatever

factors were present in these provinces, they must have been local
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indeed.

Another third of the Legations' provinces, (15 out of 45) pro-

duced no names at all in this study.
One final observation is in order.

The statistics of this table

show that prisoners outnumber exiles in every region except the Legations, and specifically the coastal Legations of Ferrara, Ravenna and
Forli'.
double.

In these three areas, exiles outnumber prisoners by more than
35

In times of revolutionary turmoil, the question of who is cap-

tured by the police and who escapes to fight another day may very well
be decided by one's access to boats, or to some other means of escape.
There is probably a "maritime" factor at work here, which would explain
this lopsided statistic.

A glance at Appendix A also reveals that the

city of Ancona (a port) shows a similar imbalance of exiles over prisoners, whereas the rest of the Marches region does not.

A closer look at

these factors in a future study could shed more light on how exiles from
the northwest differed from all others.

3 5

The term "exile" in this study not only describes ex-prisoners
released to serve double time outside the country, but voluntary exiles
and those who have fled to escape prosecution as well.
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Division by Profession or Social Class
The categories already used (see page 4) reflect social divisions as
they were conceived at the time: six major socio-economic groupings, and
several minor ones.

Division by Profession
grouping

--x/--p/--o

Nobility

28

1

Gentry

36

16

Clergy

3

5

Urban Commoners

342 123

Bourgeois

69

19

2

Petty Bourgeois

87

19

3

157

58

29

27

Artisans
Unskilled
Peasantry
Military
Others

8

3

37

7

9

6

-unspecified

87 272

TOTALS (989)

550 433

1

5

6

Please refer to Appendix B for a more detailed breakdown of each
class.

36

36

These statistics, unlike those for the previous group, are

Lest there be any doubt, the term "gentry" refers to any individual who listed himself a "possidente," but had no noble title, and gave
no other profession. The very large number of untitled town-dwellers
(called "Urban Commoners" here) covers a vast spectrum of professions
and levels of wealth. This category has been subdivided according to·
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The large number of uunspecified 11 professions

obviously incomplete.

(over 1/3 of the total) leaves us with a much smaller base total with
which to work: 630.

The lion's share of those doubts are the fault of

the poor prison records, which will continue to leave many questions
unanswered.
To return briefly to a discussion in the previous section, please
note the imbalance between exiles and prisoners on this table as well.
Prisoners predominate only in the "unspecified" group. 17 However the
of exiles to prisoners is highest among the nobility, gentry and
uppermost

profes~ional

killed workers.

circles, while it is almost even among the uns-

We return to the question of who escaped and who was

captured after a failed revolt.

Among those who were able to flee, the

factors of wealth and influence may also be as important as access to
boats.
In comparison to their total share of the population, the numbers
of titled nobility and untitled gentry are quite high (30 and 52).

One

possible reason for it is the lack of opportunity in the predominantly
clerical administration for these otherwise talented and potentially
well-motivated people.

Another topic for a future study would be a com-

parison of the level of disillusionment among aristocrats in the Papal
States with those of Piedmont or Tuscany, for example.

the author's own system, which may hopefully reflect a more accurate
clustering by attitude. Any policemen or carabinieri who came to light
are listed as "military," according to their ranks.
37

There is one exception; the clergy, whose total is so small that
any statistical discussion would be foolish.
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Similar in proportion is the total of 44 for members of the military, usually trusted to remain loyal, even in times of trouble.
interesting that officers outnumber enlisted ranks 27 to 17.

It is

The Papal

states of the time, as everywhere else, drew its officers largely from
the upper classes of society.

Whatever motivation was operative among

the nobility, gentry and professional classes would probably be significant to the military officers as well.
By way of contrast, the numbers of clergy and peasants are so
small as to appear almost non-existent.

True, the percentage of clergy

is proportional to their numbers of society, but absolute loyalty was
expected of them in a clerical regime.

Even 8 might seem high.

other hand, the peasants were the largest single class.

On the

Most of them

had no easy life, but very few had attempted to redress their grievances
by revolutionary means.

Whatever else these figures might suggest, they

show that the sort of revolts which had taken place before 1846 had little appeal for people in the countryside.
The umbrella category of Urban Commoners provides 470 names,
three-quarters of the total known professions.

It is therefore easy to

demonstrate that the revolts of the 1830 1 s and 1840's were essentially
urban phenomena; a concentrated populus certainly facilitates political
mobilization.

The fairly broad range of professions also provides a

highly diversified spectrum of those who put down their tools to take up
arms against their sovereign.

Although the artisans as a group provide

nearly half the names in this subdivision, there does not appear to be
any one group which stands out.

We might assume that many of the tai-

lors, shoemakers or building tradesmen who are listed may have been

71
unemployed or underemployed, but there is no reason to point to a crisis
in any one sector of the economy.

If, indeed, there is an economic rea-

son for their discontent at all, it might be best found in the overall
stagnation of trade and production, and nowhere else.
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Division by Place of Exile or Imprisonment
once a former rebel had fled the country, he had to select a place to
live.

After a captured revolutionary was sentenced, he was assigned to

a prison.

The places where these men found themselves in mid 1846 pro-

vide an interesting mosaic.

Division by Place of Exile
grouping

--x/--p/--o

France

358

Italian States

75

Elsewhere in Europe

81

Asia

2

The Americas

13

-unspecified

21
Division by Place of Imprisonment

Lazio

125

Umbria

11

Marches

148

Legations

47

-unspecified

102

TOTALS (983)

550 433

Please consult Appendix C for a detailed subdivision of both categories.

3 8

38

Data for this table was relatively easy to obtain, especially for
the exiles ... the letters of request had to come from somewhere. On the
other hand, most of the data does not tell us much about revolutionary
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The most striking feature of the exiles' table is the 68% of all
exiles who fled to France.

Even if one discounts those who went to Cor-

sica or to Algeria (which may arguably be written off as "non-French"
areas) the total remains astoundingly high.

Part of the reason for the

attraction of France was probably the availability of employment in a
thriving country.

Some of the exiles were reluctant to leave these jobs

after 1846, although most still applied for the amnesty in the hopes of
visiting family and friends again.

Another practical consideration was

the small pension provided by the French government for any and all
political refugees.

This token help to expatriots was one way in which

King Louis Philippe and Francois Guizot gave lip service to the idea
that their government was "revolutionary, 11 with a possible eye toward
keeping their own potential troublemakers in line.

Whatever the rea-

sons, the tolerant attitude which the exiles found in France made large
numbers of them comfortable enough to stay.
Other places of exile tend to support the wish of most expatriots
to remain close to home.

Southern Europe and the Mediterranean were

clearly preferred to northern Europe, in spite of the possible lure of
jobs in these industrializing zones.

There is decent representation

among quite a large range of Mediterranean countries. If one takes the
statistics for Malta and the other islands, the Italian and Iberian
states, the surprisingly high number for Greece and the Ottoman Empire,
and adds these to the totals for Algeria, Corsica and the French costal

motivation, since those exiled or jailed had already done their deeds.
The one exception is what may come to light as a result of the next revolution (i.e. 1848-9), if those who participate tend to follow leaders
or fellows met in their jails or places of exile.
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cities, the result is a pan-Mediterranean total of 275, or half the
entire exile contingent.

Those living under the French crown had the

dual advantage of being close to home, and still collecting their pen. ns ... the
510

best of both worlds, so to speak.

One might suppose that other Italian states would receive most of
the exiles, but this does not take place.

Easy-going Tuscany is well

represented with about half the total for all of Italy, but compared to
the French groups, this is tiny.· All the Italian states together gave
shelter to only 75 refugee&.
Brief note might be made of the very small numbers of overseas
exiles.

Many of the police and prison records make mention of prisoners

who were released from jail to serve double their remaining sentences in
exile.

The most commonly stated country of exile is Brazil, and the

Papal government would frequently buy a ticket and escort the prisoner
to the ship to make sure he arrived there.

But apparently many of those

banished to the Americas found their way back; several of those who
repatriated themselves from France are cases in point.

Of course there

is the possibility that some of those who were deported to North or
South America did stay and adapt to their new surroundings, with no
thought of returning to Italy.
in this survey.

Obviously, these people would not appear

There really is no practical way of finding out who and

how many there were.
Returning once again to the large numbers of exiles in France, we
find an interesting pattern of clustering.

One more obvious place of

settlement would be Marseilles and the south coast, where many refugees
Would first have entered France.

If we add the total for the large port
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to those of Toulon, Avignon, Nimes, Montpellier, Cette and Narbonne, we
find that there were 93 exiles in the coastal strip.

Paris, too, would

have held some hope for housing and employment, as well as proximity to
the local Italian community in the French capital.

Paris, with the

nearby towns of Versailles and Charenton, provides another 75 names.
A third settlement area is more mysterious.

A crescent-shaped

pattern of towns in western France, facing the Bay of Biscay, accounts
for more than a few names.

The towns in question are Angers, Saumur,

Tours, Loches, Chateauroux, Limoges, Perigueux and Bordeaux.

In this

crescent, 104 exjles had been settled (possibly at the behest of the
French government), making it the largest of the three clusterings in
Fratlce.
trations.

Chateauroux (30) and Saumur (22) are particularly large concenThere is some evidence that Mazzini and other revolutionary

leaders were actively communicating with men in these cities.

CHAPTER III

THE REVOLUTIONARY AND REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENTS OF 1848-9
After the joyous beginning of his reign, Pius continued to enjoy a
period of great popularity.

For a while, even the most conservative

cardinals felt it difficult to oppose the reforms of a man who was idolized by so many.

Yet the wild enthusiasm shown for Pius in his early

years tells us perhaps more about the needs and hopes of the citizenry
than it does about the man's own policy.

His willingness to discuss

change and the reform of institutions was, in itself, a near revolution.
Such flexibility was unknown since the days of Pius VII and Consalvi,
despite the speed of change in European society.

Yet the new Pope's

genuine humanity and decency did not itself constitute a policy.

Had he

been a stronger person, these virtues might have developed into a successful long-ranged program of development.

But such was not the case.

IX as Reformer
Much of his popularity was based on a misunderstanding.

People tended

to see a liberal political leader first of all, and a priest only afterward.

Yet the opposite ranking of priorities was. the true one.

For

those few people who cared to observe him, there was ample evidence of
the Pope's timidity and fear of dramatic action.

Especially in the

early spring of 1848, he complained of excessive pressure to anyone who
would listen: close advisers, Civic Guard officers, diplomats, visiting
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bishops.

He lamented his lack of freedom to act as leader of the

Church, and declared that he could only see one way to solve a conflict
in his roles of priest and prince - to throw himself on God's providence
and accept whatever troubles might follow.

1

In spite of all appearances, the Pope never passed through a "liberal phase," because true liberals embrace certain optimistic assumptions 2 which Pius found totally alien.

For him, human beings were weak

and helpless creatures, flawed by original sin, and incapable of good
and virtuous conduct without the help of God and the controls of society.

The duty

ot an enlightened ruler was to protect and guide his sub-

jects, like a stern parent, but never allow them so much freedom that
they might hurt themselves or destroy those institutions which kept them
safe.

Pius could never bring himself to believe that human beings are

perfectable creatures, or that they are able to make wise and prudent
judgements with nothing but natural reason to guide them.

Pessimism and

religious traditionalism were far more important factors in Piust thinking than liberalism ever was.

He lived largely for the next life, and

assumed that most of his subjects did too.

Whenever he was faced with

hard decisions, for example, he would consult theologians before cabinet
ministers.

This tendency, while admirable in any religious leader,

causes untold complications when it is applied to statecraft.

It is

interesting to note that both Mazzini and Metternich saw this element of

1

Alberto M. Ghisalberti, "Intorno alla fuga di Pio IX," Archivio
Storico Italiano (1969), CXXVII, 110-2.
2

For example, humans are naturally perfectible beings, with an
innate attraction to good and virtuous activity; the individual will
advance toward a more perfect state, as long as he is free to act
rationally.
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pessimism in Pius much earlier than most others.

-labus

The author of the

Errors (1864) was obviously someone who saw little hope for the

modern world.

3

In his earliest political reforms, Pius IX was strongly motivated
by the need to reduce suffering among his subjects, and a hope to remove
the widespread hatred for the Papal States as one of the worst governed
states in Europe.

In one sense, his plan to turn Rome into a "showcase

of good government" was doomed from the outset; he was able to correct
some abuses and improve ce·rtain conditions, but he was never totally
free to make sweeping reforms.

His unalterable view of State as secon-

dary to Church would not allow him, as Prince/Pope, to act with the same
freedom which any other sovereign could exercise.

At every turn, his

inability to wear two crowns simultaneously seemed to hamper even the
best motivated efforts.
Added to the major difficulty of setting harmonious policy for
both church and state, we must consider the aspirations of many other
proponents of change.

Far from suffering from a dearth of followers,

Pius had far too many adherents, most of whom offered confusing and contradictory proposals.

Some wanted to create a constitutional monarchy

with liberal institutions.

Others saw Rome as. the moral nucleus of a

strong federation of Italian states.

Still others hoped for a revival

of the Italian national spirit which would bring on a fusion of states
and the renewal of social harmony.

His own ideas were certainly condi-

tioned by the many petitions, pleas and suggestions he received from his

3

Frank J. Coppa, "Pessimism and Traditionalism in the Personality
and Policies of Pio Nono, 11
of Italian History (1979) II, 210-5 .'
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subjects and advisers - but he spoke only rarely of the limits beyond
which he would not pass.

As one reform edict followed another, Pius

felt the growing panic of a man being forced to walk the plank: sooner
of later, he would have to stop moving or face disaster.
everyone else wanted him to continue?
the ways occur?

But what if

When and how would the parting of

He never decided on an answer to that question.

One principal difficulty in his policy was that his proposed
reforms would only touch certain·segments of the population.

During his

first year as Pope, he agreed to an independent judiciary, equality
before the law, and taxation of moral entities, such as seminaries.
These measures were generally applauded, and indeed, long overdue.

Yet

many of the popular journals complained that such modest decrees did not
go far enough to correct the principal cause of the state's trouble, the
hopeless plight of the smaller farmers and other working classes. 4 Up to
this time, revolutionary influence in Rome (carbonaro or Mazzinian) had
largely been confined to artisans, small merchants, some nobles and professionals,

and a few priests.

Despite the amnesty and the early

reforms, the loyalty of the poorest classes remained uncertain, conditioned as it was by the needs of the poor and by their rising hopes and
expectations of the new regime.

5

In Naples, by way of contrast, much of the revolutionary discontent was found among the middle level of the commercial class.

Bour-

geois critics of the government wanted structural and constitutional

4

Franco Catalano, "La Repubblica Romana del 1849," Scritti storici e
giuridici in memoria di~· Visconti (Milano: Cisalpino, 1955), p. 212.
5

Hearder, "Republic," p. 173.
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reforms to allow them into the political arena.

But in the Papal

States, with its unique clerical monopoly and huge, tax-exempt estates
in the hands of religious entities, the suffering was most acute among
sharecroppers, day laborers and unemployed craftsmen.

The popular slo-

gan among Roman revolutionaries was "work and bread, 11 signalling the
need for social reform.

Since economic and financial disorder was ramp-

ant, much of the underground rhetoric spoke of gaining control of the
financial administration, solving unemployment, abolishing the grist
tax, and raising taxes on the estates of the wealthiest landowners, jewelry, lavish carriages, and similar luxuries.

It remained unsaid, but

vivid in the minds of all, that prelates and cardinals would be among
the first to be inconvenienced by such laws, and therefore would be
reliably opposed to them.

6

For conveniece, we can trace the political activity of Pius IX
through four distinct phases.

Each of these phases is marked by a dif-

ferent relationship between the Pope (especially as he saw himself) and
the liberal or radical popular movements outside his immediate circle.
1.

From his election in 1846 until the authorization of the Civic
Guard (July, 184 7)

- Pius enacted many fundamental reforms

with the full support of political liberals, and against frantic opposition from the most retrograde conservatives.
2.

From July of 1847 until the publication of the new Constitution (March, 1848) - he continued reforms at a slower rate,
under the

influence of clubs and popular movements;

he

remained in control, but became increasingly conscious of his

6

Catalano, p. 211.
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own popularity, with a consequent loss of good judgement.
3.

From March to September, 1848, when he appointed Pellegrino
Rossi to the Ministry - the popular press and clubs actually
directed policy, and the Pope followed with a growing sense of
alarm and apprehension.
of these

11

(The Allocut ion of April 29 was one

second thoughts 11 but not necessarily a burned

bridge.)
4.

From Rossi's Ministry until the Pope's own death in 1878 - he
resisted all further political innovation and fought unsuccessfully, to retain control of his state.

This period has

been likened to a "30-year Greek Tragedy" in which Pius was
forced to go on living among hostile fates, where al1 remaining choices were bad.
The elements of this division ignore the mythical

11

liberal phase" and

more accurately show the known traits of Pius' personality at work.

7

From his 1850 restoration onward, Pius put away his attempts at
being a reforming prince.

He reverted to governing the Church as his

principal occupation, and the Papal States as a necessary evil, if only
because he needed somewhere to stand.

His pessimism and religiosity

reasserted themselves, and he began to read most contemporary movements
as potential assaults on a strong and united papacy.

The remainder of

his pontificate is marked by strenuous efforts to preserve what he considered to be the necessary tools to govern the Church freely and
firmly.

From the end of the middle ages until his own time, Pius saw

attacks on the power of the papacy as the work of the devil, to be

7

Hearder, "Republic," 170f.
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opposed at all costs.

A contemporary author in 1862 wrote of a consis-

tent trend in the work of Arnaldo di Brescia, Cola di Rienzo, Martin
Luther and John Calvin to destroy Papal influence; these earlier attacks
were now supported by Cavour, Ricasoli, Garibaldi and Mazzini. 8
Reforms
The initial work done by Pius and his collaborators provides an interesting vignette of one man's attempt to modernize his state in a very
short time.

But since it is only marginally significant to the present

study, this period will be dealt with quickly.

The main point of inter-

est here is the part which several of the former exiles and prisoners
played in the new government, a hallmark of the new policy of reconciliation.
The Press Law of March 15, 1847 allowed relatively free publication of political journals.

These journals were not subject to actual

censorship, merely the supervision of a review board; the board consisted of 5 nominated members, 4 of them laymen.

By early 1848, there

were over 100 political publications appearing regularly in all parts of
the Papal States.

This feature is all the more remarkable for the fact

that not a single free paper existed in Milan or Vienna at that time.

9

Almost immediately, these publications began to bring political
discussion and debate into broad daylight.

Most authors agree that the

newspapers themselves, along with the political clubs, were largely
responsible for the lively ferment which became the matrix for the

8

Pier Giorgio Camaiani, "Il diavolo, Roma e la rivoluzione, 11 Rivista
di Storia ~ Letteratura Religiosa (1972) VIII, 489 & 496.
9

Hearder, "Republic," p. 174.
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events of 1848.

Chief among these active journals was Pietro Sterbini's

Contemporaneo, which proved to be one of the most widely read papers in
Rome.

One strong moderate, Luigi Carlo Farini, considered Sterbini (a

returned exile, like himself) to be both an opportunist and a demagogue,
a man who would say or write absolutely anything to enhance his own
political standing.

He calls Sterbini a man whose flights of fancy

overshadowed his intellect, !!an imaginative but inaccurate" writer, and
a person ignorant of everything· except the history of Rome and the
French Revolution.

In a more favorable light, Farini cites several

other publications: the Felsino of Bologna, competently published by
Marco Minghetti and Antonio Montinari, the Roman Bilancia, work of Professor Orioli (also a returned exile) and Advocate Cattabene, and BertiPichat 's excellent Bolognese journal Ital

, which he described as

bitter against the "Gregorians 11 but not necessarily hostile to the present government.

10

Farini further pointed out that the liberalized Press Law served
to solidify and highlight the two tendencies within the liberal camp.
The Moderates (whom he clearly favored) worked for concord between government and people, non-violent evolution toward a representative system, and a League of Italian States to oppose Austrian policy in Italy.
On the other hand, the Radicals would settle for nothing less, said Farini, than a unitary republic based on popular passion and war against
the Austrians and other crowned heads.

This highly vocal minority did

favor moderate reforms, but only as stepping stones to their final goal,

1

°

Farini, I, 213f.
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not as ends in themselves.

11

In Farini's view, four principal villains

emerged from this radical camp: editor Sterbini himself, lawyer Giuseppe
Galletti of Bologna, the popular leader Angelo Brunetti, called "Ciceruacchio" by the Romans, and Carlo Bonaparte, Prince of Canino.

Sterbini

and Galletti are the most visible of the amnesty recipients who supported the overthrow of Pius IX in 1848.
Following closely after the Press Law, Cardinal Gizzi also enacted
two structural reforms for the Papal government during mid-1847.

The

first, on April 14, instituted the Council of State, an advisory body
designed to assist the government in the moderization program.

Legates

and Delegates were asked to nominate three worthy individuals from their
respective provinces; one of these would be chosen by the Pope to serve
a 2-year term.

The other directive, dated June 14, set up a Council of

Ministers or cabinet.

Without stopping the process of government, this

edict re-named and re-defined the off ices of the principal administrators.

The most important office (that of President) absorbed all of

Gizzi's duties as Cardinal Secretary of State, including the Interior
Ministry, and both Ecclesiastical and Secular Foreign Affairs.

Other

ministries included Industry and Commerce, Public Works, War, Finance,
and Police.

All members of this first cabinet.were cardinals or prel-

ates, but there was a clear implication that the reorganization had
opened the door for laymen in at least some of these offices.
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The institution of a Civic Guard had long been a pet project of
liberal reformers, dating at least from the French Revolution.

In the

Papal States, where a history of foreign troops and centurian atrocities
had embittered relations between subjects and government, the idea of a
domestic force of citizens keeping order in their own towns seemed especially attractive.

As it was originally conceived under Pius IX, the

Civica was seen more as a hedge against food riots and crimes against
property by the starving poor during the bad harvests of 1846-7.

Only

later was it seen as a vehicle of military training and organization for
a future nationalistic crusade against Austria.

For the moment, it was

requested and granted as a domestic police force to support the existing
carabinieri and soldiers in maintaining order.

13

Unfortunately, while

the project was well funded by the municipalities, it was not always
well organized.

Local leaders usually took charge of their respective

units and recruited heavily among their closest friends, clients and
associates.

There was little attempt to screen membership or exclude

people with questionable backgrounds.

Conservatives feared the Civic

Guard as the latest step in arming the common mob against the police,
the Swiss and the Volunteers.

Just as the amnesty had allowed radical

leaders to resume their activities, and the Press Law had given them
permission to propagandize, so the Civic Guard permitted the arming of
those who would carry out the next revolution.

The old "Gregorian" fac-

tion saw the Pope's program as a slow-acting dose of political suicide.

13
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As events turned out, the paramilitary ranks and structure, the
handsome uniforms, and the stirring display of band concerts, honor
guards and parades all served to convince large numbers of civic guards
that they were almost the equals of real soldiers.

The events of early

1848 would teach them hard lessons: that good weapons did not automatically bring training in their use, that enthusiasm was no substitute for
discipline, that there are few shortcuts to military professionalism.
The tragedy of the Civic troops was that their many examples of individual heroism could not save the units themselves from disintegrating
under the pounding they took from the well trained Austrian conscripts.
On March 14, 1848, Pius promulgated a new constitution, the Sta' which he hoped would become the keystone of his new reformed
state.

As he saw it, this was the final instalment in the concessions

he was prepared to make to admit laymen to the structure of civil government.

Although he was aware of the uniqueness of the Papal States,

he made strenuous efforts to conform to the appearances of other constitutional monarchies.

The Council of State would continue to function as

an advisory board on executive matters.

There would also be a bicameral

legislature for all non-ecclesiastical affairs.

The Pope would select

members of the High Council from lists of nominees, while voters would
elect members of the Council of Deputies according to a_ restricted franchise.

Professors, doctors, lawyers, pastors, ecclesiastical leaders,

magistrates, mayors, councillors, and other such "notables, 11 had the
right to vote automatically.

Any other prospective voters had to show

evidence that they had either paid 12 scudi in taxes, or possessed 300

14
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scudi in capital.

This limited franchise was fairly typical of most

contemporary states, based as it was on the twin assumptions that public
policy at its best when decided by the well educated or those already
engaged in administration, and that tax revenue would be spent most prudently by those who paid most of it.

15

Yet even under the accepted restrictions of the day, the Statuto
was hardly a revolutionary concession.

Pius was never prepared to place

any part of the government of the Church in the hands of laymen.

It was

taken for granted that clerics would continue to participate in all
civic functions, .both voting and being eligible for any office.
opposite was not allowed.

But the

Non-clerics would only be free to set policy

for clearly secular issues, something which was admittedly hard to
define in a society where church and state blended so closely on most
issues:

foreign policy, education, taxation of property related to

religious institutions, and such like.

There was a tacit understanding

that the title of "Secretary of State" was reserved for the cardinal who
controlled the foreign affairs of the
president of the Cabinet.

The Interior Ministry was reserved for the

highest ranking layman, who was effective "prime minister" in secular
affairs.

But it was also understood that most of the ministers and

functionaries would henceforth be laymen, unless their offices dealt
heavily with religious matters.

As a final safeguard on the freedom of

the Church, all legislation and policy would be submitted to secret
review by the College of Cardinals.

Although not an official element of

the new government, the Cardinals effectively became a parliamentary
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"third house" with power to veto the work of the other two chambers.

16

But even with its obvious limitations, the Papal Statuto significantly opened government decisions to lay influence for the first time
since Consalvi's reforms.

Coming as it did on March 15, it was the

fourth Italian charter granted in a two-month period.

Ferdinand II of

the Two Sicilies had conceeded his on January 23, principally as a
response to the revolt in Sicily.

Charles Albert announced the funda-

mental principles of a Statute for Piedmont-Sardinia on February 9,
later finalized in the document of March 5.
Tuscany followed.suit on February 17.

Grand Duke Leopold II of

Thus, even before the outbreak of

war, the liberals of 1848 successfully achieved adoption of relatively
free constitutions for the larger Italian states, with the signal exception of Lombardy- Venetia.

17

Almost unseen amid the hectic activity of March, 1848, the last of
the 1846 amnistiati were quietly released from prison.

These were 25

prisoners held in Civita Castellana for crimes of armed violence which
were technically not covered by the original terms of the amnesty.
Their cases had been appealed and reviewed by the Consulta.

Pius

decided to pardon them as a gesture of good will, and they were turned
loose at last.

18

Five of these prisoners were accused of a murder during

the revolt of 1845 in Rimini.

All twenty of the others were among the

more violent members of the Muratori and Imola groups of 1843.

Despite

the seriousness of their charges, most of these men lived up to the con-
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ditions of the amnesty following their release, and never turned up in
court again.

As will be seen, however, four of the same names, Angelo

Gori, Domenico Conti, Antonio Nanni and Paolo Scorzoni, are accused of
later crimes in 1848-9.

Gori's identity in the subsequent case is some-

what doubtful, but the others are confirmed matches.
War

and the

Many of the Pope's reforms would doubtless have been tested and criticized by his own citizens, even if the outside world had stayed peaceful, and the Papal States had remained calm.

But the eruption of a lib-

eral revolution in Vienna (March 17), followed by the nationalistic
upris

in Milan and Venice (March 18- 22) guaranteed that turmoil and

national passions would further confuse an already uncertain process.
Public sentiment nearly everywhere in Italy longed for the day when the
Austrians would depart (or be expelled) from northern Italy.

The Pope's

own words had often supported and encouraged this growing consciousness
of Italian nationality.

Since he was probably the most popular and

admired individual in Italy, there is no realistic way that Pius would
NOT be involved in any Italo-Austrian conflict.

Especially after the

Piedmonteie king, Charles Albert, declared war on Austria (March 24),
the conflict became more than just an isolated rebellion.

Charles

Albert called for all patriotic Italians to join him in a crusade to
push the Germans back across the Alps.

There seemed to be a general

expectation that the Pope would strongly endorse, if not actually lead,
this popular effort.
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Because the war between the Austrian army and the Italian rebels
was taking place just across the Po river from the Romagna, there was
legitimate concern that the fighting might spill over the frontier.

In

particular, the city of Ferrara and the small forts in the Cornacchio
region, where the Austrians claimed the right to maintain garrisons,
appeared to be dangerous flash points.

The Ministry decided in mid-

March to send troops to the northern frontier. They ordered most of the
regular army into a state of readiness, and called for volunteers to
support them.
schooled in
soldiers.

The Papal army of 1848 was relatively small, and better

mai~taining

internal order than in fighting against other

Even so, the troops themselves were considered to be of good

quality, and able to defend their State.

A Piedmontese general, Giov-

anni Durando, was given command of the division containing most of the
regular units, including 2 excellent Swiss regiments, as well as 4 regiments of native infantry,

2 of cavalry, and smaller formations of

artillery, engineers and staff officers.

Durando's column, about 7000

strong, was ordered to prepare for departure by the last week of
March.

19

A second division, comprising most of the Civic Guards and volunteer troops, was placed under the command of General Ferrari, a well
respected Neapolitan officer in French service.

The Civic Guard, as we

have already seen, existed by now as an auxiliary force.

It had the

appearance of a military formation, but actual training was very weak,
and the quality of its weapons and equipment uneven.

Nevertheless, the

Civica was mobilized to support the regulars by fleshing out the numbers
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of the army, if not its quality.

The core of Ferrari's force comprised

four civic regiments, proudly called
one or two battalions.

11

Roman Legions," each consisting of

A number of ad hoc units also enlisted in the

enthusiasm of the hour, comprising 3 volunteer regiments (also with 2
battalions each), and the Roman University battalion, in hopes of bolstering the army still further.

Although, Ferrari's division numbered

almost 10, 000 troops, i t never had all of its basic equipment, and
remained weak in cavalry, artillery and trained officers of every variety. 20
Still other volunteer units from the Romagna (not to be confused
with those under Ferrari's command) were raised and led by local notables independently of any real control by the War Ministry.
these independent battalions were named for river valleys:
Basso Reno,

=-=-=-=~·

and Senio.

Four of
~Ito

Reno,

The Alto Reno battalion, soon to become

the most aggressive of these units, was commanded by Count Livio Zambeccari, a returned exile. 21 These so called "free corps," together with a
handful of civic units, had already marched to the Po long before the
regular force had left Rome.
As early as March 20, the Duke of Modena's police had attacked
Modenese citizens who were demanding reforms..

S.ince this fighting

angered many citizens in nearby Bologna, Cardinal Amat, the Legate,
moved immeditely to contain the troubles, and prevent involvement by
Papal citizens in the politics of another state.

He tried to seal the

frontier with a force of Swiss, Volunteers and Civic Guards, but Major
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zambeccari led his irregulars all the way to Modena to support the rebels.

He returned after the Duke was deposed but insisted on keeping his

force together for action elsewhere. 22 Several other local forces moved
against Austrian contingents within the Papal states.

Volunteer units

from Ravenna and the lower Romagna under Major Montanari forced Austrian
troops to yield the Cornacchio forts.

About a thousand others, including

Zambeccari's men, surrounded the citadel of Ferrara, but were unable to
capture it without heavy guns.

It became increasingly obvious that only

Durando's regulars could provide the crucial edge to dislodge Austrian
troops from places which they were determined to hold. 23
Meanwhile, the government in Rome eagerly hoped to conclude negotiations for the League of Italian States.

The cabinet saw such an

alliance as a neat way to avoid the knotty problem of declaring war
against Austria, and might even allow Durando's troops to fight, simply
as members of the League, and not as soldiers of Pius IX.

Furthermore,

it might provide a stronger moral basis for Charles Albert's efforts to
forge

11

Italy, 11 rather than an expanded Piedmont.

On April 10, Monsignor

Corboli-Bussi was sent to the king as special legate, with orders to
expedite co-operation and eliminate all obstacles to the finalization of
the League.
fruit.

It is genuinely unfortunate that these efforts did not bear

Although the whole issue is idle speculation today, it remains

possible that much bloodshed might have been avoided if Vienna had seen
a relatively unified front among the Italian states.

Given a willing-

ness to compromise in Vienna, there might have been a negotiated settle-
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ment for some sort of Italian federation.

But while the goals of a cus-

toms union and a political federation seemed wonderful before the fighting began, the need to expel Austria militarily replaced all other
issues in Charles Albert's mind.
Corboli-Bussi returned home.

The League was never concluded, and

For the Piedmontese, this narrowing of

focus meant that they would be all but alone in their struggle.

For the

Roman cabinet, it meant a far more serious need to clarify the status of
their troops, now that they were on the verge of active fighting.

24

Since there still appeared to be some chance of an alliance, War
Minister Aldobrandini ordered General Durando to "enter into communication with his majesty (Charles Albert) and act in concert with him."
April 18, he authorized Durando to cross the Po.
step remained short of war, however.

On

Even this dramatic

The north bank of the river was

the "Polesine di Rovigo, 11 formerly Papal territory which was assigned to
Austria after 1815, but which Rome still claimed. 2 s The government
appointed Count Carlo Pepoli as

a

special commissioner for the army, and

traveled along with Durando's headquarters as both adviser and watchdog.
When Pepoli was elected to the assembly as deputy for Bologna, he was
replaced on June 1 by Filippo Canuti.

Both Pepoli and Canuti were for-

mer exiles, passionately devoted to the moderate liberal cause.

Canuti,

a close associate of Farini, spent much of his time trying to restrain
Durando from rash action and preserve the army's original mission as
peacekeeper and guardian of the frontiers.

Although he remained a loyal

partisan of the Pope, he never succeeded in his task of preventing the

24
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disaster which would soon follow.

26

But before Durando's army had arrived,
decided to commit his volunteers to action.

Zambeccari once again
His Alto Reno battalion

crossed the frontier and marched toward the Austrian fortress of Legnano.

By April 8th, they had marched 20 kilometers into Austrian terri-

tory and occupied Ostiglia, on the north bank of the Po.

The following

week, two other units crossed the frontier to join them: the Bersaglieri
del Po, commanded by Count Raffaele Pasi, another returned exile, and
the Lower Romagna Volunteers.

27

On April 20, Charles Albert ordered Durando to follow the volunteer columns, and occupy Ostiglia and Governolo, but these orders were
soon changed.

An Austrian relief column under Marshal Nugent had begun

moving to Radetzky's aid, and Durando's men were the only trained formation able to intercept these reinforcements.

The Papal contingent

marched to Treviso instead, and prepared to block all crossings of the
Piave river. 28 Ferrari's Volunteer column, marching several days behind,
received orders to conform to Durando's movements and support him with
all possible speed.
At just this crucial moment, Pius and his Cabinet had a falling
out.

After a meeting on April 25, Cardinal Antonelli, the Secretary of

State, sent the Pope a memo on behalf of the rest of the Cabinet
requesting a public clarification of policy concerning the war.
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memo listed three possible courses of action: a formal declaration of
war against Austria) the outright withdrawl of the troops) or a statement that the government did not want war, but could not stop its own
citizens if they wanted to fight.
alternative:

29

The Cabinet recommended the third

allowing the troops to continue fighting without formal

support, while declaring that a peaceful settlement would be the ideal
solution.

But instead of a simple clarification of policy, the Pope

reacted more strongly than the cabinet wished.

Some German bishops were

reported to be considering- schism if the Papacy continued to promote
Italian nationalism at their expense.

Pius himself had shown signs of

exasperation with the many demamds which had pushed him far beyond his
better judgement, and decided to make a sudden end to the whole process.
After meeting with a Consistory of the Cardinals, he issued what has
subsequently been called the Allocution of April 29.

He strongly repu-

diated the war being waged in his name, and ordered that all military
activity stop at once.

30

The shock waves were not slow in spreading.

The Cabinet resigned immediately) since their recommendation had
been so firmly rejected.

The general public realized suddenly that

their army was now in a "limbo" condition: denied belligerent status,
but committed to action against a resolute enemy._ Rumors circulated in
Rome that Austrian troops had lynched a prisoner in a civic guard uniform, saying that he had no rights as a soldier.
state of panic and near-revolt.

Crowds gathered in a

Princes and dukes mingled with the mob,

trying to calm their passions, as Orioli and Mamiani attempted to repair

29
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the political damage Pius had inflicted on himself.

31

Despite previous indications that he would never go to war, even
to support neo-guelph efforts, Pius had still shocked public opinion too
badly to recover quickly.

Whether he knew it or not at the time, Pius

squarely faced the question of whether church or state considerations
would take priority in his Risorgimento policy:

he chose the church.

Ultimately, this choice proved to be long-ranged and durable; it probably cost him the Papal States, but actually strengthened the moral and
spiritual influence of the·Papacy in the long run.

However, it did not

solve his immediate crisis, or save him from the turmoil which followed
it.

He clarified the Church's position on national politics once and

for all: no active war against Austria, no endorsement of popular revolution, and no sacrifice of the Papal States, if it meant loss of the
Pope's freedom to act.

Just a few years later, one writer opined that

the Roman Republic was only "baptized" on February 9, 1849 - it had been
born the day of the Allocution.

32

Politically, the Allocution appears to have taken power away from
the moderates almost overnight, and set up the subsequent clash between
radicals and reactionaries.

Despite the substantial progress of several

ministries, the moderate liberals seemed discredited in the eyes of the
general public, since they had failed to make Pius do the single thing
the nationalists really wanted in April of 1848: to drive the Austrians
out of Italy.

33

After May 1, the political clubs took over effective
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leadership of the population; through the Civic Guard, they held the
keys to the physical control of the capital.

The next ministry, that of

Terenzio Mamiani, turned out to be one of the most talented and nobleminded in the history of the Papal States.

But by this stage, practi-

cally no one was paying attention to the official cabinet, seen as an
agent of betrayal.

34

Despite the thundering shock to his political momentum and personal popularity, Pio Nono tried to carry on as usual.

The Pope allowed

Mamiani a great deal of latitude in setting policy, including measures
to reduce cleric.al control over temporal affairs.

Mamiani' s vigorous

policy, in harmony with his own most deeply held principles, earned him
strong opposition from many of the curial cardinals.

A1though Pius

stood by his minister, the timing of the conflict was quite unfortunate:
it alienated the clerical right without slowing the subversive efforts
of Sterbini and the political left.

On May 30, Pius named his Council

of State, hoping desparately that stability might follow.

Among its

distinguished members were Advocate Sturbinetti and Professor Francesco
Orioli, a former exile.

Only 4 or the 14 members were clarics.

Elections for the Chamber of Deputies followed on May 18.

Despite the

turmoil, the elections went smoothly and most of the candidates returned
by the voters were highly respected.

The president of the new chamber

was the elderly Cardinal Soglia, the virtuous follower of Pius VII in
exile.
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Reverses and Violence
1

Meanwhile, Durando s army had moved into a position to block the reinforcements intended for Radetzky.

On the day of the Allocution, he had

reached Treviso with his Swiss Brigade and the other regular troops; he
immediately prepared to defend the Piave bridges against Marshal Nugent,
who was approaching from the east with an Austrian column twice his
size.

Since Charles Albert's forces had already been halted before the

heavily fortified Quadrilateral, the duel between Durando and Nugent
took the spotlight as the crucial campaign to save or destroy the Austrian empire.

W~thout

supplies and reinforcements, Radetzky would soon

be forced to surrender, despite his strong position.

But Durando's

force was still relatively small; the volunteer corps had only arrived
at Ferrara, and would not be able to support him for at least a week, no
matter what.

36

Even if he were so inclined, Durando was in no condition

to act boldly and decisively at just the time when he might have turned
the tide in favor of the Italians.
One other variable factor lay in the 40,000 troops promised by
Ferdinand of Naples.

An advance guard of 14,000 under General Pepe had

already entered the Papal States and had reached Bologna; the rest were
to follow shortly.

The full Neapolitan contingent would assure Durando

of almost 50,000 regulars, plus several thousand additional volunteers.
Such a force would be nearly impossible for Nugent to pass.
Neapolitans would never see combat.

But the

Shortly after the street fighting

of May 15, King Ferdinand recalled all of his troops to keep order at
home (and eventually to re-conquer Sicily).
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ately, although a few hundred volunteers were allowed to follow Pepe
northward to continue the struggle.

They made a noble contribution to

the defense of Venice, but were of no use to Durando as a mobile
force.

37

By the time Papal troops actually met Nugent's force in battle,
they were well aware of the Allocution.

Although none of them broke off

their campaign, most were understandably dispirited at the lack of support from their own revered sovereign.

Especially among Ferrari's vol-

unteers (most of whom tended toward republicanism anyway), there was an
underlying spirit of anger.

More than a few grumbled that this was one

more example of Italy's being betrayed by its own princes.

38

These same

volunteers took the brunt of Nugent's attack during the battle of Cornuda (May 8 & 9).

This misfortune was due largely to the Austrians'

skillful movement and good discipline, as well as a few bad judgements
by Durando.

Ferrari's men gave a good account of themselves during the

battle, but took dozens of casualties waiting for support that never
came.

The "conspiracy" rumor took hold of them again, and discipline

collapsed completely during their retreat.

Although good numbers of

these men would continue to fight, this single battle finished Ferrari's
division as an organized force.

39

One month later, Durando defended a strong position at Vicenza
against a much more powerful Austrian force.

He deployed most of his

Swiss and other regulars, together with the best of his volunteers, led
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by former exiles Pietramellara and Pasi, and other ardent patriots.
Despite a spirited effort, Austrian numbers and training prevailed.

On

June 11, Durando was allowed to withdraw from Veneta with arms, baggage
and honors of war, but on the condition that he and his men would not
fight against Austria for the next 3 months. 40 The disaster at Treviso
ensured that other rebel forces in Veneta would quickly be mopped up by
Austrian columns: Padua, Treviso, Palmanova.

By the end of June, Venice

was isolated and would eventually succumb to a lengthy siege.

Radetzky

now faced no one in the field except Charles Albert's Piedmontese, who
presently received the same quick hammer blows which had destroyed their
allies.

The unqualified Austrian victory at the battle of Custoza hurt

the Piedmontese forces so badly that they were unable to continue the
campaign.

They fell back in disorder.

By August 6, the Austrians had

retaken Milan; on August 9, they signed the Armistice of Salasco, which
required the Piedrnontese to withdraw all forces to the old frontier.

41

For all practical purposes, these events finished the military threat to
Radetzky in 1848.
After Vicenza, Durando's army fell back on Bologna in fairly good
order.

That city had been in an agitated state ever since the recall of

the Neapolitan force in mid-March.

The arrival of the 4000 armed and

frustrated veterans served only to further inflame passions here and
elsewhere in the Rornagna.

42

Durando and Canuti decided to disband most

of the restive volunteer units rather than risk further erosion of
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morale.

Unhappily, these discharged troops took their rage and frustra-

tion back to their native towns, plunging many of them into anarchy.
Ravenna, Faenza, Pesaro and Fano experienced an extraordinary number of
political assassinations, with few if any arrests.

Imola, Senigallia

and Ancona suffered similar convulsions, as angry civic guards took out
their hostility on anyone perceived to be an enemy.

Bologna remained

relatively quiet at first, due in part to the presence of the army, but
also to Cardinal Amat 1 s wise and honest government, and to the efforts
of many leading citizens.

·Wherever political clubs existed, they served

not only as sounding boards for the nationalist and revolutionary rhetoric of the day, but also became de facto provisional governments, especially where papal administrators were either intimidated or ignored. 43
In Rome, Sterbini had gained virtual control of the semi-radical
Circolo Popolare, the club which would do so much to topple Pius IX's
regime; it opposed the more moderate (and more timid) Circolo Romano.
Bologna's political world was dominated by two similar clubs: another
Circolo Popolare, which represented the extremists and more violent
party, and the moderate but relatively powerful Circolo Nazionale, with
a broad and talented membership, many amnesty veterans among them. 44
Ancona was polarized in a similar way, with the Circolo Anconitano representing those who favored the Pope's liberal reforms, and the Circolo
Popolare which attracted the anti-papal carbonari and Mazzinian democrats.

Many other cities had clubs with similar names and groupings,
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which would eventually function very much like political parties.

45

Some of the Austrian commanders, emboldened by their recent success,

moved

to

regain their

former

strongholds

south of

the Po.

Lichtenstein's ~orps temporarily re-occupied Ferrara on July 13, where
Count Francesco Lovatelli,

a former exile, was pro-Legate.

protested the occupation vigorously,

Lovatelli

and Pius added his own pressure

through diplomatic channels to force the Austrians to withdraw.

46

On August 4, Baron Welden announced his intention to move another
column toward Bologna,
Alpi.

encouraged and followed by the sanfedist leader

He took Genta easily, then continued toward Bologna, where the

Papal army (still bound by its pledge not to fight until September 11)
made preparations to withdraw, leaving the city defenseless.

Spontane-

ous resentment provoked ordinary citizens to initiate a four-hour clash
at the city's gates on August 8,

forcing Welden's troops to fall back.

Although Radetzky rebuked Welden for his rashness, he did nothing to
restore. stability to the largest city of the Legations.

Volunteers and

civic guards from the district converged on Bologna to defend it against
another Austrian foray.

When nothing materialized, many of them joined

local rowdies in settling old scores with policemen or court officials.
A Commission of' Public Safety,

formed by local property owners, took

power from pro-Legate Cesare Bianchetti in a vain attempt to maintain
order.

By the beginning of September, the city had approached nearly

total chaos, with countless violent crimes happening every day.
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In Bologna, as elsewhere in Italy, the issues of liberty and independence mesmerized the attention of the educated professional classes.
But other factors, such as regional contrasts, irreconcilable factional
disputes, and the nagging social question, with its economic and moral
implications, all combined to reveal that the proposed
being built over a void.

11

nation" was

Much of the chaos which was about to wrack

Bologna would come from lower class people who saw nothing for themselves in the unification programs of the elite.

These weaknesses in

the social fabric demonstrated the pernicious effects of a long material
and moral poverty, which no short-term or rapid reforms could ever hope
to cure. 48 Yet Bologna was also a natural communications center, important for the spread of revolutionary information, among other things.
News travelled from there to Faenza (mainly through the efforts of former exiles Pasi and Galdesi), and then to Lugo and elsewhere.

The Cir-

cola Popolare of Lugo was an essential link in the planning and execution of coordinated political activity, such as organized voting or
blocking the movements of Swiss troops.

Obviously, any upheaval in

Bologna would have a strong ripple effect throughout the entire Legations region. 49
Meanwhile in Rome, the government became more and more embarrassed
and unstable because of the reverses and violence of the summer months.
Mamiani had already strained his relations with Pius over the lack of
support for Charles Albert.

48

With a growing sense of helplessness, Mam-
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iani decided to resign when his reform program faltered, especially
since the August crime spree in Bologna would be sustained largely by
the people he hoped to protect: unskilled and semi-skilled workers, with
some help from nearby peasants. 50 By the time that disorder occurred, a
new ministry had already been formed, led by Count Odoardo Fabbri, a
sick, elderly figurehead who obliged the Pope by accepting the job no
one else wanted.

Among the other notables who resigned in disgust was a

conservative deputy, Professor Francesco Orioli.

Scholar, mandarin, and

former exile, Orioli had, until now, enthusiastically served the Pope in
his attempted reforms, intensely thankful for his pardon in 1846.

He

retired from public life altogether in late July, and was heard from no
more.

51

After their defeat of Welden's troops, most of the Bolognese laid
down their arms, but many of the more violent popolani, supported by the
volunteers from nearby towns, did not.

Two recipients of the 1846

amnesty, Livio Zambeccari and Angelo Masini, attempted to seize control
of the commune on August 15, using their own free corps of volunteers.
The result was not revolution, but anarchy.

Many leading moderates,

including former exile Oreste Biancoli, made strenuous efforts to support the beleaguered pro-Legate Bianchetti.

But the rabble and the free

corps continued to act with relative freedom: they robbed, broke criminals out of jail, plundered homes of wealthy citizens, levied taxes on
those quarters of the city where they were strongest, and systematically
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killed a judge, police officers, magistrates and prison guards.

52

In

these acts of violence, many property owners saw the awakening of the
"monster" of popular insurrection and redoubled their cries for aid.
Farini sent General Zucchi north with troops to support Cardinal Amat,
and by early September, they had temporarily restored order.

Zambeccari

led his men away to help defend Venice, while the rest of the free corps
were broken up and fused into the newly formed Unione regiment, which
was soon incorporated into the regular army.

53

Count Fabbri, for all his good will, was unequal to the task of
government.

He asked to resign because of the hopeless financial situ-

ation, and was replaced on September 16 with the vigorous Pellegrino
Rossi, called "tlte most talented statesman in Italy" by no less a critic
than Camillo Cavour.

Rossi was an unlikely choice for minister to the

Pope: a cynical free-thinker with a Protestant wife, a doctrinaire liberal who had followed Murat, a brilliant jurist and economist.

He had

come to Rome as ambassador for France, then stayed after the fall of
Louis Philippe as a legal adviser to Pius.

Rossi was aware of the

urgent need to overhaul finances and public order, and was strongly supported by moderate liberals who favored the rule of law, especially
those in Bologna.

His program was ambitious from the angle of domestic

development (foreign loans, a reformed civil service, railroads, telegraph, and compensation for the war veterans), but offered little to
those nationalists who still wanted to fight Austria.

Rossi favored the

revival of Gioberti's Customs League, and its possible transformation
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into a formal Confederation of States.

It may stand as a tribute to

Rossi's fairness that his program did not favor any one party; on the
other hand, he had the misfortune of being suspected by all and strongly
supported by relatively few.

Farini lists those opposed to Rossi as

"all who favored turbulence,

corrupt magistrates, Sanfedists, greedy

clerics, and whoever wanted to destroy or change the Constitution by
violent means. 1154
During this period of the September-October armistice, there was a
renewed call to summon a Constituent Assembly for Italy.

The proposal

was made by the Montanelli ministry in Tuscany (which included Guerrazzi) as an alternative to Gioberti's now moribund Congress for Federation.

Among all the factions competing for the soul of Italian unifica-

tion, Mazzini's Young Italy was most passionately devoted to the
Constituent proposal.

Because of the process involved, Mazzini saw it

as having a messianic and mystical function which matched his own views.
From a more practical bias, he also knew that his oratory and charisma
would play well in such a forum.

55

As proposed by the Tuscans, this Cos-

tituente would be a single chamber elected by universal suffrage
throughout Italy, and would function as paramount sovereign for the
Italian people, above all other princes and assemblies.

Rossi and Far-

ini opposed this suggestion as dangerous and inflamatory.

To them,

Gioberti's neo-guelph proposals offered a brighter hope of consolidating
the progress already made (moderate constitutions, economic co-operation, plans for military fusion, streamlined administration), without
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the dangers of a relapse into political turmoil in the process. 56
Rossi has drawn much criticism for trying a conservative solution
to the Italian problem, and a moderate solution to the internal problem.
He lost the support of the ultra-clerical faction because he planned to
tax Church estates and promote lay administration.

Much of the support

which he and Pius might have had from the educated and propertied
classes had eroded when they refused both the Constituent Assembly and
war against Austria.

The poorest of the peasants and workers had never

seen their grievances addressed, and stayed enthusiastic only as long as
Pius was the leading reformer and patriot on the peninsula.

The Allocu-

tion had effectively cost him that position in the popular mind.

The

most rabid nationalists felt threatened by Rossi's sheer administrative
competence which would not long permit them to preach war and revolution
in every town square.

The hostility to Rossi from both ends of the

political spectrum, coupled with the relative indifference of many others, turned out to be a deadly combination.

His lack of popularity left

open a window of opportunity for the more extreme faction of Sterbini,
Galletti and Canino.

57

Rossi knew that his enemies might try to disrupt the opening session of parliament, when he intended to present his program to the legislators.

He ordered up extra carabinieri to guard against disorder,

but Rome was hardly in a state of agitation.

So the political shock was

all the greater when Rossi was confronted by a sullen crowd of discharged veterans, and swiftly struck down by an assassin's dagger.
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November 15 was a day when everyone lost nerve but the assassins.

Their

partisans paraded along the Corso with the tricolor, chanting slogans
and brandishing daggers.

No one objected.

and no one wanted to form a new one.

58

Pius, already shocked by his min-

ister's murder, now felt very much alone.
him except four, including Antonelli.

Rossi's ministry dissolved,

All Cardinals had abandoned

The Roman nobility were careful

to go about their affairs as though nothing were amiss.

Most of those

moderate liberals who had promoted his reform measures seemed to be
occupied elsewhere.
porting the
weapons.

Papa~y

Only the foreign diplomats were in evidence, supby their words, their presence, and a few personal

Without advice or support, the Pope turned his thoughts to the

basic survival of himself and his state, even if it meant asking for
foreign assistance.

The suggestion to flee the capital came from Anto-

nelli, and was supported by the legates from France, Spain, Portugal,
Bavaria, and to a lesser degree, Count Liedekerke of the Netherlands.
Both the French and Spanish ministers (d'Harcourt and Martinez de la
Rosa) hoped to host the exile,

if possible, but the Pope quietly

declined. 59
The following morning, there were rumors of a popular rally to
demand Sterbini and other democrats in a popular ministry, with a commitment to the Constituent Assembly.

Pius' own preference to form a new

cabinet would have Pasolini or Minghetti, but these were quite unacceptable to the people in the streets.
best of a bad lot.

He began to see Galletti as the

Galletti had, after all, functioned reasonably well
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as police minister in the last 4 cabinets, and at least had a basic
grasp of the political realities of the Roman government.

Despite his

continuing admiration for Mazzini (reasoned Pius) Galletti might prove
to be loyal, if only out of gratitude for his 1846 pardon.
the crowd outside the Quirinal palace grew more violent.

By mid-day,
Some of them

fired into the palace, killing one bishop, and wheeled a cannon into the
square, aimed at the central gate.
defend the palace at all costs.
surrender.

The only advice the Pope heard was to

He protested formally to the diplomats that he was no longer

able to act freely.
ment.

The Swiss fired back and prepared to

Only then did Pius ask Galletti to from a govern-

He also nominated Rosmini and Mamiani to significant ministries,

but they declined.

Sterbini accepted the portfolio of Commerce and Pub-

lic Works, and now became virtual ruler of Rome through Galletti and his
control of the political clubs.

The members of the Assembly were so

cowed by those clubs and the mob violence that they almost ceased to
function.

Bolognese deputies Minghetti, Bevilacqua and Banzi resigned

their seats in disgust, and others followed their example.

Overcome

with despair, Pius decided to flee his capital and trust foreign monarchs to rescue him from his own subjects.

He slipped out of Rome the

night of November 25, aided by the Bavarian, Spanish and French ambassadors.

Once across the Ngapolitan frontier,

he took refuge at Gaeta

under the protection of Ferdinand II, and called for help to restore his
reign.

6
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After the Flight to Gaeta
once it became clear that Pius had left the Papal States, the remainder
of the Government was in somewhat of a quandry.

On one hand, Galletti's

November 16 cabinet felt compelled to carry on, if only because someone
had to do so.

On the other hand, the ministry and the councils only

existed because the Constitution allowed them to share the Pope's executive and legislative authority.
mandate to act.

At least in theory, they had no other

Until some other basis for their authority could be

established, their legitimacy as a governing body was very much in
doubt.

And

unle~s

there was a reconciliation with the Pope, the ability

of Galletti and company to continue in power demanded a high degree of
popularity with the citizenry.

This need to legitimatize themselves

served to condition nearly every element of the policy which followed.
Although heavily manipulated by Sterbini and the Circolo Popolare,
the violent mob of November 16 really DID represent a genuine popular
movement.

As a result, their demands became a sort of initial, unwrit-

ten charter for Galletti' s cabinet:

a democratic ministry,

social

reforms, creation of jobs, war on Austria, the Costituente, and Mamiani 's national program of June 5.

The first priority of what came to be

called the "Roman Parliament," was to create jobs, beginning with the
previously authorized rail line from Rome to Ceprano.

War minister Cam-

pello decided to hire unemployed tailors to make uniforms for the next
campaign.

Sterbini found artistic jobs for craftsmen to work on mosaics

in St. Mary Major, and restoration of paintings in other churches.

He

spent an existing Fine Arts fund, but saw that more money would be
needed.

So began a cycle of programs and spending which would mark the
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entire history of the Provisional and Republican regimes.

The need to

create employment was essential, but the money to pay for the programs
was hard to come by.

This chronic lack of funds was never solved (and

never seriously addressed) until Pius was restored to power. 61
The Provisional Government also hastened to clear away many of the
most annoying statutes and feudal remnants of the old regime: the fedecommesso (a perpetual trust status which prohibited sale of certain sections of land), encumbered noble estates which favored eldest sons as
heirs, feudal banalities and rural prohibitions on wood gathering, pasturing and the like, and above all, the hated grist tax. Although most
working people applauded the abolition of this last tax, the municipalities had to face the loss of a major source of their revenue.

62

The legislative agenda of the Provisional Government included more
social reform than any regime since the French Revolution.

The circle

most concerned with the radical re-organization of society was led by
former .exile Sterbini and the Prince of Canino.

Their closest collabo-

rators (all on record as favoring the working classes) included Carlo
Armellini, Fasci, Campello the War Minister, Captain Torre, Martini,
Sacripante, Giacomo Manzoni, Rusconi, and a few others.

With the sig-

nificant exception of Sterbini himself, none of these radical partisans
were veterans of the 1846 amnesty.
ies.

These were the "new" revolutionar-

Already under Pius IX, this faction had taken full advantage of

the liberalized press and association laws, and the implementation of
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the new constitution.

They had gained worthwhile support for their

programs by skillful use of the press and the political clubs, as well
as the election of some of their number to public office.

The Prince of

Canino was one of a small group who saw the circoli popolari as the
ideal means to promote Rome as the site for the Constituent Assembly,
which would then come under the sway of Mazzini and his Italian National
Society.

Mazzini, for his part, was very receptive to that idea; he saw

the social legislation of the Provisional Government as a healthy beginning for his populist campaign to set up an Italian republic.
the same policy

~ame

Echoes of

from clubs in Ancona and Forli' in appeals for a

popularly elected assembly to establish a new political order. 63
Meanwhile the Pope, from Gaeta, sought to undermine the Provisional Government.

He issued a brief on November 27 which stated that

all actions taken since his departure were null and void.

He then named

a 7-member Governative Commission (December 3) to rule in his name until
he returned to the Capital.

Although Sturbinetti and the Assembly waved

these acts aside as invalid ("issued on foreign soil and not signed by a
responsible minister"), they also sent a deputation to Pius to work out
a reconciliation.

The envoys were turned back at the frontier.

64

The other major issue was to decide what was to be done about
Italian unification.

There were still two possibilities alive.

The

Tuscan plan for a Constituent Assembly would decide the fate of Italy
without compromising the sovereignty of the people, expressed through
universal manhood suffrage.

The alternate plan was Gioberti's Confeder-
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ation of States, to be implemented by princes without any direct, popular initiative.

The issue of the Costituente would not go away.

Canino

and his partisans were a clear minority in the Assembly, but the moderates realized that their status was uncertain.

They had, after all,

been elected as deputies to support and advise the Pope, who now refused
to acknowlege their validity as legislators.

Resignations continued to

weaken the cabinet, which finally fell on December 23.

The new cabinet

dissolved parliament, calling for new elections, and hence a new popular
mandate.

The election was ·set for January 21 and would choose 200 depu-

ties by direct and univetsal suffrage.

Before this balloting took

place, however, the cabinet received a strong petition from the "Committee of Italian Clubs," an umbrella organization of many of the more radical societies; it demanded that the 100 most popular candidates be
declared the Roman delegation to a Constituent Assembly, "providing a
nucleus for a unified Italy, based on universal suffrage and a sovereign
mandate. 1165 The government agreed on January 17, and the elections took
on that added significance.
The Pope issued a condemnation of the election and banned any form
of participation or support.

But 200,000 to 250,000 votes were cast,

perhaps one third of all those eligible, although .this data is difficult
to determine.

Demarco gives a breakdown of those elected according to

profession and social class.

He points out that there were only 27

nobles among the 200, as opposed to 33 in the previous Assembly of 125,
and almost all of the High Council.

One of these noblemen was Canino,

of course, who was far more radical than most commoners.
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majority of the others were upper bourgeoisie and professional men.
Only 24 deputies were re-elected from previous councils, the rest were
new.

Of special interest to this study are the 24 deputies previously

exiled or imprisoned under Gregory XVI.

Most moderate leaders made it a

point not to participate in the election, still holding out for a reconciliation with Pius, but their boycott appears to have attracted little
popular support.
Pope 1 s ban;
extremists,

A few moderates did participate, however, despite'the

Mamiani was one who refused to abandon the field to the
and was elected easily.

Mazzini, Garibaldi and several

other foreigners were also elected, although Mazzini did not arrive in
person until March.

Because of duplications or renunciations on the

part of those elected, there were several follow-up elections before all
200 deputies were chosen. 66
The new Constituent Assembly, its ranks still incomplete, formally
met for the first time on February 5, 1849.
of the Pope's temporal power was introduced.

Four days later, the issue
After a furious debate,

142 members voted in favor of terminating the Papal State "in theory and
in fact."

Pius IX was deposed in favor of a Roman Republic, which would

function as a pure democracy.

Never one to shrink from a fight, Teren-

zio Mamiani led the debate against the resolution,, and voted "no" with 8
others.

There were also 12 abstentions,

absentees.

1 conditional vote and 37

Mamiani and several others resigned their seats before the

end of the month. 67
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To replace the Pope as executive, the Assembly decided on a Triumvirate.

Mattia Montecchi, a former prisoner, was one of the first tri-

umvirs, together with Armellini and Salicetti.

The better known triad

of Mazzini, Armellini and Saffi did not take power until March 23, after
the battle of Novara.

Sterbini kept his cabinet seat for Commerce and

Public Works, and Galletti retained control of the Police.

The new

republican legislature would spend most of its efforts on just two
items: defending itself, and responding to the petitions and needs of
its citizens.
April, the

Since defense would not become a critical issue until

earli~st

legislation showed a determined effort to redesign

the social and economic fabric of the state.
rebuild faith in the pitiful economy.

First came efforts to

The Republic assumed the national

debt, then declared Church property and deposits to be property of the
state (February 21).

Treasury bonds continued to lose value, however,

necessitating forced loans at a later time.

The Assembly abolished the

bishops' authority over the universities and schools (February 25), then
dissolved the Holy Off ice and the other ecclesiastical tribunals (February 29).

Demarco considers these actions to be genuinely revolutionary,

since the clergy lost control of most remaining phases of public life.
He credits the Assembly with the willingness to keep trying economic
remedies until something worked, but cautiously adds that the seizure of
church property was certainly a convenient shortcut, but a one-time
action, which could never be repeated.
hostility of the clergy. 68
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Finances continued to be a headache for the Triumvirate.

Despite

the sale of religious assets, monetary instability continued because of
inflation, deficit spending,

and a general loss of faith in the new

paper currency.· The "right to work" principle of the early days of the
provisional government demanded that jobs be available to anyone in
need.

Despite the shortness of credit, 1200 workers and artists were

put to work on the restoration of St. Paul's basilica.

Housing for the

poor was provided in the former Holy Office building, and in other
houses and convents.
was abolished,

The salt tax and monopoly of the Torlonia family

and unused church land was given to peasants.

These

measures were intensely popular when they were granted, but the long
range result of many social experiments was not good.
cial administrations were
demands and empty coffers.

Local and provin-

in severe trouble because of increasing
By May, most commoners complained that the

government had put them into the precarious dilema of abundant jobs
(working for the state, if nothing else), but wages paid in nearly
worthless money.

The combination of severe inflation, bonds without

backing, requisitions, and forced loans eventually eroded the support
for the government among nearly all but the most ardent republicans.
Even without war, the Triumvirate would have reached a financial crisis
by summertime.
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By February 18, Pius IX admitted that there could be no reconciliation; he asked Catholic Europe for help to restore him to power.

Along

with a Neapolitan force assembled by his host, Ferdinand, substantial
numbers of troops from France, Spain and Austria would assemble to
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extinguish the upstart Republic.

Because the so-called First War of

Independence was over before Rome's troubles began, support for the
Republic also came from northern diehards who wanted to prolong the
struggle wherever possible.

In addition to Garibaldi's own Red Shirts,

substantial numbers of experienced fighters from the north joined the
defenders, including Luciano Manara's battalion of Lombard Bersaglieri.
One of the refugees from the abortive revolt in Genoa was Giuseppe Avezzana, who would serve the Republic as a War Minister.

Most leaders had

no illusions about Rome's ability to defy Europe indefinitely, but the
coming struggle .began to take on the aura of an apocalyptic clash
between the combined forces of Italian nationalism and the might of the
old order on the peninsula.

70

While the Republic was striving to build its popularity and moral
authority among its own citizens, the military forces of Austria, Spain,
France, and the Two Sicilies prepared to overthrow it.

Mazzini's gov-

ernment was considerably hurt in the eyes of the international community
by disorders within the Roman State.

Widespread murder and factional

fighting in the Legations and Marches,

(especially in Ancona during

March and April) betrayed his lack of control on provinces outside the
walls of Rome.

The chaos in Ancona culminated with the murder of an

Irish Carmelite friar on April 19, with a subsequent British protest and
the dispatch of a warship to Ancona harbor.

This sensitive condition

eased only when Felice Orsini imposed draconian police measures in late
April, and regained control of Rome's largest port.

Just as damaging to

the prestige of the Republic were several local uprisings among rural
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communities in the provinces of Ascoli and Fermo.

Badly needed Repub-

lican troops had to be detatched from combat duty to regain control of
those sectors in April and May of the same year.

71

After the battle of Novara, the Austrian army was free to begin a
systematic occupation of the Legations
slow but relentless,

and beyond.

This process was

and involved relatively few major battles, since

the bulk of the Republican troops had been concentrated in the capital.
Although Spanish and Neapolitan preparations were proceeding, it was the
French army under General Oudinot which was in a position to strike at
the heart of the. upstart regime.

Even when his force of 10,000 troops

landed at Civitavecchia, there was a great deal of doubt as to whether
the French had come as friends or adversaries.

Prince-President Louis-

Napoleon Bonaparte had good reason to favor Mazzini's immediate expulsion,

since he was eager to enhance his political standing among the

French clericals, and also improve his image as an international arbiter
and peacekeeper.

But there was an equally strong democratic- republican

faction in the French National Assembly which saw the Roman regime as a
kindred state and a potential ally against despotism.

The vagueness of

Oudinot's orders reflected the ambivalence of his own government.

He

was given the impression that the Triumvirate was an unpopular usurpation which could be easily removed.
leaders with respect, he should not
legitimacy as a government.

71
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Although he was told to treat the
imply any recognition of their
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The only real hope for the Romans, under these circumstances, was
French public opinion.

If the views of Alexandre Ledru-Rollin, Ferdi-

nand deLesseps, and other French democrats prevailed, then Oudinot's
army might actually shield the capital from the other three forces, and
buy enough time for the Triumvirs to establish themselves in power.
This hope ebbed away slowly, however, as Bonaparte held out for the use
of force.
Paris,

The final chapter came on June 13, when the

11

Red 11 faction in

led by Ledru-Rollin, attempted an insurrection over earlier

French actions against the Roman Republic.

The army quickly suppressed

the effort, and .the police arrested socialist and democratic leaders,
some deputies among them.
been remov<:::.d.

The last obstacle to a military solution had

73

At first, Oudinot was able to take advantage of the uncertainty of
his mission.

He pursuaded the troops guarding Civitavecchia (commanded

by former exile Pietramellara) to permit his landing, then disarmed them
to make sure that there would be no resistance to French control of the
port.

Loudly proclaiming that his forces were a threat to no one, he

marched the 40 miles to Rome, only to discover that Garibaldi's legionaires and Manara's Lombards had arrived mere days ahead of him.

In his

eagerness to establish a French presence, Oudinot decided to seize control of the city on April 30 by a coup de

The result was a costly

assault against the Pertusa Gate which had long since been walled up,
but not shown as such on the French maps.

Although surprised at first,

the Roman defenders rallied to defend the walls and the Vatican gardens.
After 6 bloody hours, the French withdrew, leaving 500 casualties and
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365 prisoners in Roman hands.

74

This abortive assault cost the French

whatever elements of surprise or good will which they might otherwise
have enjoyed.

It also encouraged the defenders to redouble their prepa-

rations for a siege, as it proved that even the French army could be
defeated on a given day.
Oudinot, for his part, asked for an armistice, and offered to
exchange Pietramellara's men for those prisoners taken by the Romans.
He also realized that his present force was unequal to a proper siege of
the fortified capital and its now arroused defenders.

So he struck an

agreement to refrain from further attacks, and sat beck to await reinforcements and heavy artillery.

Garibaldi and the other Roman generals

took advantage of this temporary truce to deliver a smashing counterattack against the Neapolitans.

Ferdinand II's army had advanced into the

Alban hills southeast of Rome while the French were landing at Civitavecchia.

Garibaldi countered by advancing rapidly toward him with a

striking force of Rome's best troops.

Severly jolted at Palestrina (May

9) and Velletri (May 19), the Neapolitans withdrew in great disorder
toward their own frontier.

They contributed little else of value to the

French efforts during the rest of the campaign.
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On May 31, the day Garibaldi returned to.Rome, the French special
envoy Ferdinand de Lesseps signed an agreement with the Triumvirs
extending the peaceful truce, and agreeing to protect Rome against the
Austrians and Neapolitans.
pact.

But his home government never ratified the

Indeed, the use of force was all but certain, as Oudinot's army
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had now grown to over 20,000 men, including excellent artillery and
engineering units, and still more on the way.

Only a day after de Les-

seps' treaty, Oudinot informed Rome that the truce was at an end, though
he carefully specified that he would not attack 'the place' until June
4.

He interpreted his own words to mean that he would not attack Rome's
ifications before then.

However, he shrewdly planned to seize key

outposts in the Corsini and Pamphili villas; these commanded the essential approaches to the walls of the Gianicolo, the weakest defensive
sector.

Accordingly, strong French columns dashed into these villas in

the early hours of June 3, routing the handful of defenders, and gaining
positions which might otherwise have cost thousands of casualties to a
storming party.

A~though

the outrage of the Roman defenders prompted

them to fight like lions to regain this sector, mere zeal could not compensate for the villas' stout walls and good cover, now in French hands.
Although Garibaldi's men continued to hold the Vascello, a house well
sited to defend the San Pancrazi6 gate, they never succeeded in improving their position.

With uncharacteristic lack of skill, Garibaldi

threw hundreds of his own men against the villa walls in such a piecemeal fashion that he gained only heartbreaking casualties and stories of
heroic death.

Many of the most famous martyrs of 1849 - Angelo Masina,

Goffredo Mameli, Gaetano Bonnet, Enrico Dandolo, Francesco Daverio were killed in just a few hours during this fruitless carnage.

As the

French methodically moved up their heavy guns to begin a month-long
pounding of the ancient walls, the best among the officers of both sides
must have seen that the question had already been decided.
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Although a month of hard fighting still remained, there was little
hope left for the Republic.

Since Mazzini had made the struggle one of

Nationalism versus Reaction anyhow,
state's life dearly.

he was now careful to sell his

The future propaganda value of noble sacrifice and

symbolic gestures seemed to be his only remaining advantage.

Even after

French troops had stormed through breaches in the fortifications, Mazzini was careful to publish a new constitution as his final gesture
before handing over the government to others.

Although it was never put

into effect, it remains to·this day an interesting charter for a social
republic, founded on national pride.

Garibaldi was equally determined

to continue the fight as long as he was able.

He assembled the most

ardent of his followers (including Ciceruacchio and his sons) and made a
dramatic breakout through the French lines.

His bold escape and march

toward the north captured the imagination of many a patriot, although he
never actually succeeded in reaching beleaguered Venice with aid.

Oudi-

not' s soldiers streamed through the streets of the shattered capital,
and captured the remaining strongpoints with relative ease.

The French

set up their military government, and hoisted the French and Papal flags
over the Campidoglio and all public buildings.

Thus the Roman Republic

of 1849 passed from the political arena to the pages of epic literature.

CHAPTER IV

THE RESTORATION OF PIUS IX
Following the final collapse of all resistance on the part of the Republican forces, the French army set up a military occupation government in
conjunction with representatives of Pius IX.

Although the Pope himself

would not physically return until the middle of 1850, his ministers made
strenuous efforts to erase all traces of the Republic and its regime, as
though it were a bad dream which could safely be ignored once normal
activity was resumed.

With the Republic gone, General Oudinot now found

himself at odds with the ~ape's most conservative advisers, a handful of
zelanti who hoped to restore the

11

Gregorian 11 regime in its full vigor.

After the death and destruction his siege had caused, Oudinot hoped for
a generous, conciliatory agreement with the former republicans.

But

Pius and the court of Gaeta were not about to agree with him.
As early as 1831, Monsignor Corboli-Bussi had described the political condition of the Papal States in terms of a dying man who sought to
prolong his life with doses of poison.

Now in 1849, after two years of

failed reforms and one year of revolt, Pius found himself in the same
uncomfortable spot as had Bernetti in 1832.

He was no longer inclined

to tinker with the machinery of the state, since it had already come
crashing down around his ears.

Some curial cardinals seemed to favor

blind reaction, preserving everything and changing nothing, and hope to
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postpone the moment of final collapse.

1

Farini felt that the severity of

the restoration was a turning point in relations between Pius IX and his
subjects.

The Allocution of April 29, 1848 had been traumatic to the

hopes of most nationalists, but Farini was convinced that most Italians
continued to give him the benefit of the doubt.
erated, if not loved.

His government was tol-

But the restoration, occurring as it did, assured

nothing but contempt for papal rule on the part of both republicans and
moderate constitutionalists alike.

2

As the French troops entered the battered and defeated city on
July 3, a few d:i.e-hard republicans made their final gestures of defiance.

A mob near Palazzo Chigi attempted to attack ex-deputy Diomede

Pantaleoni and his friend Abate Perfetti, who had been strong backers of
Mamiani and the moderates;

Doctor Pantaleoni managed to defend himself

with a sword, but Perfetti was wounded.

Later the same afternoon, three

priests were stabbed and killed in a demonstration in Piazza Colonna.
Nevertheless, the French were able to re-establish order rather swiftly.
The only real result of the final disorders may have been to harden the
positions of the reactionaries when they restored civilian rule.

3

Oudi-

not quickly vested administrative power in a military government under
General Rostolan, who closed the clubs and political associations.

His

other emergency measures included a curfew, disarmament and preventive
censure, suspension of the press, and a ban on all posters and placards.
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Prince Odescalchi formed a provisional commission to replace the
republican communal administrators and assist Rostolan.

Defeated repub-

lican troops were confined to barracks, but Oudinot promised that they
would not otherwise be mistreated.

Soldiers and civilians from outside

the Roman State were encouraged to leave as soon as possible, although
even Mazzini stayed until July 16 without any trouble from the French.
When he did finally leave, it was simply because he decided it was time
to go.

4

The Triumvirs of the Republic and their closest collaborators left
in small groups with British or American passports.

These foreign docu-

ments were not closely inspected by the French officers at Civitavecchia;

most of them were already inclined to let the refugees depart

quietly aboard French steamers. 5 Sturbinetti, Galletti and Mariani were
allowed to emigrate with French passports and encouragement, largely to
avoid conflicts later.

6

By way of exception, officials at Civitavecchia

arrested ex-deputy Enrico Cernuschi.

Although he had also been the most

ardent member of the barricades committee, Cernuschi was only charged
with a part in the Piazza Colonna disorders of July 3, after the French
military government had been proclaimed.

7

The new French envoy, Franc-

isque de Corcelle, was a liberal Catholic and close friend of Alexis de
Tocqueville, who was beginning his short but eventful term as foreign
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minister (June 2 - October 31, 1849).

Corcelle saw the restoration as a

golden opportunity to streamline and consolidate the Poper s liberal
reforms of the 1846-8 period and to ensure the continuation of the "new"
Papal State, something Pius himself no longer believed in.

This align-

ment put him at odds with Esterhazy and the Austrian delegation, who
favored the "Gregorian" policy of no change whatever. 8 As things turned
out, Corcelle and his occupation forces continued to promote a mild and
conciliatory regime to replace the defeated Republic.

But Pius insisted

on biding his time and waiting for greater assurances that Paris would
restore total control of his state to him.

He considered himself to be

the principal injured party and saw no reason to allow others a hand in
making his policy.
was ill placed.

Any trust the French may have had in his benevolence

9

The Interim

of

Red Triumvirate

General Oudinot, anxious to begin withdrawal of his troops, grew impatient to return control of Rome to the Pope, and stated his wish to do
so by the end of July.

But Pius refused to be hurried, and sent cardi-

nals instead; he nominated the so-called "Red Triumvirate" to rule in
Rome until he returned.

The members were three "Gregorian" cardinals,

all considered reactionaries of one degree or another:

Cardinals

Gabriele Della Genga Sermattei, (nephew of Pope Leo XII), Luigi Vannicelli Casoni, and Ludovico Altieri.

The Austrians considered the first

two to be safely conservative and pro-Austrian, but found Altieri to be

8
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too "pro-French" and too open to the sort of experimentation that had
marked the Pope's early years.

10

In point of fact, Altieri was from a

distinguished Roman family with diplomatic experience in Vienna and a
strong devotion to Metternich, as well as to Pius.
described as intelligent

Della Genga is also

and proud, but strongly anti-liberal and

touched with rumors of scandal while Archbishop of Ferrara.

He had

strongly opposed the election of Pius IX, the amnesty, and all of his
reforms.

In his first years, Pius considered Della Genga to be his only

true enemy among the Cardinals.

Vannicelli, on the other hand, had no

evident ability pr education whatever; the only reason for his red hat
was friendship with Gregory XVI.

He had served as pro-Legate of

Ravenna, Governor of Rome and Legate of Bologna, and had performed badly
in all three positions.

He was finally removed from administrative work

by Pius IX and hidden in the presidency of the Lands Registry Office.

11

It is very curious that Pius now appointed this conservative but "bal-

anced" trio

(one friend, one enemy and one non-entity) to pave his

return to Rome.

Austrian Ambassador Esterhazy saw it as a more profound

political conversion than he had dared to imagine.

12

Had the Pope of the

amnesty and the Innovations disappeared forever in the smoke of the
siege guns?

If so, then Austrian policy in Italy could once again count

on Rome to be an anchor of conservatism.
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The Triumvirate's principal task was to bridge the gap between the
violent overthrow of the Republic and the peaceful celebration of the
Pope's return as a healer and conciliator.

Although the French military

government continued to occupy military strongpoints, Oudinot was only
too happy to relinquish control of all but security matters to civilians.

Officially known as the Governative Commission of State, the Tri-

umvirate had full powers to act in the Pope's name beginning from August
1, 1849.

Their first act, on August 2, was to annul everything which

had occurred since November 16, 1848 - the day that Pius consented to
the formation of. Galletti's cabinet.

From that point onward, they went

to work resetting the mechanism of government.

13

They began by reversing a French directive concerning the defeated
army.

Oudinot had always considered the Roman regular troops (about

8000 men) to be his greatest potential allies in restoring order.

He

had offered conciliatory guarantees to any military men who agreed to
enter the Pope's service.

14

The cardinals, however, never trusted the

army, and insisted that they were not bound by such promises made in the
heat of battle.

They discharged anyone who had enlisted since November

16; they also voided any promotions which had taken place since then,
and began a general investigation of the conduct of everyone else.

13
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Many anti-republicans were released from the prisons.

Among these

were partisans of Gregory XVI's government, including Colonel Stanislao
Freddi, one of the prime movers of the military commissions of 1843-4,
Captain Allai, another of the military

_z_e--'-'-'~~·

and large numbers of

ex-Papal Volunteers and centurioni imprisoned at Faenza.

Most of these

men had done nothing beyond favoring the Pope, so their release was
probably justified.

What was harder to excuse was the immediate incor-

poration of these bitter partisans into police service to track down and
punish their foes - a factious and utterly senseless measure.

16

The cardinals then appointed a "Council of Censure" to investigate
and decide the fate of all government employees who were still at their
posts.

This measure was not so much aimed at appointees of the Republic

(who were simply dismissed out of hand) as it was against those of the
former Papal administration who had held onto their off ices even after
the flight to Gaeta.

This vindictive act stirred up much resentment and

hostility toward the new regime on the part of those who might otherwise
have been friendly.

17

There were two particular target groups for this Council.

The

first was made up of state employees in general, such as school teachers, provincial magistrates, postal employees, and even cleaning women.
The other group consisted of members of the "Famiglia Palatina," the
papal household, and other employees of the Apostolic Palaces:
goons, coachmen, clerks, kitchen helpers and similar workers.

draRecords

indicate meticulous investigation of hundreds of names, but few, if any,
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charges were ever brought against the vast majority of these perfectly
harmless people.

Quite the contrary, many of those investigated main-

tained an almost childlike fidelity to the Holy Father, sometimes at the
expense of great personal suffering and abuse.

Most suspects were never

prosecuted or indicted for disloyalty of any sort.

18

These individuals,

like many service and governmental workers elsewhere, were generally
loyal to their employer, but relatively lethargic and inert when it came
to confronting those who represented an opposing system, like the Republie.

This "lack of fervor'~ was enough to incur the wrath of the Council

of Censure.

It is uncertain how many of the same people may have walked

away in disgust after their grilling, but Doctor Pantaleoni, for one,
wrote on August 7 that he felt compelled to leave the country which
countenanced such disgusting treatment of its own citizens.

19

The Cardinals also appointed a Council of Ministers to take over
the regular adminstration.

This cabinet contained only 5 members, 4 of

them laymen; but the single cleric was Monsignor Savelli, who received
the portfolio of the Interior, including control of the Police.

This

was the same Savelli who led rebels against the Republic in Ascoli, a
sharp and talented Corsican with a reputation for being violent and
avaricious.

The Ministry of Grace and Justice went to Avvocato Gian

Santo, a man of integrity but little imagination, while Camillo Jaco-
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bini, an honest farmer, took over the combined Ministry of Commerce,
Industry, Fine Arts and Public Works.

Angelo Galli, the new Minister of

Finance, was well known as a fiscal bungler. 20 The War Ministry was held
by a nobleman known for his loyalty and little else.
' new
o f t h is

11

Despite the image

1aymen I s cab'ine t , !! i' t was on 1y the tough-minded Monsignor
'

Savelli who held the lion's share of administrative and punitive
power. 21
Finally, the Triumvirate set up a special Court of Inquiry to
investigate all crimes against religion, against the majesty of the sovereign, and against public and private safety.

Over the next several

years, this special court would zealously prosecute many real and imagined threats to Papal rule.

Most of the political cases which reached

the Consulta between 1849 and 1854 began as investigations by the Court
of Inquiry.

Thus the Triumvirate set in motion the legal machinery

which generated much of the data used in the present study. 22
Alarmed by what he considered the harsh mis-government of the Triumvirate, Oudinot petitioned the Pope to return quickly in person.
replied that he would, but did not do so.

Pius

The French President Louis

Napoleon Bonaparte was also incensed by the actions of the three cardinals, whose policy was seen as overtly pro-Austrian.

Bonaparte was anx-

ious to maintain public support at home for his policy of restoring the
Pope to his throne, but knew likewise that he could not survive if it
looked like he favored destruction of a sister republic, and the repres-
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sion of the wishes of a sovereign people.

He told the Chamber of Depu-

ties that France had acted to preserve human rights, and should be
respected for doing so.

Upset that the cardinals never mentioned the

sacrifices of the French soldiers, he now took steps to win a more generous policy from Gaeta.

23

President Bonaparte concisely stated his own program in a letter
(dated August 18, 1849) to Colonel Edgar Ney, a trusted aide and envoy.
He intended the letter for General Rostolan, who was to replace Oudinot,
and would be the cornerstone of French policy during the restoration
process.

The letter listed four elements designed to restore harmony

and reconciliation as soon as possible:

a general amnesty, a secular-

ized administration, a liberal ministry, and implementation of the Code
Napoleon.

Since the French had restored the Temporal Power, he did not

feel this was too much to ask.

24

Pius found Ney's policy too threatening to his own independence;
he immediately acted to show that he was unwilling to return home as a
mere pawn of the French army.

On September 4, he left Gaeta with his

Court-in-Exile, but not for Rome.

In company with his host, King Ferdi-

nand II, he sailed further south to Portici, where he would remain for
another seven months, stubbornly insisting that only full sovereignty
and independence of the military forces could suffice. 25 This delay is
significant because the practical steps to a genuine reconciliation were
postponed yet again.

The Triumvirate Cardinals freely continued their
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policy of repression and alienation.
With an eye toward establishing a "presence" in Rome without actually being present, Pius issued a Motu Proprio on September 12, in which
he set out broad guidelines for the governmental structure to follow.
The first four of the six parts traced the outlines of the future Council of State to advise him on major administrative and legislative
issues, an Assembly for Finance, Provincial Diets and autonomous Municipal Diets;

members of these bodies were to be appointed from lists nom-

inated by the broadest suitable franchise, and all would support a consultive

administ~ation.

The fifth element vaguely promised reforms of

the administration and of the civil and criminal courts.

The sixth and

final paragraph granted the second (1849) amnesty to "victims of the
seduction, hesitation or inactivity of others. 11

This policy statement

had the desired effect on both Austrian and French representatives; both
declared their satisfaction. 26 Even the most casual analysis of this
Portici manifesto shows that the Pope's political principles had not
advanced beyond the Memorandum of 1831.

Bland and outdated by 1848

standards, he still resurrected that document as the key to restoring
the Temporal Regime, just as he had in 1846.

By now Pius felt that his

earlier reforms had failed, but his personality still forced him to concede something else, without knowing how or what.

27

Revolution notwithstanding, one thing which had not changed since
1846 was the staunch opposition of most Cardinals to political change of
any sort.

After the Motu Proprio of Portici, both Antonelli and Pius
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were again subjected to severe criticism by many Curial prelates and
officials for their "liberalism" in not restoring the ultra-stable system of Gregory XVI.

It is essential to remember that Antonelli was not

considered to be a reactionary by his fellow cardinals, but a reckless
innovator and opportunist.

The Austrophile faction within the Sacred

College increased its influence by insisting that the Pope's return not
take place until the French occupation forces had been reduced below
10,000 men.

28

Thus the formal return did not take place until April,

1850.
Before we abandon the subject of Austrian influence, it is important to recall that Austrian forces still occupied the Legations, the
Marches, and Umbria, and that Austrian military governors ruled those
regions harshly, with or without the consent of the papal representatives.

Despite the theoretical alliance between France and Austria to

restore the Papal regime, Austro-French relations remained tense.

Franz

Josef's new ministry in Vienna considered French intervention in Italy
to be not only an encroachment on Austrian prerogatives, but a source of
destabilization.

The Second Republic in Paris, on the other hand, saw

Austrian hegemony as a continuing source of trouble, which provoked
rebellion instead of repressing it.

President Bonaparte knew that he

needed a speedy resolution of the Roman occupation, or he would fe.ce
public opposition at home for overstepping his authority.

Most French

deputies were willing enough to support a short-term peacekeeping force,
but they rebelled at promoting the severe pacification of another state.
But the Austrians planned just such an operation, hoping to permanently

28
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cripple liberal movements in the Papal States.

The lines of conflict

between Vienna and Paris had been drawn. 29
Unlike the French occupation zone, the Austrian sector was closely
supervised by the military.

Pro-legates and other local administrators

had seen their power effectively reduced to a largely ceremonial level.
For example, the Extraordinary Commissioner for the Legations was Mansignor Bedini, a close friend of the Pope and a native of Sinigallia.

In

theory, he was to be the supreme civilian authority in the region, yet
he conformed so closely to ·the policy of General Gorzhowski, that he was
widely considered to be a mere rubber stamp for the Austrians.

Austrian

officials cons.idered any anti-government activity to be treason, no matter how trivial, and therefore subject to a possible death sentence.

By

sharp contrast, there were examples in Lazio of well-disciplined Spanish
or French troops protecting civilians from the local police whenever
they felt that justice was not being served.

Yet Austrian officials

continued to comport themselves as conquerors, rather than peacekeepers.
They acted as though the overly permissive papal governors had brought
the revolt upon themselves, and should be treated with disdain.
to complete the humiliation of the Pope,

As if

the Austrian government

insisted on billing Rome for the occupation forces, while the soldiers
of the other states served at the expense of their own governments.

29
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The Second Amnesty
The Triumvirate published the amnesty in Rome on September 18, 1849, the
date associated with it ever since.

It is significant that this second

pardon was broad enough to encompass nearly all who had supported the
Provisional and Republican governments.

Although it obviously made good

political sense, it also betrayed the hard fact that so many Roman citizens needed a formal reconciliation with their sovereign.

Too many of

them had supported some or all of the events after November 15, 1848,
and it was impossible to punish them all.

Yet Antonelli and Pius could

afford to be generous; they were firmly and safely in charge, with
French bayonets to back them up.

They actually had more control over

the machinery of government during the occupation than at any time
before it, or afterward.

According to Farini, the time at Portici

marked Antonelli's rise to the peak of his influence.

His own fidelity

to Pius throughout the exile was still appreciated, and the infighting
between French and Austrian partisans had paralyzed many other potential
advisers.

Cardinals Della Porta and Piccolomini were dismissed as too

reform-minded.

Other wise and temporate men, Amat, Orioli, Giacchi,

Bofondo, Marini and Soglia, remained in the Pope's good graces, but outside his inner circle of power.

Curiously, Antonelli continued to be

criticized as "too liberal" by many of his contemporaries among the car· dinals.

31

The amnesty of 1849 specifically excluded several groups, particularly those who were leaders in the Provisional government, the Constituent Assembly, and the Republic; Mazzini and his fellow Triumvirs were
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high on the list of offenders.

It also banned members of any Assembly

who accepted election and took part in the proceedings.

Some of these

claimed that they had worked with the Pope's interests in mind, but
their arguments were ignored.

Pius had already declared from Gaeta that

it was a political crime to co-operate with the Provisional Government
or, to support the Republic by accepting election to its highest legislative body.

Other suspects among the civil administrators included the

presidi of the provinces, directors of the police, regional commissars,
and presidents of the civil and criminal tribunals, if they were nominated by the Repµblican government.

There were further exclusions for

all those who had been leaders of military units, whether regular army,
civic legions, or volunteer formations.

After a few clarifications, the

term "military leaders 11 came to signify those who held the rank of major
or above.
ing doubts.

Several more inquiries followed to clarify and remove linger32

Finally, the second amnesty excluded all individuals who

had received the amnesty of 1846; and all those who had been accused of
ordinary crimes.
Farini protested the injustice of what he called this "punishment
by class," which lumped together, without distinction, all participants
in Provisional Government, Constituent Assembly and Republic.

In so

doing, the Pope glossed over the very real differences between those who
actually planned the revolution (chiefly republicans), and those who

32
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tried to oppose the revolution from a position of strength (mainly
constitutionalists).

Farini insisted that most moderate deputies acted

courageously in speaking out against what they saw as republican
excesses, even when they knew they were a minority in the Assembly.
Their only real "crime" had been the decision to participate in government rather than abstain.

By failing to set off the real revolutionar-

ies from all others, the reactionaries swept everyone outside their own
clique into one grand massa damnata, and virtually assured their own
isolation instead.

Farini ·sees this tactical error as one of the criti-

cal shortcomings of the Restoration, one which called into question the
entire future of Papal government.

33

A second major criticism of the new amnesty was the vague and
uncertain wording of most of the terms and guidelines.

This vagueness

may actually have been carefully calculated by the more reactionary cardinals to create a broad "gray area" which removed the clear protection
of law from their political rivals.

Obviously, the motivation of polit-

ical crimes and disloyal actions is open to broad interpretation.

So

instead of healing the wounds left by war and revolution, the amnesty
became a vehicle for any rigorists bent on breaking the power of their
political foes.

As things turned out, the Cardinal Triumvirs and some

of the judges who followed them interpreted events even before the
flight to Gaeta as worthy of prosecution:

abusing liberty of the (then

free) press, the fighting beyond the Po, taking part in political meetings while they were still legal, and so forth.

In a few cases, Cardi-

nal Vannicelli even dipped into the previous pontificate for charges,
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even though they had technically been forgiven in 1846 by Pius himself.

34

Many high-profascicolo public figures, as we have seen, did not
wait to be accused or indicted of real or imagined crimes, but chose
voluntary exile rather than fight a hopeless battle.

Among them were

Farini himself, Mamiani, Federico Torre, Giuseppe Galletti, Carlo Rusconi and others too numerous to mention.

35

Poor Mamiani was very badly

treated by the Papal government he had tried to defend.

He had argued

convincingly in the Constituent Assembly that the Pope should not be
deprived of his .Temporal Power, then resigned from that body when i t
voted against his advice, earning himself much abuse from the most
ardent republicans.

36

state altogether.

As a final insult, the Holy Office seized his per-

Now the Red Triumvirate pressured him to leave the

sonal papers for "evaluation" (including writings on philosophy, literature, politics and history) and never returned them.

Pantaleoni had

suffered a similar loss of personal papers upon departure.

As things

turned out, Mamiani was subsequently elected to several Italian Parliaments (third through eighth) from many different districts, and functioned honorably as a deputy.

He also served as Minister of Public

Instruction in Cavour's cabinet, and as President of the Council under
Cavour.

He was nominated to the Senate in 1864, and died on May 21,

1885. 37 Had the Triumvirate followed a more conciliatory policy, these
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and other talented men might have felt welcome enough to continue working for the government of Rome, and not its rival in Turin.
Altogether, those who were proscribed, exiled, dismissed from
office, and otherwise excluded from positions of influence were numbered
in the "thousands," according to Farini.

They included not only con-

vinced republicans, but constitutionalists, moderate reformers and people unconnected with any group.

The net result was great disenchantment

with Pius IX and his government among the Roman nobility, lower clergy,
and others who had been hi& early friends.
The Political Trials of

38

Restoration

Over the next five years, the Consulta, sitting as the court of appeal
in all political cases, reviewed a huge number of trials covering everything from printing and spreading seditious literature, to murders and
violent robbery with political or partisan motivation.

These trials did

not include the principal leaders of the Republic who, as we have seen,
were allowed by French military forces to emigrate before being
arrested.

This example of "mercy by neglect" allowed many deputies,

administrators and military officers to find their way out of the country without further harassment.

But far from being a denial of justice,

this "laxity" helped to stabilize the war-torn state and avoided the
divisive agony of political trials against popular leaders.
Among these refugees, as among those who decided to remain, there
were recipients of the 1846 pardon who now found themselves under suspicion.

38

It is now possible to determine who and how many of this original

Farini, IV, 317.

141
group were caught up in the later turmoil of 1848-9.

Simply stated,

those who had received the amnesty of 1846 remained out of the political
arena to a very surprising degree.

These men were politically sensi-

tized, and had already suffered exile or imprisonment for their principles at least once; their initial tendency was to return to the forum to
promote those ideals one more time.
be considered otherwise by

~_!!Y

But they did not.

Those who could

stretch of the imagination number only

160 of the 989 individuals in this study: about 16%, but no more.

One

possible reason is that many of the remaining 84% saw no future for
themselves in acting against the Pope's government.

The slow, deliber-

ate change of 1846-8 had given them enough hope to keep them content.
Although it can not be proven by these statistics, it is possible that
the alternative of following Sterbini (or Mazzini) appeared to uncertain, or too dangerous.

The previous reforms, though modest, looked

good enough to them that radical change could bring it down like a house
of cards.
If, indeed, this was "silent support" for Pius IX and his moderate
program of reform, the quiet 84% would be disappointed.

By 1849, Pius

and most of the cardinals had given up on reform - the only new opening
was to the conservatives, as embodied by the Red Triumvitate.

Taken in

this light, the choices of the Restoration appear to have been even more
crucial.

Moderates who felt they had remained loyal to the Pope at

great cost to themselves, and now had nothing to show for it, could look
to Piedmont or elsewhere for their salvation.

At least for them, the

Restoration was more tragic than the rigors of the revolution itself.
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Even allowing for those individuals who fit more than one category, most fall into four broad groupings:
1.

Officials, deputies and administrators of the intervening
regimes

(Provisional Government,

Constituent Assembly and

Republic).
2.

Military officers and men (regular army, volunteers or civic
guard) who fought for the above.

3.

Anyone who commited violent or other crimes which might carry
some degree of

4.

polit~cal

or partisan motivation.

Purely political offenders with no other crimes to their
charge; such acts as speaking, writing or disseminating literature which criticized the Church-State or promoted secret
societies.
LEGISLATORS AND ADMINISTRATORS

Perhaps the most highly visible group of participants in the political
process were elected members of the Constituent Assembly.

No more than

25 names from the 1846 amnesty list match the 200 representatives
elected, but some are quite familiar.
elected easily.

Galletti and Sterbini were

So were many leaders of the revolts of 1843-5: Bel-

trami, Pasi and Zambeccari, Vincenzo Caldesi and ·his cousin Ludovico,
Mattia Montecchi, and the young zealot Felice Orsini.

Some of these

deputies, as we will see shortly, would also distinguish themselves as
military leaders, and a few as local administrators.

But most of the

others turned out to be unremarkable - and ultimately harmless - both
before and after their election.

Geographically, 13 of the 25 were from
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the Legations (including most of those just named), while only 7 represented Lazio and 5 from the Marches.

These names were automatically

excluded by the Pope when they were elected.

39

The second amnesty also excluded all provincial governors (presidi) during the Pope's absence.

The central police office sent a cir-

cular letter to all provincial administrators on August 25,
requesting names and biographical data on these presidi.

1849

The replies

include several members of the 1846 amnesty group, including two who
were also deputies.
listed as third

~nd

In the Legations region, Count Oreste Biancoli was
final administrator of the province of Bologna, sue-

ceeding Carlo Berti-Pichat in April,

1849.

Biancoli remained there

until the Austrian capture of Bologna, when he resigned his powers to
the municipal council.

Also listed is Count Francesco Lovatelli, who

was preside of Ferrara before November 16, and stayed at his post until
resigning in protest at the proclamation of the Constituent Assembly.

40

Lovatelli was, in fact, very devoted to Pius IX and his early reform
program.

He decided to remain in office after the flight of the Pope

simply because he would be of no use as a mediator if he resigned.

Dur-

ing the previous year he had almost single handedly saved Imola from
anarchy during Durando's march northward.

He had asked for extra troops

39

ASR, RR, busta 1, fascicolo 2. This is an interesting collection
of the-rists of deputies, both printed and hand written, following the
elections of January 21, 1849. There are minor differences in these
lists, which represent interim and final election results.
40
ASR, ASP, busta 304, fascicolo 120. The key element here is a
circular letter from police headquarters, dated August 25, 1849, asking
for names and information on the presidi of all provinces during the
provisional and republican periods. Several responses to the circular
are also included.
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and police to restore order (there had been 20 attempted murders in one
month).

When these never arrived, he simply used the force of his per-

sonality and his reputation as a leading local reformer to re-establish
tranquility there in less than two weeks.

41

Like his friends Farini,

Mamiani and Minghetti, Count Lovatelli had hoped for vindication by the
Pope for his earlier services.

Unlike them, he chose to remain in the

Papal States after the restoration.

Seven years later, he was assassi-

nated by militant republicans who considered him a traitor.

His murder-

ers were never convicted; their trial was suspended in 1860, when Italy
annexed the eastern provinces of the Papal States, and never resumed.

42

In the Marches, two other recipients of the 1846 amnesty were presidi of important provinces.
Ancona for

Giuseppe Camillo Mattioli was in charge at

the entire period, as was Francesco Bubani at Fermo.

Although Mattioli was elected deputy, he never took his seat in Rome,
but remained in Ancona.

He was largely blamed for the violent disorders

not only in the city of Ancona, but in Jesi, Corinaldo and the rest of
the province as well.

Bubani is described by the police report as very

anticlerical, despite good skills as an administrator.

He is accused of

being the force behind attempts to seize church property in his province, and especially as the one responsable for the arrest of Cardinal
DeAngelis, Archbishop of Fermo. 43
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In Lazio, Pietro Sterbini is listed as the second preside of Frosinone, his home territory.

Even though he was a deputy, he apparently

had no difficulty administering the nearby province after the resignation of Francesco Mayr.

Since Sterbini was already one of the chief

promoters of the revolutionary movement, his seat in Frosinone was the
very least of his problems.

44

Another significant administrator was Dr. Tomasso Zauli-Sajani of
Forli'.
city,

He had been president of the Circolo Popolare in his native

and was appointed governor of Albano during the Republic.

police dossier d~scribes him as

11

His

an inflamatory presence" in Albano,

responsable for encouraging other.like-minded republicans in their opposition to the Pope, and also accuses him of taking 116 scudi and a gold
ring with him as he departed from the city.

The police recommendation

is that he be excluded from the amnesty because he went back on his earlier word of honor.

45

A lesser administrator worthy of note is a Roman, Luigi Uffreduzzi.
Ripa

During the Republic, he served as police commissioner for the

& Trastevere

port the Republic,

district of the city.
but also possessed

Not only did he allegedly supliterature and organizational

material pertaining to secret societies.

He is also accused of occupa-

tion and requisition of church property, as well as possible implication
in the San Calisto murders and the "Cardinals' Carriages" case (treated
below).

44

45

Uffreduzzi was arrested in January,

1850 and brought to trial

ASR, ASP, busta 304, fascicolo 120.

ASR, ASP, busta 308, fascicolo 250. Here are filed police reports
and letters dealing with suspects from the Comarca district. Zauli-Sajani is described in entry # 23 under the city of Albano.
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on these charges.

The proceedings had to be suspended, however, when he

escaped from the Castel Sant' Angelo in December of the same year.

46

MILITARY LEADERS
According to the guidelines of the 1849 amnesty, "military leaders with
the rank of major and above" were to be excluded from the pardon.

This

study has identified 14 names which fit this description and were also
beneficiaries of the 1846 amnesty.
There is· a certain degree of overlap, especially among aristocrats, when we consider the military leadership.

Four of the deputies

already listed were also officers above the rank of Major:
Pasi, Pescantini and Zambeccari.

Bartolucci,

Each of the four was also a unit com-

mander who figured prominently in the struggles against French and Austrian forces.

The story of the siege of Rome would have been quite dif-

ferent without them.
Cavaliere Luigi Bartolucci is probably the most significant officer in the sample under consideration.

He helped to organize the First

Volunteer Regiment during the earliest days of the spring campaign of
1848, and served in that unit as Lieutenant Colonel.

Later, he was pro-

moted to Colonel and transerred to the Second Volunteers as commander.

47

46

ASR, TSC, busta 219, fascicolo 143.
These documents are court
transcripts outlining the charges and judgements against Uffreduzzi,
even after his escape.
47
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Because of his service in Napoleon's army, including the Russian
campaign, he had more professional experience than the vast majority of
his collegues.

His Second Volunteers fought well in Veneto despite

their lack of experience and training, but Bartolucci 1 s own skill and
daring helped General Ferrari far more than his men's zeal.

On April

10, 1849, the day after the Republic was proclaimed, he was promoted to
General.

During the siege of Rome, he commanded the division defending

all fortifications to the east of the Tiber.

The only walls not under

his control were those of the vulnerable Gianicolo & Trastevere sectors.
That division was assigned to Ferrari, and later to Garibaldi. 48
Upon the elevation of Bartolucci to staff duties, Count Raffaele
Pasi took command of the Second Volunteer Regiment.

Pasi was already a

Colonel and had commanded the volunteers from Faenza the previous year.
In the reorganization of units, the Second Volunteers was renamed the
Sixth Regiment of the Line, and served honorably throughout the siege.
Just before the entry of the French, Pasi fell back to the Castel Sant 1 Angelo with his regiment and disbanded it before returning to exile. 49
The remaining two officer/deputies also commanded volunteer units
raised for the campaign against Austria in the spring of 1848.

Count

Livio Zambeccari raised and commanded the battalion "Cacciatori del Alto
Reno, 11 composed mainly of men from the province of Bologna.

The Alto

Reno battalion fought well in the campaigns north of the Po, then was
incorporated into the newly formed Eighth Regiment of the Line for the

48
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11

Il

generale Luigi Bartolucci, 11 Capitolium,
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defense of

Rome.

Lieutenant

Colonel Federico

Pescantini was

founding commander of the "Pio IX" battalion of Lugo.

the

Though full of

nationalistic zeal in the Veneta campaign, the "Pio IX" battalion was so
badly mauled by the Austrian regulars that it could not be rebuilt.

Its

remnants were incorporated into the "Unione" regiment, a new composite
unit which proved to be much more durable,

and

later provided the

nucleus of the Ninth Regiment of the Line in a subsequent reorganization.

Both of these line regiments served nobly during the defense of

Rome.so
Two other .officers,

though not deputies, were significant unit

commanders in their own right.

Marchese Pietro Pietramellara raised and

led the "Bersaglieri del Reno," also known as the "Melara" battalion,
after the popular shortening of his name.

The Bersagleri had made a

name for themselves by their spirited defense of Vicenza during Durando' s campaign.

With the proclamation of the Republic, Pietramellara's

unit was charged with the

defens~

of Civitavecchia.

Although surprised

and captured by the French, the unit was exchanged for French prisoners
taken in the ill-fated assault of April 30, and was able to participate
in the principal events of the siege,
Pamphili, Villa Corsini and Parioli.

including the battles of Villa
Lieutentant Colonel "Melara" was

seriously wounded on June 5, and died a month later in the hospital set
up at the Quirinal Palace.s

1

so ASR, MAV, Rubricella 1.
s 1 Rosi, I, 809.

and

Trevelyan, p. 176.
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Angelo Masini, although only a captain in rank, would certainly
have qualified as a "unit commander" if he had survived.
11

cavalry force called the

He led a small

Lancieri dell a Morte," which he raised and

equipped at his own expense, originally to aid the besieged Venetians.
During the battle for Rome, the Lancieri functioned as the effective
1

cavalry arm of Garibaldi s Italian Legion, despite the fact that he
never had more than about 40 mounted men "who knew how to die 11 at any
11

one time. Although misspelled

Masina, 11 his name is well remembered, due

principally to his heroic ·death on June 3, during an unsuccessful
assault on the Villa Corsini.

52

The officers' roster also lists Lieutenant Colonel Pietro Landi
and Major Rubicondo Barbetti of the "Unione" regiment.

Barbetti's

younger brother Eusebio had been a cellmate of Felice Orsini before the
amnesty but was already dead of a fever he had caught in prison;

Rubi-

condo himself joined the student corps of the First Roman Legion (Civic
Guards) before it was incorporated into the "Unione. 115 3 Another Civic
officer, Major Antonio Celli, served with the Third Roman Legion.

Major

Gaetano Colombarini served in the Third Volunteer Regiment as both staff
officer and company commander, including command of the bersaglieri company.

The Third Volunteers were re-designated.Seventh Regiment of the

Line during the reorganization before the fight for Rome. 54
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There remain three other officers not assigned to specific units:
Colonel Domenico Belluzzi and Major Antonio Montanari of the Officers'
Depot, and Colonel Ignazio Palazzi of the Mobilized Civic Guards. 55
Colonel Belluzzi was one of the many who went to the aid of Venice in
the spring of 1848.

He proved so successful as a fortress commander,

first at Vicenza, then at Malghera, that he was promoted to General and
given command of the fourth brigade in the Venetian army.

It appears

that he never returned to the Papal States to participate in any of the
fighting there.

56

Major Montanari was killed defending Ancona in 1849.

Following the re.storation, Colonel Palazzi was mentioned in a police
report dated July 23, 1849.

The report is probably in error, at least

insofar as it states that '\.wo ex-Republican Colonels were hiding near
Frascati, Melara (=Pietramellara,
Palazzi."

who was dead by that date) and

Palazzi is described only as having been previously condemned

to life imprisonment for political crimes, then released by Pius IX in
the 1846 amnesty.

57

VIOLENT CRIMES - GENERAL
Within this category, there are three very large "show trials" designed
by the Court of Inquiry to prosecute their most implacable foes.

They

center upon major events of the rebellion itself, and not the more local
and specific cases of crimes committed during the rebellion.

55
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ASR, ASP, Busta 302, fascicolo 50. This is another in. the very
long series of police investigations, prompted by complaints, tips and
denunciations, most of them anonomous.
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three cases

(the Rossi assassination,

the San Calisto murders and the

"Cardinals' Carriages" affair) were the best known political trials of
the day.

The prosecutors and the

judges of the Consulta considered

these cases to be the cornerstones of their campaign against the rebel
leadership, since they were so closely connected with serious and vialent action against the Ecclesiastical State.
mined to overthrow the Pope -

Those rebels most deter-

so the argument went

- had probably

decided to commit themselves to action in one or more of these cases.
So it is particularly interesting in the context of the present study,
that amnesty recipients are NOT found among the defendants to any significant degree.
The most directly connected case is the assassination of Pellegrino Rossi on November 15, the event which actually started the revolt
against Pius IX.

There were 16 men finally put on trial for the murder,

and one of them, Sante Costantini, was actually executed in 1854.
of these

individuals were from the

1846 group.

None

The actual assassin

(Ciceruacchio's son Luigi by common consensus) had already been shot by
the Austrians.

Among the many others who had fled the country and were

beyond the reach of the courts, the chief planner from behind the scenes
was Pietro Sterbini.

He was easily condemned .in. absentia, since few

doubted that he had played a major role in Rossi's murder and most of
the other events designed to turn Rome into a revolutionary center.

But

except for Sterbini, no other individual from the amnesty group was even
accused.

58

58

ASR, TSC, busta 405, fascicolo 132. This fascicolo is actually a
hardcover book of 645 pages, containing transcript material from the
Rossi murder trial.
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A second famous murder trial prosecutes the so-called San Calisto

murders.

This case is the only one on record which dealt with a system-

atic attack on the clergy, despite the heavily anti-clerical spirit of
the Republic.

The defendants were members of the militarized but badly

disciplined customs guards (finanzieri) under the command of Callimacho
Zambianchi.

Between April 29 and May 4, 1849, Zambianchi and members of

his unit executed 8 unarmed priests or clerics, and had arrested 14 others with the same thing in mind.

At the time there were 289 members

belonging to the corps, and all of them were interrogated.

Only 5 names

on the entire lipt could have matched members of the amnesty group, but
even these were not consistent with known ages, hometowns, etc.
against these 5, as against most of the others, were dropped.

Charges
No mem-

bers of the amnesty group were involved in this most famous of the
atrocity trials.

59

Finally, there is the so-called "Cardinals 1 Carriages" investigation.

The original cause for this case was the requisition of several

carriages, sometimes including the horses, to help prepare for the
impending siege.

Since some of the finest vehicles belonged to cardi-

nals still living in Rome, the scheme degenerated into an attempt to
extort money for their safe return.

In the final analysis, this case

grew into a sort of "umbrella" process for prosecution of Republican
officials for any damage to or destruction of private property, especially church property, during the interim period.

59

There were 19 dis-

ASR, TSC, busta 404, fascicolo 130. Another very extensive colincluding printed and hand written
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lectio~f transcript material,
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tinct charges, in all, against various combinations of about 70 persons.
Of these, only 6 names from the amnesty list are possible matches, and
most of these were based on circumstantial evidence because of their
official positions.

These include Ludovico Caldesi and Enrico Serpieri

among the 6 deputies named.

The others were Luigi Uffreduzzi, police

commissioner for Trastevere, Mattia Montecchi who was working at the War
Ministry, Pio Pio, another civil servant, and Angelo Gori, who was a
guard for the garage area under the Cancelleria palace.
not a secure match.)

(Gori's name is

The trial became something of a local joke,

because of its pettiness.

As the testimony proceeded,

it became

increasingly evident that the revolutionary governments had actually
done a fairly good job of safeguarding life and property.

If anything,

the end result of this and similar trials was to vindicate the Republic
from charges of "anarchy" and wholesale destruction of property, at
least insofar as was possible during a siege, when round shot and explosive shells were flying through the air.

60

VIOLENT CRIMES - SPECIFIC
This section includes violent crimes against persons or property, frequently with some added element of mob action or conspiracy.

Among the

most common crimes with political implications, are the numerous murders
and attacks against government employees.

The most interesting cases

tend to "cluster" in just a few cities and provinces, possibly because
they were planned and carried out by the same leaders or cadres.

60
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gna, Lugo, Ancona and Pesaro are the cities most frequently mentioned.
Most of these more violent crimes were committed by artisans and
other lower class people.

The tendency toward violence may reflect a

lack of hope (or a lack of opportunity) to be heard in other ways.

It

may also simply be a much older way of expressing displeasure with the
regime.

Isolated acts of violence appear in the records, but they are

probably not significant.

Short of examining very personal motives,

there is probably not much to learn from them.

On the other hand, there

is much of interest in the cases involving group activity, especially
when the group is built aiound older associatiations, such as friendships formed in exile or in prison.

As second city in the Papal States, Bologna might look like an obvious
trouble spot simply because of its size.

But the Austrian incursion of

August, 1848 also aggravated political passions in this sophisticated
northern city.

When the invading forces attempted to seize the city,

they galvanized the patriotism of the Bolognese population into a spirited defense and united the political factions for concerted action in a
way that nothing else could.

General Welden withdrew his troops after

August 8, but many of the Bolognese decided to re-direct their rage
toward their political rivals within the city.

Anyone who might be con-

si. d ere d too

II

II

.
I!
.
II
pro- Austrian,
too "G regorian,
or

degree was suddenly in danger.

. uni.t y II to wh atever
an t i-

On August 24, a large number of artisans

and unskilled workers met at the Tamburrini tavern to decide on a course
of action.

They resolved to kill all employees of the police and the
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courts, including spys, agents and prison guards, beginning with the
most hated.

Names were selected and plans finalized.

Over the next two

weeks, Bologna witnessed a series of vicious attacks on the most visible
of the police agents, resulting in at least 20 murders and 16 other
attempts.

61

Some of those most closely associated with this series of

killings were recipients of the 1846 amnesty.

62

Significant among these leaders were three working class brothers,
Gaetano, Luigi, and Alfonso Costa.

The first two of these had been

accused of rebellion by the Military Commission of January 22, 1844, and
received 15-year. sentences.

As a result of the amnesty, both were

released from Civitavecchia prison in 1846.

All three brothers were

among the ten men accused of killing police spy Luigi Giorgetti on September 1.

Giorgetti, who was greatly hated by the Costas, knew of the

August 24 meeting and planned to save himself by leaving town.

Before

he could do so, he was tracked down by the mob and shot three times,
almost certainly by Gaetano.

All three brothers were found guilty, with

two others, and all were condemned to death.

Alfonso's sentence was

immediately commuted to life imprisonment, because he was still a minor.
Luigi and one other also received a commutation on February 4, 1853, but

6 1

These assassination squads, called "Balle" by many, continued
their rampage until September 5, when a vice-brigadier of carabinieri
was wounded. Police then arrested many of the leaders and sent them to
Civita Castellana. Several of them joined Garibaldi when his column
passed by there on his retreat from Rome, and continued their fight.
ASR, TSC, busta 413, fascicolo 773.
62
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156
Gaetano and Pietro Bonetti were beheaded on July 27 of the same year. 63
Gaetano Costa was also chief among 5 defendants in a separate
trial for the murder of Pietro Brunori.

Only two hours after the Gior-

getti murder on September 1, police inspector Brunori was surprised near
his home by a group of seven armed men, and shot repeatedly despite the
pleas of his 14-year old son.

Gaetano was identified as leader of the

group, and his conviction for this second murder undoubtedly helped to
confirm his death sentence.
for the same crime.

Two of his companions were also executed

64

On the following day, September 2, someone shot at police agent
Pietro Zappoli, but failed to hit him.

Zappoli identified his attacker

as Luigi Sarti, a friend of the Costa brothers. 65 Sarti was a local
workman who had returned from exile in Algiers as a result of the
amnesty.

He had been named as one of several present at the Giorgetti

murder, but was not convicted.

Sarti was· also suspected of still

another attempted murder on August 9, along with Luigi and Alfonso
Costa.

This one involved an attack on police agent Francesco Piraz-

63
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zotti.

Although another man was sentenced to 12 years in prison for

this attempt, all other charges were dropped on March 20, 1852 for lack
of evidence, and Sarti was released. 66
Among the other attacks which took place on September 2 were the
murders of Antonio and Giuseppe Ragazzini.

Since one of these brothers

was a policeman and the other a prison guard, they were well aware of
the mortal danger to themselves, and attempted to hide at the home of a
lawyer near the Porta Maggiore. ·A large throng located them there and
proceeded to loot the house· while the brothers escaped to a nearby rooftop.

They were finally cornered and stabbed to death.

Among the 30

defendants eventually brought to trial for the killings were two local
leaders who had requested the amnesty in 1846.

Cesare Brini, a tailor,

had been serving a 15-year sentence for mob action when he was released
from Civitavecchia.

Gaetano Vicinelli had been an exile in Paris, hav-

ing fled charges of previous violent attacks in 1843.
home in 1847, apparently without authorization.

67

He had returned

Brini was condemned to

death as one of the five principal killers, and was guillotined on July
25, 1853.

Vicinelli was also condemned to death by unanimous vote the

following year, not only for his support of the murders, but for his
previous crimes and violation of the terms of the amnesty.
was commuted to life in prison on September 12, 1854. 68
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His sentence
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Vicinelli is mentioned briefly in another case which is otherwise
unrelated to events in Bologna, but which treats two other cases of
unauthorized return, and offers a possible clue to linkage among individuals.

The principals are Saverio Muratore and Gaetano Turri, leaders

of the 1843 Savigno conspiracy and the resulting killings of Captain
Castelvetri and several carabinieri.

Both are accused of having

returned without authorization, although Pius IX had been inclined to
reopen their case in March of 1848.

Records of their process had been

sent to Rome with that end in view, but the files disappeared during the
ensuing confusion and the case could not be brought to a conclusion
either way.

A decree dated April 30, 1851 (when conciliation was no

longer in vogue) orders the two to return to perpetual exile from the
state or face five years at hard labor.

69

Another in the series of killings in Bologna took place on Sunday,
September 3.

The victim was a landowner, Antonio Baraldi, who had

attempted to maintain order in his quarter of the city with a citizens'
patrol.

He was identified and followed by 3 men as he walked alone to

Mass at the church of S. Donato.

Although he tried to send for help,

they tracked him into the rectory and killed him there before escaping
up a narrow street.

The assassins were identified as Domenico Sandoni,

Domenico Conti, and Valentino Zani.
together in 1843 for rebellion.

Conti and Zani had been on trial

Conti, who had a history of 17 arrests,

had been condemned to death by the Military Commission, then had his
sentence commuted to life imprisonment.

Technically, the amnesty of

1846 did not cover his charges, but after a series of special petitions,
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Conti was judged to be harmless and was one of those finally pardoned in
March of 1848.

Zani received 15 years at the same trial and was rou-

tinely released by Pius IX three years later.

But there was little

doubt as to who had actually killed Baraldi in 1848; accordingly,
three men were found guilty and condemned to death.
executed on April 9, 1854; Sandoni died in prison.
Several

months

later,

attempted a similar killing.

on April

3,

1849,

all

Conti and Zani were

70

an unknown

person

Police inspector Giuseppe Radicchi was on

his way home when an assassin surprised him and stabbed him several
times.

Both Carlo Paccapeli and Francesco Versari were arrested as

suspects, but the evidence was too circumstantial to convict either of
them.

The 1846 amnesty had released both men from Civitavecchia on the

same day; both were also accused of subsequent crimes.

A note on the

transcript speaks of unfavorable public opinion following Paccapeli's
release in 1850, since the general population felt that he was actually
guilty of the crime.
tion.

Internal exile was one option under considera-

71

There were two additional cases in Bologna of mob related crimes
against property.
nal Court,

One was an attack on the offices of the local Crimi-

following the withdraw! of the Austrians in August,

1848.

The court offices, housed in an old convent, contained many objects and
exhibits relating to pending cases, such as firearms,
money and other precious objects.
scudi.

knives, clothing,

The money alone was probably over 200

These items were stolen when a crowd ransacked the entire build-
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ing.

Although many of the perpetrators remained unknown, three men were

eventually identified and brought to trial,

including Luigi Rossi.

Rossi had been condemned to 15 years for insurrection in 1843, but
released from Civitavecchia in 1846.

In August 1852, Rossi and his fel-

low defendants received another 20 years.

72

A similar mob threatened the villa and family of Count Ottavio
Malvezzi.

Scion of one of Bologna's oldest and wealthiest families,

Count Ottavio was known to be a devoted supporter of the government.

On

August 21, 1848, a large band of working class people marched about 8
miles to the Malvezzi villa to requisition arms.

The leaders demanded

50,000 scudi from the Count, and threatened to hold his family hostage
until it was paid.

They eventually settled for only 3000 scudi in cash,

and released their captives unharmed.

73

Among the 15 defendants in the

resulting trial were Paolo Scorzoni (whose brother was the principal
leader) and Gaetano Marchesi.
the 1843 rebellion and the

Both of these men were also veterans of

subs~quent

Military Commissions.

had been condemned to 20 years for his activity.

Marchesi

Scorzoni had received

a death sentence, later commuted to life in Civita Castellana.

Although

Marchesi was released immediately by the amnesty, Scorzoni had to wait
for a pardon in 1848.

The outcome of this trial is not indicated in the

transcript, but several other charges were also pending against both
men.

It is of interest that one of the witnesses who identified Mar-

chesi at the scene was the heroic Captain

72

73

11

Masina" (Angelo Masini) who

ASR, TSC, busta 417, fascicolo 953.

The spectacle of the Malvezzi and other distinguished families
being threatened by armed crowds vividly illustrates how completely the
traditional patterns of deference and authority had broken down.
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would shortly die during the siege of Rome.

74

Seen in combination, these cases include a dozen Bolognese individuals who received the amnesty; though the transcripts make no mention
of it, they share an interesting background.

At least ten of the twelve

were heavily involved with the Muratori sedition of 1843.

Vicinelli,

Conti and Scorzoni were known to be members of the band which attacked
the carabinieri at Savigno; Marchesi, Brini, Zani, Rossi and the Costa
brothers were all named as members of the force which marched against
Imola.

Sarti was described as a messenger for the conspirators.

The

remaining two (Paccapelli and Versari) may also have been involved with
the same group, but nothing of their background has come to light.
Other members of the same group are identified elsewhere in this paper,
though not accused of ordinary crimes.

These facts suggest that the

original command structure of the Muratori force had been maintained (or
rebuilt) for the next upheaval, and not broken up and dispersed after
1843, as the police had hoped.
Lugo
In the city of Lugo, we find a similar (if less dramatic) pattern.

A

series of· cases were combined into one trial process, since they
involved the same 9 defendants, including Antonio Marani and Alessandro
Barattoni.

Marani was released from Ferrara prison by the amnesty, and

Barattoni returned from his exile at Macon in France.

The charges are

serious ones - three murders and one attempt during the late winter of
1849 - but the prosecution's evidence was probably quite weak, since the
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cases never moved ahead.

The strongest case involved the murder of

Sub-Chancellor Giuseppe Montanari on January 19, 1849.

The victim was

in the habit of taking an afternoon walk before returning to his office
in the Rocca.

He was attacked by armed men while he was walking alone,

and collapsed at a Civic Guard post, where he died soon afterwards.
Marani and his brother, with Barattoni, were the chief suspects.

The

same men were also charged with the murders of Giuseppe Tamburini and
Desiderio Utili (both on January 29), and the wounding of District Governor Filippo Masciali on February 29.

The Consulta dropped the charges

in the Montanari.case without any judgement (May 4, 1853), and the other
charges never came to trial.

75

The same Antonio Marani was accused of being one of two attackers,
who caused injuries to Antonio Scalaberni in July of 1848.

Since his

fellow defendant has fled the country, this is not much of a trial.
Marani received one year of detention on July 12, 1851,

then was

released immediately, since he had already been jailed for that long.

76

Alessandro Barattoni was also accused taking part in a shotgun attack on
Erminia Pascoli on February 9, 1849.
but not charged.

Marani is mentioned in this case,

Pascoli, the victim, had done no more than refuse, a

year before, to believe that the Austrian army had been beaten at Gaito.
He escaped wounded, but identified his attackers.
dismissed for insufficient evidence.

This case was also

77
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ASR, TSC, busta 258, files 964-7. This is a combined process
which began as 4 individual cases, but was later united when it became
evident that the defendants had cooperated with one another.
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Alessandro's brother,
attempted murder.

Alessio Barattoni was

also accused of

Along with Agostino Morandi, a fellow exile, he was

indicted for shooting at Luigi Scalaberni as early as November 6,

1846 ... mere weeks after his return from France.

Scalaberni was only

slightly wounded in his thumb, but both his mother and he were attacked
again in September and October of 1848, allegedly by Barattoni as principal party, Morandi as instigator, and various degrees of participation
by four others.

Since Barattoni had again fled the country by the time

of the trial, it does not seem to have ever moved to completion.

How-

ever, the one element common to the defendants was participation in the
Bagnacavallo revolt of 1845.

Morandi is listed as being active in 1831

as well, and wanted for questioning in two other murders.

He is

described as espousing "anarchist principles." 78
Returned exile Giovanni Caravita was accused of taking part in two
murders and a wounding in two different incidents.

Caravita had also

been involved in the Bagnacavallo events of 1845, but only insofar as
he, a horse dealer, provided horses and vehicles for the other participants.

The earlier accusation involved the "Pio IX" battalion of Lugo,

which Caravita had joined in July of 1848.

The transcript describes the

unit as "attracting all those dedicated to the poHtics of change."

The

battalion was in the process of marching toward Bologna on Sunday,
August 6, when it passed through the town of S. Potito at the time of
the last Mass.

Caravita and several of his fellow volunteers spotted

the Baroni brothers, with whom they had long-standing disputes.

The

armed men threw themselves into the crowd, and shot both Pietro Baroni,
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who recovered, and Lazzaro Delprado, who later died.

Caravita received

3 years of hard labor for his part in the shootings, but the murder
charge did not hold up; there was probably a legitimate case for self
defense.

79

The other murder charge involved the stabbing of Luigi Dra-

goni on April 22, 1849.
and his friends.

Dragoni was a known political foe of Caravita

He was provoked into a fight at a wedding banquet and

killed in the process.

Caravita and one other defendant were probably

the main instigators of the fight, but were released because of weak
evidence.

Another defendant was condemned for the actual killing, but

died in prison in 1854, before he could be executed.

80

Several other cases name participants in the 1831 revolution from
Lugo.

One of the more prominent individuals was Carlo Polzi, a former

actuary of the Podesta' of Lugo.

He was accused of rebellion and resis-

tance to the Austrians, as well as collection of funds for the Mazzinians.

The transcript says that he was wounded in 1831 fighting against

papal troops, then emigrated to France (Lesneven in Brittany) where he
remained until the amnesty.

After he returned home, he became vice

president of the Circolo Popolare of Lugo and authored an inflamatory
poster of January 19, 1849.

(A copy of the poster is included as evi-

dence in case 362) He was promoted to lieutenant in the local civic
guard, then switched to the "Pio IX" battalion, finally_ to the
lieri del Po."

11

Bersag-

In his military capacity, he fought against the Austri-

ans beyond the Po, as well as defending Bologna and Ancona.

In his own

defense, Polzi said that he did only what hundreds of others did against
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Austria.

His claim on the second amnesty hinged on the legal technical-

ity that he did not actually need the first one.

He insisted that he

really did not fight in 1831, but simply got in the way and was wounded.
Furthermore, he claimed that his departure for France was voluntary, not
forced, and that he signed the declaration of loyalty (also voluntarily)
almost a year after publication of the amnesty, June 8, 1847. 81 The
court disagreed with this contention;
tenced to die (April 27, 1852).

Polzi was found guilty and sen-

The death sentence was commuted to life

imprisonment, then to perpetual exile. 82
Polzi's mopified sentence was used as a precedent in a similar
case against Antonio Bedeschi and Facondo Gherardi.

Both of these men

are listed as being active against the government in 1831, then going to
exile in France.

Bedeschi returned briefly in 1845 to fight at Bagnaca-

vallo and le Balze.

In the present case, both are accused of authoriz-

ing and manipulating bloody deeds from behind the scenes, while keeping
their own hands clean.

One specific crime is the murder of Giuseppe

Nostini on February 9, 1849.

Gherardi gets credit for trying to keep a

low profascicolo at first and stay clear of politics.
in after the flight of the Pope.
his old activities immediately.

He was only drawn

Bedeschi, on the other hand, took up
As an innkeeper, he made his establish-

ment a center for young hotheads, and quickly became what the transcript
describes as a "local Ciceruacchio, 11 as did fellow exile Giovanni Mor-

8 1

Polzi is almost correct.
His actual signed declaration, dated
June 29, 1847, is filed at ASV, SdS, Rubrica 86 (1847), busta 21, p. 68.
He had been cleared to return by the Secretary of State the previous
September 19. ASV, SdS, Rubrica 86 (1846), busta 29, p. 30.
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andi.

The charges of ordering murders seem to hold up in court, due in

part to Bedeschi's outspoken support of the Republic and his own defense
of Ancona as a lieutenant in the Civic Guard.

Gherardi died in prison

before the conclusion of the trial, but Bedeschi's sentence was commuted
to perpetua 1 ex1. 1e.

8 3

A similar situation exists in the case of Giuseppe Budini, a
native of Castel Bolognese.

He was one of several suspects in a politi-

cal murder in 1831, but fled to France to avoid prosecution.
qualify for

the 1846 amnesty because of the seriousness

He did not
of this

charge, 84 but found his way back anyhow in time to join the earliest
volunteer units fighting the Austrians in Veneto.

85

He stood accused of

violent crimes against Austrian troops during the wi thdrawl after
Vicenza, and of being one of the most avid partisans of the Republic
during the defense of Bologna and Castel San Pietro.

He also used his

cover as a horse trader to travel widely in an attempt to keep the Mazzinian network alive, even since the restoration.

Budini received a

sentence of 20 years in prison, but this was commuted to perpetual exile
in Brazil.

83
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It is mentioned in the transcript that fellow exile Sante Fanelli,
a suspect in the same crime, had petitioned in 1846 for the case to be
re-opened so that he could establish his innocence. This favor was
granted, and all charges against him were dropped for lack of evidence.
Fanelli remained on his good behavior during 1848-9, and never again
appeared in court.
85

Control of the frontiers in the Papal States was notoriously
sloppy, as the thriving smugglers' trade demonstrates. Budini and at
least eight other men found their way home despite being refused in
1846. No distinction exists in this study between them and those who
returned legally.
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One minor case remains among those at Lugo.

Gaetano Benini, a

hemp worker and fishmonger, is accused in taking part in an attack on
Luigi Bortolotti on June 13, 1848.

Bortolotti was seriously wounded by

a large group of men who stabbed him repeatedly.

Benini and one other

defendant are accused simply because they were known to be associates of
others who had already been condemned for the crime.

Benini was accused

of another murder in 1832, and fled to Corfu rather than face the
charges.

Neither attack was ever proven successfully and both charges

against him were soon dropped.

87

Ancona
The crimes of violence in Ancona present the most serious example of
anarchy during the time of the Republic.

Members of the so-called "Lega

Infernale," also known as the "Lega Sanguinaria," instituted a genuine
reign of terror lasting several months.

Their extralegal activities

brought the city government to its knees and left the local police helpless to protect lives and property.

For a time, it appeared that even

the Triumvirs in Rome were unable to reassert their control of the city,
until one crime too many brought the anarchy to the point of an international incident.
Even as early as 1847, a few working class toughs took advantage
of the weak and tolerant government, conveniently dis tr.acted by its own
reform projects.

The police reported cases of renewed attacks or kill-

ings, as individuals tried to eliminate those whom they perceived as
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oppressors.

Some of these earlier victims

included the Marchese

Nembrini-Gonzaga, engineer Michele Baldeschi, judge Carlo Bonelli and
carabiniere sub-lieutenant Sante Prioli.

At this early stage, the

attacks may well have been more criminal than political, although motivation is always difficult to pin down.

But after the Pope's flight to

Gaeta, the Lega continued and intensified its activity, as the government's control deteriorated outside of Rome itself.

Judged by their

activity, the overall aims of the Lega became more political, insofar as
they selected victims for ·execution or removal from office entirely
because of their support for the papal government, and not for reasons
of corruption, inefficiency or similar motives.

Unfortunately, it is

hard to determine what positive objectives the Lega was promoting, since
most of their activity was nihilistic and destructive.

There were no

obvious policies or candidates for office associated with them, and
their principal targets were symbols of authority in general, even the
existing Republican regime.

Yet the Lega's crimes actually alienated

popular support for their faction, and became a considerable embarassment to the Republic.

88

The Triumvirs hoped to present the new Rome to

the world as a humane, highly principled force opposed to Austrian despotism; the Lega's crimes reminded leaders of o.ther nations that Revolution could also have a more anarchistic and violent element.
Part of the resilience of Lega partisans came from their tactic of
paying lip service to liberty and the Republic, but acting on blatant
criminal motives in practice.

In addition to Ancona, the "Lega Infer-

nale" was also active in Senigallia, Pesaro and Corinaldo, which will be
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treated shortly.

Despite obvious similarities to the Centurians and the

"Colonna Mobile" of 1832, it should be noted that the Lega included some
policemen and civil servants among its ranks.

89

After the proclamation of the Republic, several of the deputies
from the Marches demanded that Mazzini restore order, but he was slow to
do so.

The deputies wanted someone like an olympian hero:

a good

administrator who was also a political moderate; sufficiently attractive
to appeal to all but the most extreme criminals, and impartial enough to
reconcile warring factions.
seemed hesitant
His first

to

For reasons best known to himself, Mazzini

entrust such power to anyone outside his own circle.

two nominees for the task were political commissars whose

principal qualification seemed to be loyalty to him.
terously.

Both failed disas-

Finally, on April 19, an Irish Carmelite friar referred to as

"Luigi Okeller"

(probably Aloisius O'Keller or O'Kelleher) was murdered

in the streets of Ancona.

The British government lodged a formal pro-

test in Rome and dispatched a warship to Ancona harbor to protect British citizens, if the Republic was unable to do so.

With the credibility

of his government at stake, Mazzini selected Felice Orsini, also a deputy, to take control of the situation as a last resort.

Orsini was not

one of Mazzini's inner circle, but he was both inflexible and highly
motivated.

He immediately determined which policemen were most trust-

worthy, then found out who were the principal leaders of the Lega and
where they lived.

On April 27, Orsini took a small force of trusted men

and staged a brilliant nighttime raid (2:30 A.M.) to arrest 20 of the

89

Giuseppe Leti, La Rivoluzione ~ la Repubblica Romana 1848-1849
(Milano: F.Vallardi, 1913), p. 219.

170
worst leaders,

and still more the following day.

Several days of

vigorous police work followed, although he had already paralyzed the
Lega from the first hour.

His state of siege was called off after only

three days.90
Although the crime wave in Ancona stopped suddenly after Orsini 1 s
decisive action, the prisoners were not actually brought to trial until
after the restoration.

The main process charged 40 individuals with 14

separate counts of violence (including 5 murders and 9 other attacks)
against persons. 91 Most of the accused were named in several of the
charges.

They were jailed first at Foligno, then moved to Spoleto for

about 20 days.

Special Commissioner Caldesi (himself a recipient of the

amnesty) took them to Narni, where they were confined to a military
prison for another 20 days, but then released by Garibaldi's men during
their epic retreat from Rome.

Although the police made earnest efforts

to round up the prisoners, only 8 defendants of the 29 named on the main
indictment were present when their trial opened.

The 3 who shot 0 1 Kel-

leher were among them, and 2 of these were eventually sentenced to
death.

11 other names were mentioned as possible conspirators, but none

of these were in custody either.
the 1846 amnesty group.

NONE of these 40 men were members of

There were over 60 returnees from the city of

Ancona and its province, but none of them saw fit to join this more rad-

90 Natalucci, Marche, pp. 144f.
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The police archives ( ASR, ASP, busta 308, fascicolo 258) contains
another more complete list of Anconans compromised by the events of
1849. The original list of 35 individuals (later increased to 44)
duplicates much of what already exists in Consulta fascicolo 22. One of
the additional names, however, was Cesare Gemini, who will be discussed
shortly. Gemini was only arrested in 1850 in Rome, not Ancona, which
may account for his failure to appear in the earlier court records.
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ical group.

It is significant, however, that several others - Orsini,

caldesi and Mattioli among the most important - were amnesty recipients,
and defended Mazzini's republic against Lega members, most of whom had
no previous political record.

92

This divergence of opinion supports the

theory that much of the turmoil, in Ancona at least, had its root in a
"new" faction of conspirators.

The earlier rebels

(as represented by

the 1846 group) may have been largely satisfied by the degree of political progress attained by 1849.

Members of the Lega,

obviously, were

not.
Although tbe arch-conservatives found few distinctions within the
liberal camp, there were certainly sev.eral "levels of expectation" among
those who hoped for change.

The faction led by Farini and Mamiani sup-

ported the moderate reforms of 1846-8 and wanted them to continue.

The

group represented here by Orsini, Caldesi and Mattioli wanted more than
Pius IX had provided, but were hardly anarchists.

As functionaries of

the Republic, they favored its iecular administration and social programs, but not murder in the streets.

Members of the Lega, by contrast,

were not satisfied even with Mazzini's regime.

Information from this

study does not tell us whether they had a more radical program of their
own, or simply took advantage of the moment.

Whatever their motives,

they created great hardship for the Republic.
Two related cases,
lanti very prominently.

labeled "Corinaldo/Ancona," name Mariano BalBallanti himself was not present for either

trial, since he had fled to Piedmont with a false passport.

Yet these

legal processes present a spectacular list of charges against this one
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individual.

He was accused of founding and leading a secret society

called "Pasquale and Companions," dedicated to "debasing religion, promoting disorder and killing honest people" in the words of the indictHe associated this society with another larger one, the "Carbo-

ment.

nari Cousins," to help achieve his ends by violent means, as the "Lega
Infernale" had been doing in Ancona.

He was also wanted for 5 murders

(including those of an archpriest, an uncle of his, and one of his own
assassins, killed with 22 stab wounds),

and 10 violent attacks or

attempted murders, some of· them against civic officials.
accused of defamation,

bl~sphemy,

He was also

forcing councilors to resign after

they had beaten his party in open elections, theft of criminal records
(against himself), and promoting riots.

Finally, the fascicolo includes

a small booklet of 52 other charges which are attributed to him or his
group.

He was wanted for questioning about all of them, and may have

been the motivating force behind more than a few.

No defense for Bal-

lanti was presented, since he was safely out of the country, but the
trial of his companions proceded without him.

93

Ballanti, a native of Corinaldo, had been a corporal of grenadiers
with the Pesaro garrison in September, 1845.

He left his post to join

Renzi' s revolt at Rimini, then fled to Tuscany and France after it
failed.

He returned home after the amnesty.

He joined the Civic Guard

during the time of the Republic, and served as an artillery sergeant and
instructor.

The transcript describes him as

11

a truly perverse individ-

ual, an enemy of religion, and violent by nature."
thought that he was capable of anything.
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Even his compatriots

He loved the Republic because
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he saw it as an opportunity to promote civil war and place himself in
positions of authority.
time occupations.
for over 30 crimes.

He probably saw no future for himself in peace-

Leaderless, 23 of his associates were put on trial
Most were condemned to prison terms, and 7 were

given a death sentence for one of the murders - 4 of these were eventually shot.

Ballanti himself never returned to the Papal States,

although his arrest was ordered.

Other records indicate that he died in

1860 fighting with Garibaldi 1 s men in Sicily during the battle of
Milazzo.

9 4

Ballanti 1 s spec·tacular record of criminal activity looks

entirely personal and well isolated from his fellow amnestiati
- no others from the 1846 list were noted among his followers.
Another amnesty recipient, Caterbo Biagetti, was also involved
with the events of Orsini's lightning strike against society members in
Ancona.

Biagetti was a non-commissioned officer in the Civic Guard,

which Orsini mobilized to maintain order after he had arrested the most
extreme of the anarchist leaders.

Members of Biagetti's company sympa-

thized with the Lega, and resolved to seize the citadel where their
leaders were being held.

Biagetti himself, as one of the sergeants, was

chosen to "relieve" the carabinieri on duty with 40 or SO of his own
men.

The alert policemen were not fooled, however, and most of the

civic guards were arrested instead.

Biagetti admitted belonging to the

Circolo Popolare and the Civic Guard, but protested that he had done
nothing wrong.

He claimed to have been drunk during the incident, and

pointed out that he was never actually condemned before the 1846 amnesty
released him from jail.
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The court disagreed, adding that he had also
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abandoned a wife and 3 children in Urbino in order to live with a girlfriend.
labor.

Biagetti was one of several leaders condemned to 5 years of
The others received lighter sentences.
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One case which may be remotely related to the activities of the
Lega includes Costantino Schiavoni, a basketmaker released from Civita
Castellana in 1846.
February,

1849.

He was charged with wounding Giovanni Lanari in

Schiavoni had been refused when he asked Lanari' s

daughter to dance at a Liberty Tree celebration;

Lanari, who had been a

Centurian and was considered a spy by some, defended his daughter, and
was later attack,ed on his way home.

Schiavoni was not formally con-

victed of the deed, but remained a suspect.
were released on probation.

He and a fellow defendant
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Pesaro
In the city of Pesaro, several related charges were brought against a
relatively small number of men; surprisingly, quite a few of them were
amnistiati.

Pesaro had been a relatively calm and peaceful city until

the reign of Pius IX.

The sudden change may very well have resulted,

not from spontaneous demonstrations in the streets, but from the efforts
of a carefully organized network of activists, following the pattern of
1831.
Evidence in many of the cases indicates that the leaders of the
entire movement

were Achille

Stefani and

Ferdinando Ciacci,

released from prison by the amnesty of 1846.
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both

Even before the fateful
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events of

1848, both men had enlisted in the local Civic Guard as

officers, and turned Pesaro into a secure base for their own political
advancement.

One composite case against 26 defendants includes the mur-

ders of several of their factional rivals.

In this case alone, 8 of the

accused were former prisoners released by the amnesty.

In addition to

Stefani and Ciacci, three others had found municipal jobs as excise
clerks or collectors:

former soldier Ludovico Esposto (also spelled

"degli Esposti"), Giuseppe Siepi, and Antonio Baroni, who died in prison
before the end of the trial.

The others were two artisans, Domenico

Orazietti and Sisto Mosca (or "Mossa"), and Captain Lorenzo Bucci, of
the Second Volunteer Regiment, who had been killed in the fighting near
Rome during June, 1849.

This case and those related to it,

like the

cases in Bologna, reveal a concerted effort to paralyze the police,
prison and court systems.

Pesaro may have had 9 or 10 murder victims,

including the 5 considered in the large case.

Although not included,

mention is also made of a murder by ex-prisoner Camillo Gaj, who subsequently died in the Mondavio jail.
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Two of the victims mentioned in the same case were killed in late
1847.

One was Girolamo Terni, a workman who did menial jobs for the

local police, and was considered a spy by some.

The other was painter

Curzio Andreozzi, who had spoken out against the formation of the Civic
Guard.

Both murders had been carried out by groups of armed men, led by

Mosca and Esposto,

respectively, according to witnesses.

Esposto was

also accused of being the principal killer of Giuliano Nicolai, Secretary General of the Delegation of Pesaro, who was stabbed to death on
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February 4, 1848 as he returned from his customary after-dinner walk.
Esposto may have met Ciacci during his prison term in San Leo, and is
described as being totally dependent on him for direction and advice.
Baroni and Siepi are described as being helpers in this crime,
assisting Esposto to get away.

Ironically,

by

another of the victims,

Angelo Lombardi, was himself an exile who returned from Florence after
the amnesty.

He opened his own tavern on the Via Borgomazzo, where he

openly criticized the local liberal leaders and the Civic Guards for
putting their own interests ahead of the community at large.

After the

Veneta campaign pf 1848, he attracted many veterans of Vicenza and Trevisa as patrons; he jokingly referred to this informal group as his
"Lega Lombarda."

Although Lombardi considered himself intensely patri-

otic, he was very firm in backing the government of Pius IX, which he
felt his oath of loyalty demanded.

On one occasion, he rebuked some of

his followers for attempting to steal
Venice.

cattl~

being shipped to besieged

Resented as a turncoat by some, he was earmarked for death by

Stefani and Ciacci, probably because the "Lega Lombarda" was not under
their control.
and missed.

On December 14 or 15, unknown persons shot at Lombardi

A week later, he was shot once in the throat and died.

Although the actual killers were identified as men of Bucci's Volunteer
company, Stefani and Ciacci were generally considered to be the ones who
ordered the killing.
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The final murder charged in this series took place on January 6,
1849.

A shoemaker, Terenzio Seraghiti, was killed, and his assistant

slightly wounded in what looks like a mistaken encounter with Orazietti

98

ASR, TSC, busta 406, fascicolo 150.

177

and the same two men who probably shot Lombardi.

The three were seeking

(at 3 A.M.) to kill another man who had stated his desire to avenge Lombardi, and fired at the wrong victims in the dark.

The combined testi-

mony of both Nicola Conti, a returned exile, and one Isidoro Rossi, was

a pivotal element in this case, since both men were witnesses to the
planning of these attacks.

Conti, especially, proved to be a valuable

witness against his former companions, and may never have shared their
convictions at all.

No final verdict is found in these records.
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Ludovico Esposto had· already been implicated as the principal
felon in the murders of Andreozzi and Secretary General Nicolai.

In a

separate case, he is likewise accused of killing the young Sub-Lieutenant Vincenzo Arnaldi on March 12, less than a week after he stabbed
Nicolai.

Witnesses claimed that Esposto may have hated Arnaldi for

blocking his application to the treasury police (the finanzieri) and
because he considered Arnaldi too friendly toward the Jesuits.

The

Lieutenant was attacked by 3 men as he returned to his barracks and
stabbed several times.
Esposto as his killer.

He died the following morning after naming
The next day, the police jailed Esposto, only to

see him broken out by a large crowd within hours.
crowd was not random or spontaneous at all.
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The action of this

The quick, decisive vio-

lence betrays not only careful planning by Stefani and Ciacci but their
perception that Esposto was a major asset to them, and worth fighting to
liberate.
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The throng which quickly assembled in the main piazza was openly
led by Stefani and Ciacci.

In addition to Domenico Orazietti, already

mentioned, the group included Giulio Grilli, Luigi Santinelli, Graziano
palombi, Raffaele Farina and Ferdinando Maccari, all former prisoners
released in 1846.

The crowd, described in the transcript as "anar-

chists," demonstrated loudly for Esposto' s release in front of the
Legate's residence and the police offices, then marched to the jail,
where they attempted to tear down the main gate.

The warden saw no hope

of any assistance from the police, so released the prisoner to prevent
further violence,

The triumphant rioters then escorted Esposto to the

Cafe' d'Ausonia, their favorite meeting place.

At the conclusion of

this trial (March 2, 1853), Santinelli, Grilli and Maccari all received
10-year sentences for their part in the jail break, and Santinelli got
an additional 7 years for distruction of property.
years for the same charge.

Palombi received 8
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Several of the same people assembled later in the year for a similar attack on the off ices of the provincial police and the burning of
the criminal archives.

This event came as part of the popular demon-

stration on Sunday, November 19, when Pesaro native Terenzio Mamiani was
asked to form a government.

The "Unione" regiment of volunteers was

passing through the city at that time, and joined the festivities.
fani and Ciacci, as civic officers,

Ste-

probably saw the joyful turmoil as

a golden opportunity to cover the traces of their earlier activity.
That evening, civic guards and a substantial throng assembled in front
of the police offices, and demanded entry.
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The carabinieri on duty were
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won over, but a small picket of grenadiers remained suspicious.

These

gave way only when a cannon was rolled up to the gate they were guarding.

The police headquarters was sacked and burned before the employees

could do anything.

All available records went into the bonfire, system-

atic destruction of furnishings and offices continued for 2 hours, and
the fire in the building itself burned long into the night.

In addition

to Stefani and Ciacci, Raffaele Farina and Graziano Palombi are indicted
as members of the crowd, and Nicola Conti is also mentioned here as a
friendly witness to reduce his own prison time.
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Later the same evening, a group of young people, most of them
drunk, reportedly broke into a house just inside the Fano gate in the
name of the Civic Guard.

As they searched for "spys," they terrorized

the inhabitants, including 3 poor old men who usually slept in the basement of the house.

They left after a while to visit a tavern, then

returned to confront Natale Guglielmi, one of the old men.

In spite of

his denials that he was a spy, they beat and stoned him to death, then
sacked the house.

Chief among the eight men accused of this crime was

Luigi Santinelli, a veteran of the previous mob activities, and the one
who reportedly leveled the accusation of spying.

After reviewing this

latter case, the Consulta decided that it should be handled as an ordinary murder, and not a political crime.
1851) to the local court.
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It was sent back (June 18,
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Still another of the charges against Stefani and Ciacci (with 11
others) is the violent expulsion of Major Lelia Lecce, commander of the
Pesaro fortress.

Lecce had the reputation of being a tough and uncom-

promising police official, but in February of 1849, he faced the dilemma
of conflicting orders from the Government in Rome,
Gaeta;

and the Pope in

Stefani and Ciacci decided to use the occassion to get rid of

him entirely.

He received a note on February 21,

signed by Ciacci,

telling him to resign and leave the city if he wanted to avoid trouble.
When he refused to leave his office, he was forced physically into a
carriage by a

c~owd,

and escorted to the Fano gate by a Civic Guard

force under the command of Lieutenant Stefani.

Lecce then continued to

Rome when he saw that resistance was pointless.

Also named in this case

are Eugenio Marroni,
Nicola Conti.

himself a former prisoner,

and returned exile

Although both Marroni and Conti were present in the

crowd, neither was charged, since both were freely co-operating with the
prosecution.

In this and other trials, large gaps exist in the informa-

tion, since both Ciacci and Stefani had fled the country, and therefore
neither could be questioned.
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One final charge was leveled at Stefani and Ciacci in their capacity as lieutenants of the Civic Guard.

They commanded a Civic contin-

gent sent to suppress resistance in the countryside west of Pesaro.
When the Republic decided to introduce conscription in March of 1849,
many rural villages refused to comply. By order of Andrea Catabeni, the
£reside, a punitive expedition sent against the villages of Ginestretto,
Sant'Angelo in Lizzola,
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Montecciardo and Mombaroccio.
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Confident of
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their overwhelming numbers and their artillery, the Civic Guards were
accused of looting and destruction, and especially the burning of a
local leader's house to conceal the theft of about 30 scudi, which
reportedly ended up in Stefani's pocket.
found in the records.

No verdict in this case is
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There is certainly a pattern or linkage in the Pesaro cases, but
it remains difficult to see what it is.

Even the single common element

- all 15 of the accused were prisoners, not exiles - is considerably
weakened because they were· released from so many different jails.

Six

of the fifteen came out of San Leo, but each of the others was locked up
in a different place.

Granted, prisoners were periodically moved

between jails, and both Esposto and Orazietti are described as being
prison friends of Stefani and Ciacci.
men remains a mystery.

But the conection between these

The police records give very little of value - 5

of the 15 were known to be condemned for activities in Rimini (1845),
but the others have no records provided at all.

The single most inter-

esting feature is the frequency of multiple-case defendants.

In addi-

tion to the planners, Stefani and Ciacci, 5 others figure in more than
one case: Esposto, the assassin, Mosca, Santinelli, Maccari, and Siepi.
(The first 3 of these were known to be veterans of Rimini.)

So we are

still left with an unsolved mystery about what brought these men
together and kept them active.
of the leaders.

It may be no more than personal charisma

Whatever their original connection, the group certainly

stayed together once their activities began. The activities of this band
definitely invite more attention from scholars.
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Faenza
Beyond any doubt whatever, bloody Faenza was the most highly polarized
town in the Papal States before the amnesty.

Since Faenza had contrib-

uted the largest number of exiles, it would also welcome home the largest number of returnees.

The amnesty, together with the disbanding of

the Pontifical Volunteers and the subsequent authorization of the Civic
Guard, assured that the local strife would continue, but under modified
rules.

Even geography had its part to play in the conflict, as the

transcript of one of the trials points out.

The old town of Faenza

within the walls. had been strongly liberal and anti-Papal in outlook.
It was an independent minded city-state with medieval roots and a longstanding antipathy to directives from a distant capital.

On the other

hand, the sub-town (or borgo) of Urbecco just across the river Lamone
was a more recent entity.

The inhabitants keenly resented the shadow of

the more prosperous and better educated municipality, and looked to the
central government for protection against discrimination.

Bargo resi-

dents, some of whom were of recent peasant stock, became rabidly progovernment, and had traditionally supplied large numbers of Volunteers.
One of the prosecuting lawyers felt it necessary to explain this polarization for the benefit of judges or officials from other places; he likened it to the medieval wars to the death between rival cities.

The

Volunteers had doubtless misused their authority greatly, and the Faentini nourished their smoldering resentment for the day when a new opportunity would come.

Such a turn of events occurred with the reforms of

Pius IX, although his objectives had nothing to do with such local
affairs.

The net result was to discredit members of one faction, who
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had been armed and dangerous, then to first rehabilitate, and later arm,
partisans of the other faction against their old rivals.
October 11,

As early as

1846, disorders were taking place between inhabitants of

faenza and Urbecco,

as both factions felt the winds of change.

clashes would not be slow to follow.

106

Following the restoration of 1849,
crimes were brought to trial.

More

several of these partisan

What is most shocking is not that the

traditional strife continued (which it did, unabated), but that it had
little relative connection ·with the revolution and the war raging everywhere else in the state.

Could it be that the Italian convulsion of

1848 looked so trivial to people in Faenza that it was no more than a
new variation to a centuries-old feud?

At least some of the evidence

says so.
The earliest of these crimes was a murder which took place on the
afternoon of February 11, 1847, which was the last Saturday of Carnival
for that year.

The victim was Filippo Melandri, a papal sympathizer in

his 60's (a "Papalone") from the Bargo who was making his way home.

He

was accosted by a group of 5 or 6 men, who stabbed and shot him several
times without a word.

Among those accused were 3 returned exiles: Giu-

seppe Bandini, Gaspare Mammini and Francesco Ballardini, all of Faenza.
The Consulta was convinced that Bandini was genuinely one of the killers, but decided to send the case back to the provincial court
Ravenna (April 5, 1853) to be treated as an ordinary murder.

Evidence

was insufficient to establish a "political" motive for the crime.
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Ballardini was not as fortunate in a related charge of murder in
the nearby town of Fognano.

The victim in this case was a local noble-

man, Andrea Albani, a former police chief who was very devoted to the
papal government.

He was variously called a "Papalone," a Gregorian,

and a brigand by many of the defendants, and had nearly been killed in
1842 by some of them.

According to the testimony, Albani was killed on

the morning of April 5,

1849 (which was Holy Thursday).

Three men

unknown to anyone in Fognano arrived by carriage along the road from
Brisighella and Faenza;

two of the strangers left the carriage, killed

Albani, and quickly fled town in the direct ion they had come.

Although

there are many locals among the 21 defendants in this case, the accused
absassins are all from Faenza and all unknown to the victim, lending
weight to the argument for a conspiracy.

Francesco Ballardini was even-

tually found guilty and condemned to death, his defense substantially
hurt by his violation of the amnesty.

Other defendants were cleared,

but Ballardini was beheaded on December 19, 1854 as the principal assassin.1os
Two other multi-faceted cases describe the continuing strife in
Faenza.

One case recalls several incidents on July 14 and 15, 1847 in

which former Volunteers were beaten up and their homes ransacked for
weapons.

Part of the same activity was a rather bizarre attack on a

peasant selling manure just inside the walls of the city - he was beaten
by 5 men who wanted his pitchfork.

Among the defendants are 6 returned

exiles: Sante Angeletti, Paolo Caroli, Andrea Pozzi, Raffaele Silvestrini, Niccola Versari, and Cristofaro Rustichelli, all of Faenza.
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verdict was given in this case.
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Substantially more serious was the other case: 10 seperate counts
of murder and other acts of violence, charged against 22 defendants.
The obvious leader of the group was Count Raffaele Pasi, who has already
been noted as leader of the revolt at le Balze in 1845, was soon elected
Deputy for Faenza, and who would command the Second Volunteers during
the siege of Rome.

Pasi was a natural leader with great personal char-

isma, a logical choice to become commander of the local Civic Guard,
with the rank of major.

Among Pasi's followers in this case were fellow

exiles who had a1so enlisted in the Civic Guard:

Giuseppe Brisighelli,

Pasquale Sangiorgi, Vincenzo Valli, Natale Mazzotti, and Niccola Versari, mentioned in the previous case.

The most serious of the violent

acts occurred on February 14, 1848 when Pasi led a large Civic Guard
patrol into Urbecco without an obvious and valid objective.
in the Bargo barred their doors against this armed force.

Most people
A number of

stragglers were beaten up before they could get home, then several homes
were broken into in an apparent search for ex-Volunteers.
were found hiding with their families.

Three victims

After attempting to escape, they

were surrounded and hacked to death with sabers.

Hatred for the Papal

government was seen as the principal motive in this case.

Brisighelli,

Valli and three others were found guilty as principals in these murders,
and were condemned to death on September 20, 1853.
commuted to life under maximum security;
sentance as an accomplice.
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The sentences were

Mazzotti also received a life

Pasi had fled the country long before the
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trial, b~t remained under order of arrest.
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Among the Faentini in these cases, a rather obvious pattern can be
seen in Pasi's

followers.

Of the

14 defendants who

received the

amnesty, at least 11 were veterans of Pasi's expedition to le Balze in
1845.

All 14 were exiles in France, most of them in the towns of the

"western crescent."
Loches,
Paris.)

1 in Tours,

(There had been 4 in Limoges, 3 in Saumur, 2 in
1 in Montpelier, plus 1 in Marseilles and 2 in

With the exception of Count Pasi himself, the rest were all

innkeepers or artisans, acting as reliable clients and loyal followers.
Evidence shows that Pasi was far more successful than most local leaders
in keeping his own political network intact before, during and after
exile.
There remains one final case related to this group from Faenza.
The nearby town of Brisighella experienced a mob action on February 14,
1849 which resulted in the arson of all local records of the communal
government,

carabinieri and holy office.

Natale Mazzotti already mentioned,

One of Pasi's followers, the

led a band of men from Faenza and

Brisighella to attack the Chancery and Communal Residence.
the buildings and burned all the records they discovered.

They sacked
Then Mazzotti

used his position as a police agent in Faenza to demand that the local
carabiniere commander to turn over the police records, then moved on to
the holy office where he did the same thing.
up in the bonfire.

All of these papers ended

The transcript of this trial contends that Mazzotti

and his followers came to town for this specific purpose.
individuals indicted in this case,
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Of the 30

18 eventually received prison terms,
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including Mazzotti and 4 other principals, who got 15 years.
tence of June 24,

1854 followed

the

This sen-

life sentence he had already

received for his part in the murders of exactly one year before.
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NON-VIOLENT POLITICAL CHARGES
We have already seen the results of a punitive expedition near Pesaro.
Elsewhere in the Marches, there were several other expeditions sent to
deal with villages hostile to the Republic, as well as church property
and persons.

Central to this effort in the province of Fermo was the

preside Francesco Bubani.

The most clear cut case against him was the

violation of ecclesiastical immunity by arresting Cardinal DeAngelis.
Although warned of danger by his friends,
Fermo,

and continued to protest

the

DeAngelis refused to leave

illegitimacy of the Republic.

Finally, the Interior Ministry ordered his arrest on March 9,

1849, and

Bubani carried out the order with the forces at his disposal.

He was

one of 7 defendants found guilty, and received an 8-year sentence, later
commuted to 5 years.
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A similar but less serious charge was also lev-

eled at Bubani in his official capacity.

A long-standing feud between

one Cassiano Bonanni and a sergeant in the Civic Guard came to a head in
late December,

1848.

dle of the night,

Bonanni's house was raided and looted in the mid-

and he was arrested, presumably on Bubani's orders.
.

These charges were apparently considered too weak, and were dropped.
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Bubani found himself in far more serious trouble over the seizure
of church property.

The case in point involved the convent of clois-

tered nuns of Santa Chiara near the country town of Petritoli.

In Feb-

ruary, 1849, everyone expected a decree from the central government to
seize church land and property.

When Bubani received word of frenzied

efforts to send valuables away from the convent, he decided to act on
his own authority.

He ordered a mixed force of carabinieri and civic

guards to occupy the convent and arrest anyone there who might be hiding
valuable goods.
was seized.

He also authorized payment of all expenses out of what

The.resulting expedition did capture the house without dif-

ficulty on February 19, then proceeded to sell off the large quantities
of the wheat, corn, oil, meat and soap which they had confiscated, as
well as linens and vestments from the sacristy.

When the Assembly in

Rome finally did publish the secularization law on February 25,

it

allowed the religious orders to continue to administer their own goods,
or to be compensated eventually for their loss.

Thus Bubani's mistaken

judgement to anticipate the decree put him not only in a position of
violating ecclesiastical
well.

immunity, but the laws

of the Republic, as

Eventually 16 men were brought to trial on these charges, but

Bubani was obviously the one who had made the fatal decision.

The court

sentenced him to an additional 20 years in prison, while releasing most
of the others on probation.
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No other amnesty recipients at all par-

ticipated in these events.
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Finally, Bubani was brought to trial on the generic charge of
rebellion and violation of the 1846 amnesty.

He had certainly received

the amnesty and signed the printed declaration.

Bubani defended himself

on two points: that he technically did not have to sign the declaration,
since the earlier charges against him were unproven; and that he did not
accept his post in Fermo until after Pius had fled to Gaeta, and effectively left the state leaderless.

The Consulta disagreed.

By unanimous

decision on August 17, 1853, the 6 judges condemned Francesco Bubani to
death.
later.

The Pope commuted this sentence to life imprisonment a week
115

The provinces of Fermo and Ascoli,had been a considerable thorn in
the side of the Republic.

Since both provinces were at the southern end

of the Marches, they were less influenced by the busy commercial cities
of the Legations.

Even the larger towns maintained an essentially rural

outlook, and local leadership tended to be strongly conservative.

Many

of those farming towns in the Appennine foothills opposed Republican
policies of taxation and conscription, the secularization of religious
property, and the continued occupation of Rome (as they saw it) at the
Pope's expense.

The aforementioned Cardinal DeAngelis and Monsignor

Savelli, the future police chief, were two of the many clerics in the
provinces who continued to promote hostility to the Republic, and
encourage armed resistance to the local administration.
itself was near the Neapolitan frontier,

Since Ascoli

the nearby peasants could

receive direction and possibly weapons from Gaeta, and took courage from
the government's inability to surround them with troops.
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these peasants attempted (on April 12) to re-establish papal government
in the province of Ascoli, Ugo Calindri of Perugia, the preside, ordered
a mixed force of Civic Guards and volunteer troops against them in the
late spring of 1849.

The force, commonly called the "Roselli battal-

ion," was commanded by Colonel Pietro Roselli, of the Second Volunteer
Regiment.

In addition to the second battalion of his own regiment,

Roselli took command of the Civic Battalion of Ascoli, with token contingents of carabinieri and finance troops.

His first expedition, in

April, was directed against the villages of Balza, Arquata and Spelonga
in the Montegallp region.

This operation resulted in charges against

Roselli and several of his men, including theft, sacking and destruction
of private homes and church property, arson, extortion, and so on.

In

spite of the large number of men involved, only one individual charged
is a recipient of the 1846 amnesty, Count Giovanni Battista Ferri, of
Porto San Giorgio.

In his capacity as Major of a militia column

attached to Roselli's force, Ferri is accused of helping to requisition
religious houses and threaten their inhabitants, particularly in the
case of one house in Arquata.

Ferri was not present for this trial,

since he had already fled the country.
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The same Ferri is also accused of participation in a more extensive operation against several towns in the Aquasanta district, southwest of Ascoli.

He and the men under his command were charged with

theft, arson, and other damage to property of several citizens in the
towns of San Gregorio, Arquata, Luco, Santa Maria, Talvacchi, and Torre
Santa Lucia.

l l 6

In all of these towns, the houses most frequently selected
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for sacking were those of former Pontifical Volunteers or their sympathizers.

One charge filed against Ferri alone alleges that he extorted

30 scudi from Francesco Tosi of Torre Santa Lucia.

Here, as elsewhere,

money was freely taken from perceived enemies to defray costs, since the
province had no money to pay its troops.

Ferri is described as being a

political activist since 1831, as well as a high-ranking member of Young
Italy and a friend of Mazzini from his days in England.

He had already

served as a volunteer officer in 1831, and found a temporary commission
in the Piedmontese army during his exile.

When Pius authorized forma-

tion of the Civic Guard, Ferri joined as a lieutenant and rose through
the ranks as fighting against the Austrians and the French presented him
opportunities.
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As Mazzinian leader for the southern Marches, he sup-

ported the violent expulsion of the Jesuits from Fermo, according to the
trial transcript.

Still later, he is said to have commanded the column

which seized Narni and released the 23 prisoners from Ancona, following
the siege of Rome.
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The transcript collection which contains the evidence against
Ferri is a large one: a four-inch stack of paper, with 56 charges
against 94 individuals.

Yet with the exception of Ferri, the only other

amnistiato accused is Felice Orsini, once again acting as special envoy
and trouble-shooter for the Republic.

Since neither Ferri nor Orsini

was present for the trial, no effective defense was presented on their
behalf, but even half of the story makes interesting reading.
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In early

The trial transcript describes Ferri as a "self-styled" major of
militia. In fact his name is not given in the register of commissioned
officers for 1848-49. ASR, MDV, Rubricella 1.
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May, Calindri' s effort against his local rebels was running out of
steam.

Orsini moved south with token reinforcements to revive the cam-

paign and maintain the Republic's hold on the entire province.

Even

after Roselli's troops (presumably with Count Ferri in company) were
called back to support Rome's final defense, Orsini insisted that the
local forces in Ascoli had to do their utmost to foil the local "brigands," as the rebels were commonly known.

Not only did Orsini order

another sweep of towns to the north and north-east of Ascoli (Offida,
Appignano, Force, Montalto and Castignano), but he was also accused of
theft and extortion at the expense of clergy and local leaders in Ascoli
itself.

As late as June 10, when French guns were pounding the walls of

the Gianicolo, Orsini's columas were wringing over 800 scudi from the
people of the hill towns, as their contribution to the war effort.

At

this late stage, very little effort was made to enforce the Republic's
conscription laws - raising money for the troops by any possible means
took priority.

Orsini apparently considered himself worthy of his pay.

He completed the spoliation of the town palace of Commendatore Francesco
DeAngelis of Ascoli (brother of the Cardinal) by confiscating clothing,
furnishings and 2 carriages.

When the Austrians made t_heir final

approach, according to the accusations, Orsini fled toward the Tuscan
frontier in one of these vehicles, wearing one of DeAngelis' suits, and
carrying a valise of his filled with still more of his possessions.
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There are also several political cases in Ancona which imply guilt
by association or leadership.

One of these included Lorenzo Lesti and

the aforementioned Cesare Gemini among its defendants.

l l 9

ASR, TSC, busta 416, fascicolo 927.
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accused of being leaders of Mazzini's Young Italy, and of recidivism,
due to their reception of the amnesty of 1846.

Neither was accused of

personal crimes, but rather complicity in all of the bloody deeds of
their underlings.

Lesti was known to be one of the three principal

leaders of the Society in Ancona.

He had carried on a brisk correspon-

dence with Mazzini, and was a friend of all other major republicans in
the city.

Lesti admitted belonging to Young Italy since 1832 or 1833,

and his flight to Paris at that time.

But he claimed that he quit in

1836 because of a policy dispute with Mazzini, and that he had no part
in any killings pr other crimes since then.

He declared his admiration

for Marat and Robespierre, but had no use for Gioberti or Mamiani, whom
he considered to be halfhearted.
idea of the trial's outcome.
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The transcript does not give a clear
We know from other sources, however,

that Lesti was condemned to 20 years in Paliano prison (December 17,
1851), and was not released until August of 1863.
unbowed, he died after only 9 days of freedom.

Seriously ill, but
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Similarly accused was Domenico Buglioni, formerly a captain and
adjutant major of the Civic Guard, First Ancona Battalion.

Buglioni

freely admitted that he was released from prison in 1846 by the amnesty,
and that he retained his friendship with Giuseppe Camillo Mattioli, preside of Ancona.

He was suspected of association with the Circolo Popo-

lare, and possible complicity in the activity of the assassins which
Orsini was sent to eliminate.

The prosecution asserted that, as adju-

tant major, Buglioni always knew what the Civic Guard was doing,
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must have known something of the murders.

These charges were too weak,

.
.
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and were soon d ism1sse

Another friend and adviser of Mattioli, Antonio Giannelli, was
likewise accused of promoting rebellion and being a leader in the Circo lo Popolare.

Giannelli was a customs clerk before his imprisonment

(therefore a government employee), then continued in the same job after
his release in 1846.

As a civil servant, he seems to have been close

enough to those protecting the "Lega Sanguinaria" to know their activities,

and was of great help

to Orsini in suppressing the group.

Although he signed a proclamation calling for a general assembly in
November, 1848, Giannelli had always disapproved of the Republic.

The

opinion was presented during his trial that he had actually gotten close
to the assassins in order to save or warn their designated victims.

He

was presented as a moderate leader who actively blocked formation of
carbonari lodges.

In so doing, he incurred the enmity of Lesti and Gem-

ini, as well as others inclined to extreme tactics.

This latter argu-

ment prevailed in the trial, and that he was released on probation.

He

probably was able to benefit from the second amnesty and retain his job,
since his supposed rebellion against the state was never proved.
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After his acquittal, however, he did continue to maintain ties with Mazzini.

The same Antonio Giannelli was arrested again in 1853, as a liai-

son with 40 Hungarian officers of the Archduke Friedrich Karl regiment
of the Austrian army.

A Mazzinian plot to have the regiment seize

Ancona never took place before it was discovered by the Austrian mili-
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Giannelli and 14 of the Hungarians received death sen-

tary governor.

tences, which would have been quickly carried out except for the intervention of a young woman.

Emma Gaggiotti, daughter of the military

intendant, appealed for mercy directly to General Hoyos.
were commuted to prison terms as a result.

All sentences

124

Reflections
All of the cases described here were based on real or perceived crimes,
but their relatively low collective number says a lot.

Despite vigorous

efforts by the prosecutors, the ex-Volunteers and the zelanti to identify and punish their enemies, most of those designated did not come
from the ranks of the veterans.

The majority of all political and mili-

tary leaders described here managed to find themselves on the wrong side
of the fence

again, but they acted like statesmen and soldiers, not

major criminals.

Most likely, they concluded that the age of Papal

Princes had passed, and they hoped to participate in constructing the
next age.

Whatever other results flowed from their choices, their crime

was essentially a difference of opinion.
A few

examples of terrible violence did take place, sometimes

involving 'the returnees.

In some instances, political motives were very

evident (as in some of the murders in Bologna),

in others,

fighting

hinged on the settling of old disputes (especially evident in Faenza).
But even allowing for the most extreme examples, there was no pattern of
general violence among exiles and prisoners, certainly no more than in
the population at large.

124

Natalucci, Marche, pp. 166-8.

196
All things considered, the amnesty, and the men who received it,
should get a clean bill of political health.

CHAPTER V

REBELS OR LOYAL CITIZENS?
Who Participated in the Revolution?
The first of the three original objectives of this study was to discover
who actually violated the terms of the amnesty of 1846.

The assembled

evidence indicates that over 80% of the amnesty recipients stayed clear
of all political
1848-49.

and revolutionary activity during

the events of

Only 160 names from the complete list of 989 can be identified

as politically active, or were even accused of being such; 90 of these
were returned exiles and 70 were released prisoners.

As quite a few of

the cases from the last chapter demonstrate, many of those who fall
within the maximum of 160 accused were either judged to be innocent, or
found guilty of lesser charges.

Especially allowing for cases of doubt-

ful indentity, mistaken matches, or those whose charges were dismissed
entirely, the number of those who failed to honor their amnesty agreement is extremely small.

This basic conclusion is not based on partisan

rhetoric or rationalization, but on data from the Consulta's own transcripts.

The highest court in the land was hardly permissive.

So even the most pessimistic tally yields on1y 16.18% of the total
who were prosecuted, even according to the rigorous standards of the Red
Triumvirate.

When 5 out of every 6 veteran political offenders sit

through a revolution, thinking their own thoughts, but doing nothing
illegal, one is justified in concluding that they have met all expectations.
197
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Within this group of 160, the most irreconcilable tended to be
members of an organization, which probably sustained a sort of activist
momentum.

Some were members of formal societies like Young Italy, which

allowed no possibility of compromise with a clerical government, at
least in theory.

Others belonged to local or less formal groups, like

the Lega Infernale in Ancona, or the followers of Stefani and Ciacci in
Pesaro.

It is noteworthy that especially in the cases where violent

crimes are charged, there is almost always a group behind the violence.
It is also curious that, at least in cases involving amnesty recipients,
there is only

on~

group per city: Faenza, Lugo, Pesaro, Ascoli, Fermo,

Ancona, and even Bologna.

There may have been other groups, but the

amnestiati did not join them, for whatever reason.
All things considered, most of the 1846 group maintained their
political equilibrium to a surprising degree, and with it, their continued freedom.

There is no obvious support for the allegation that the

former exiles and prisoners betrayed their trust by turning on Pius or
the government.

Even among the 160 of the Short List, a legitimate

doubt remains about "which Pius IX" they were loyal to.

At least before

the Allocution of April, a zealous nationalist who enlisted to fight the
Austrians could legitimately proclaim his undying loyalty to the Pope.
Whatever else one believes about the wisdom of the amnesty of 1846, the
fantasy of mass defections or betrayal during the Revolution simply does
not hold water, and - barring new evidence to the contrary - never will.
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What Background Patterns Exist?
Using the general rate of participation as a criterion (16.18%),
sections of the statistical tables appear disproportionately large.

sowe
For

example, out of the original 75 exiles in Paris, 14 appear on the Short
List of 160.

Since they represent 18.67% of the original group, we may

conclude that the Parisian contingent had a slightly higher recidivist
rate than the entire sample.

Using this simple percentage method,

let

us compare the breakdown of the sub-group with the divisions of the
original Long List.

1

Division by Place of Origin

--x/ --p/ --o

grouping
Lazio

6

8

Umbria

0

0

Marches

11

24

Legations

73

38

90

70

Ferrara

23

10

Bologna

14

14

Ravenna

27

3

9

11

Forli'
TOTALS (160 of 989)

1

11

11

As already established in chapter II, x on the statistical tables
•
II II
'
d for exiles,
s t ans
p for prisoners,
an d II o II f or o th ers.
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Of the four major regions, only the Marches shows a higher percentage
(19.4%) than the average.

The Legations and Lazio are relatively nor-

mal, and Umbria, with no one at all from the original list active in
1848, has 0.0%.

Of the Legations, Ferrara shows a sharp rise in activ-

ity (25.2%), while Ravenna (19.6%) and Bologna (17.8%) are only moderately ahead of the norm.

Forli'

actually registered a decline.

At

least where men from the original Long List were active, they seem to be
most aggressive in those regions with well organized groups, as we have
already established.

The geographical pattern supports that theory.

Statistics.for the individual cities show that individuals in most
municipalities chose not to participate.
increases.

2

Only 6 cities show strong

Pesaro is the city with the greatest rate of participation

(28.1%), nearly all of them from Stefani and Ciacci's band.
with Ancona' s 18. 9% (most of these from the Lega),

Together

Pesaro' s total

explains why the percentage for the Marches is so high.

In the Lega-

tions, there are high participation rates for Lugo (27.9%), Bagnacavallo
(27.7%), and Faenza (24.4%), as well as a slightly elevated rate for
Bologna (18.5%).

Each of these cities had either a well organized local

group, or a long history of strife which may transcend 1848 entirely.
Another look at the geographic patterns described in Chapter II is
in order.

Recall that the combination of the "Via Emilia" pattern with

the "Faenza Circle" - 15 provinces in all - represented over 60% of the
names on the Long List of 989, and 88.5% of the same men known to be
from the Legations region.

2

If we reconstruct the same patterns from the

For the sake of clarity, cities with fewer than 10 individuals from
the Long List are not considered, since the percentage changes would
appear overly dramatic.
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Short List of 160, the combined configuration is sharply down (48% and
69% respectively), and so is the single "Via Emilia" pattern.
the 10 "Faenza Circle" provinces increase dramatically:
of 47% of the Legations' names has grown to 56%.

However

a former share

The large remaining

totals for Faenza, Bagnacavallo and Lugo account for the increase, made
even more dramatic by their geographical proximity to one another.

This

is NOT part of the general trend, so there must be specific local reasons for the variation.

Better orgainzation or communication within

groups, and stronger leadership are likely factors in the elevated statistics, but the actual reasons are not evident from this study.

Division by Profession
- -x/--p/- -o

grouping
Nobility

8

0

Gentry

8

9

Clergy

0

0

65

40

Peasantry

0

0

Military

2

2

Other

3

2

-unspecified

4

17

90

70

Urban Commoners
Bourgeois

17

8

Petty Bourgeois

19

9

Artisans

24

19

5

4

Unskilled

TOTALS (160 of 989)
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The numbers may tell their most interesting story here, insofar as
members of the upper classes were far more attracted to continued political activity than their lower class brothers.

Could it be that ideol-

ogy was a stronger motive than were material conditions?

In general

terms, the gentry and the nobility showed the greatest tendency to continue their political activity after the 1846 amnesty, with 32.7% and
26.7% respectively.

Most of the urban commoners show a moderate rise in

the participation rate, but in a clear descending order: bourgeoisie
(27.8%),
(16.1%).

petit bourgeoisie

(24.7%),

artisans

(20%)

and unskilled

The simplest explanation may also be the most accurate: the

more prosperous and the better educated felt more secure and free to
act, whereas the less fortunate classes considered themselves more at
risk.

Among those listed as students, a hefty 45.5% reappear on the

Short List, although most of these would no longer be students by 1848;
the lion's share of these young people came from, and returned to, the
upper classes after their education was suspended or completed.

The

handful of clergy and peasants on the Long List do not appear at all in
the later group, and the participation rate for the military is down.
Among the individual professions, it seems significant that 48% of
the lawyers went back to politics; considering. what lawyers do for a
living, this should surprise no one.
high return rate of 28.6%.

Commercial dealers also showed a

Among the petit bourgeois professions, the

highest rates occur for clerks (34.8%), shopkeepers (36.4%), coffeehouse
keepers (50%) and innkeepers (46.2%).

One possible linkage is the need

for those in the given professions to deal with large numbers of customers, and hence be exposed to much conversation and propaganda.· However
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the same characteristic also applies to others whose rate is much lower.
Finally, among the artisans, only bricklayers (44.4%) and blacksmiths
(25%) show substantial participation during 1848.

No reason for this

combination is evident.
Among the suggestions already offered, most are only possible
theories; nothing in this study conclusively proves any of them.

The

one single pattern that appears to stand by itself is the clear tendency
of the elite classes to be more active, and the working classes to
remain less so.

It is hardly a shocking revelation, but it is interest-

ing to see the statistics line up so evenly.
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Division by Place of Exile
grouping

- -x/--p/--o

France

73

Italian States

7

Elsewhere in Europe

9

Asia

0

The Americas

0

-unspecified

1

Division by Place of Imprisonment
Lazio

22

Umbria

1

Marches

24

Legations

11

-unspecified

12

TOTALS (160 of 983)

90

70

Among the exiles who had been in France, the participation rate was
higher than the general percentage (20.4%).

What is more striking, how-

ever, is that except for Corfu, exiles from all other states were LESS
likely to return to politics than their French counterparts.

3

The high-

est percentages are recorded for Bordeaux (50%) and Limoges (43.8%),
with less dramatic increases for Algiers, Loches, Paris, Marseilles and
Saumur.

3

Of these 7 cities, 4 belong to the "Western Crescent" described

Here, as previously, samples of fewer persons are ignored, in the
name of statistical simplicity.
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in chapter II.
imagination:

Those three patterns of refuge continue to tease the
exiles from the Western Crescent showed a collective

relapse rate of 19.2% (although very unevenly distributed).

This is

lower than the rate for the Marseilles cluster (22.6%) but higher than
the Paris group (18.7%).

Hard and fast reasons for it are not obvious.

Whatever political factors had been operative in France, they clearly
made more of an impression on the exiles living there than the same factors in other countries.
It is unfortunate that the statistics on the prisons include 102
men whose prison.was unknown.
cise.

The rest of the numbers will be less pre-

Prisons in only 2 of the 4 regions showed increased rates: the

Legations (23.4%) and Lazio (17.6%).

The reasons are not obvious, but

those imprisoned at Ferrara had a 25.6% of participation, far ahead of
all others.

San Leo (20.9%), Civita Castellana (20.5%) and Civitavec-

chia (17.7%) show more modest increases.

Other significant prisons such

as Ancona and the Castel Sant 1 Angelo had significant drops in the rate
of participation, compared to the entire list.

It is not conclusively

provable, but these figures certainly suggest that leadership among
prisoners may have had much to do with fostering or preserving friendships and networks in the jails.

Clearly, the same factors were at work

among the exiles, who were more free to move around.

Once prisoners or

exiles were allowed to resume their ordinary lives, these connections
probably continued, especially among men from the same town.

The exis-

tence of these connections seems to be self-evident; the story of who
formed them and how they were later used remains to be told by future
scholars.
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Does Background Explain the Crimes?
Based on interpretation of the preceeding tables, several relatively
easy conclusions are now possible.

Many of the best known members of

this group were noble and high- minded patriots whose only crime was
disagreement with the theory and practice of the Church-State.

However

a large percentage of the Short List group (especially among the lower
classes) engaged in overtly criminal activity, whether politically motivated or not.

Unfortunately, the charges against these individuals dif-

fer widely, so it is difficult to detect patterns among such relatively
small numbers.

One possibility, of course, is that there simply are no

consistent trends at all.

But a few patterns probably do merit some

attention.
Legislators and Administrators
This category and the following one become especially interesting
because they are composed almost totally of the elite: nobles, gentry,
and upper bourgeois professionals.
There are 24 possible names on the list of deputies who are probably amnesty recipients, and another 5 who were significant administrators duririg the Republic.

Not surprisingly, every single one of these

people belonged to one of the elite classes of society: nobility, landed
gentry, or upper bourgeoisie.

These names represent many of the best

known of the original amnesty group.

In addition, several of those who

were most passionately dedicated to the Revolution as an
here:

Sterbini, Galletti, Orsini, Zambeccari and Caldesi.

are found
Although

these individuals and others certainly differ widely in many of their
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ideas, we must remember that collectively they represent the leadership
which gave life to the Republic, and that they were also lumped together
in the minds of many reactionaries.
Several of these deputies and administrators were also accused of
other offenses, but not all charges held up under scrutiny.

Two were

accused of conspiring to commit murder (Sterbini and Pasi),

five others

(including Orsini) of crimes against property, and still two others of
promoting secret societies.

These additional charges were not actively

prosecuted, since most of these Deputies and Administrators had fled the
state anyhow, knqwing that their chances of vindication were nil.

Military Leaders
Among military officers who were not also deputies or accused of crimes,
only nine officers were excluded.

Pietramellara (a noble) and Masini

(landed gentry) were already dead in battle, and beyond the reach of
earthly courts.

Palazzi (a doctor) was never charged, probably because

he also emigrated, and Domenico Belluzzi (a professional soldier) may
have never returned home after his

spectacular defense of Venice.

Although each of these individuals found himself on the opposite side of
the fence from the Papal regime, none of them seems to have committed
even remotely criminal acts, or indeed anything unbecoming of a good
soldier.

All eight of those with known professions are either career

soldiers or the same upper class types as their colleagues in the previous category.
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Murder
By way of contrast,

& other Violence

lower class people seem to be the exclusive defen-

dants in crimes of violence, whether against people or property.

For

example, there were 40 defendants charged with actual or attempted murder, multiple in some cases.
be gentry,

with no nobles

Among these accused, only 1 was known to

or upper bourgeoisie at all.

included 9 petit bourgeois, 17 artisans and 5 unskilled.

The

rest

This very lop-

sided condition may be one result of the limited political options which
working class people saw as open to them.

The same imbalance is cer-

tainly visible in the severity of their sentences.

Although 9 of the

defendants were released after dismissal of the charges, several others
were convicted with overwhelming evidence.

Those who were convicted and

actually executed (6) were all lower class people: 1 petit bourgeois, 4
artisans, and 1 unskilled.
wise from the same

The 7 who received life sentences were like-

lower classes, as were the 4 others who died in

prison.
Under the category of violence against persons (shootings, beatings,

and lesser

injuries),

13 are so charged.

Although 3 are of

unknown background, 3 others were petit bourgeois, and 7 were artisans.
Charges were dismissed in 4 of the 13 cases.

Damage to Property

& Society

There were 10 individuals - petit bourgeois, artisans and unskilled accused of various crimes against property, both state and private.

One

of these (Antonio Liverani) was shot by the Austrians while trying to
escape, and 3 other cases were dismissed.
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Under a more vague charge of other crimes against society or property,

there were 5

individuals:

one each from the nobility

G.B.Ferri), bourgeoisie, petit bourgeoisie, artisans,

(Count

and one unknown.

Unfortunately, the outcome of these cases is not provided in the transcripts.
Finally, there were 8 men, all of them former prisoners, accused
of planning or participating in prison breaks.

At least one case was

dismissed, the rest are unknown.

Non-violent Political Charges
Ironically, the only category of charges which cuts across the entire
social spectrum appears to be

t~e

political offenses.

One frequent accusation was "Offense to the Dignity of the Savereign"

(Lesa :t-1aesta').

the amnesty terms,
of loyalty.

In practice, this frequently meant violation of

especially with reference to the signed declaration

It is worth noting that this title seems to have been used

exclusively against amnesty recipients.

A very broad spectrum of 29

persons were so charged, including all classes except unskilled.

These

cases were either dismissed altogether (11 of 29) or given severe sentences - there was no middle ground.

Among the known sentences, 5 were

given life in prison, 7 perpetual exile and one death in absentia.
A similar but less serious grouping of charges covers all forms of
communication or association perceived as hostile to the government:
talk, literature or membership in secret societies.

There were 16 peo-

ple so charged; one of these is accused of membership in some unnamed
society, and 6 others are specifically listed as being Mazzinians.

The
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accused also cut across the social spectrum: gentry, upper and lower
bourgeoisie, artisans, students and one unskilled worker.
known to have received prison terms, 3 of them artisans.

Only 4 are
Of more than

passing interest is the fact that 10 of the 16 accused had their charges
dismissed entirely.
conditions:

This high dismissal rate may indicate one of two

the difficulty of making a clear case in such a nebulous

field, or the possible use of this heading to cover trumped up charges
with little substance.
In general, it appears that the individual's background did condition the crimes he was accused of to a certain degree.

Upper class pea-

ple were more like to find themselves in leadership roles in the government or the military.

So their "dis loyalty" would more likely occur

because they backed the wrong government, and not because of a murder or
a prison break.

Lower class people, on the other hand, tended to steer

their political zeal into violent crimes, if indeed they did anything at
all.

Only in the purely political

field are the

classes relatively

equal in their participation, allowing for a slight "bulge" at the middle of the social spectrum.

What Next?
Despite the interesting patterns which emerge from this wealth of data,
there are almost as many new questions

raised as there are old ones

answered.
Beyond any doubt, there is solid evidence which suggests organizations or networks about which we know relatively little.

At least some

of the revolutionary process in 1848 was far from the traditional con-
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spiracies among alienated elites, or bread riots by starving workers.
Spontaneous outbursts and generic unrest do not account for the methodical and coordinated attacks on government personnel in Lugo.

More work

is necessary on Count Pasi's group in Faenza and the Lega Infernale in
Ancona.
study.

The Pesaro crowds of Stefani and Ciacci are begging for more
Even the coordination of the small bands in Bologna could use

more study.

Compared to these clusters of activists, the debates and

decrees of members of the government seem far more like a modest reform
program than a true revolution.
For

furthe~

study, one good place to start would be the police

intelligence files stored in the Sapienza Archives in Rome, as well as
the local police records and day books in Bologna and other provincial
archives.

The Consulta records may offer a few additional details about

the cases reviewed here, but not much more; this present study shows the
lion's share of what is there.

Transcripts from the local courts might

help, but not the Consulta.
In any case, the "voiceless thousand" have now been heard.

It is

no longer necessary to assume what the amnistiati thought or did after
their repatriation;

their actions,

and in many cases

their touching

fidelity to a pledge of loyalty, have now been shown in full daylight.
More needs to be said about them and their political world, but at least
there has been a beginning.

Hopefully this study will provide a stimu-

lus to further investigation of these forgotten men.

Their desire to

improve their state and their world, even at the price of their own suffering, should find common ground among many of us who hope for the same
good things.

If their efforts serve to inspire and instruct the state

builders of tomorrow, then they certainly have not suffered in vain.
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REmON OF LAZIO
Delegation
Rema

Governo

& Comarca

Patrim::>nio

-same-

Viteroo

City or town

x/ p/

(city)

22

27

(city)

1

14
1

Marta

Ronciglione
Civitavecchia (city)
Cometo (= Tarquinia)

campagna

Frosinone

Velletri

(city)
Se:nooneta
'lbrrice
Trevi
Vico
(city)
f.t:>nte Libretti
Palestrina
Tivoli
Vicovaro

-sameOrvieto

Umbria-sabina

Spoleto

Rieti
Terni

ROOION OF UMBRIA
(city)
Citta' della Pieve
Acquapendente
S. IDrenzo in f.t:>nte
(city)
Assisi
Foligno
Gualdo Tadino
Narni
(city)
(city)
Petriolo di Terni

x/ p
4

4
2

1

1
1

1
2
1

2

1
1
2

1

1
1
1
1
1
1

-none-

Benevento & Pontecorvo

Perugia

0

5
1

2
1
1

1
1
1

2
1
3
2
1

2
2
2

1
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BRFAKDCMN BY PIACE OF ORIGIN
ROOION OF THE MARCHES
Delegation
Gc>verno
Urbino-Pesaro -:same-

City or town
Urbino
Pesaro
Candelara
Citta' di Castello
Fano
Fossanbrone
Fratte (Rosa)
Gubbio
Monte Grimano
Monte Porzio
Pergola
s. Angelo di Pesaro
s. Angelo in Vado
s. Costanzo

s.

Macerata

-same-

-same-

10
1
1
7

l
2

Leo

Schieggia
Senigallia
Urbania
Ancona

l

x/ 12/

(city)
Belvedere
Corinaldo
Fabriano
Jesi
!Dreto
Montignano
Osimo
S. Angelo in Pontano
Serra di Conti
Serra S. Quirico
(city)

1
2

Camerino

Fenno

-same-

Ascoli

(city)
Grottazzolina
Monte Giorgio
Porto S. Giorgio
(city)
Folignano
Ripatransone

13
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1

xt._ E
1

8

3

l
1

1

5

2

25
1

12

3

4

2

2
2

1

1

2

1

2
1
1

2

1
1
1
1
2

Dano

Montolmo (= Corridonia)
Recanati
s. Elpidio
s. Severino
Treja
(city)
Monte Cavallo

2
22

0

7
1
4

1

5

l
1
1

l
l

1

3
4

5
1
1

1
1

1
2

1
1
1

2

l
l

l
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BREAKDCMN BY PIACE OF ORIGIN
REX3ION OF THE LEX.;ATIONS
Legation

Governo

City or tCMil

Legations - unspecified
Ferrara

Bologna

(city)
Montalbano
(city)
Argenta
s. Biagio di Argenta
(city)
Bagnacavallo
Traversara
(city)
Cento
(city)
Conselice
Iavezzola
(city)
Fusignano
(city)
Lugo
Cotignola
Ma.ssa Ianbarda (city)
Sant'Agata
(city)

6
1
37

(city)
S. Alberto
Brisighella (city)
castel Bolognese (city)
(city)
Faenza
(city)
Im:lla
(city)
Russi
-same-

x/

p

4
1
4
1
10
1

2
1
11

2
1
2

10

2

2
1
1
9
30
1
1
1
44

Amola

calderino
Crespellano
Tignano
Minerbio Garuolaro
Budrio
castel s. Pietro (city)
(city)
Medicina
Villa Fontana
(city)
Porretta
S. Pietro in casale (city)
(city)
Vergato
Bargo Panigale
Monte Severo
Rocca Pitigliano
Savigno
SUsano sotto Vergato
Ravenna

0

I

1

-same-

-same-

xt.. p/

13

3

5
1
91
1

12

13

1

2
1
1
1
3
2

1
1
1
1
2
1
1

1
1

1

1
1

19

6
85
7
14

13
1
1

1
3
3

1
2
21
1
2

3

Legation
Forli'

BRE'AKlXMN BY PIACE OF ORIGIN
REX3ION OF THE LEX3ATIONS (continued)
Govern.o
City or town
x/ p/

(city)
3
36
Terra del Sole
1
Forlimpopoli
Bertinoro
1
Meldola
2
5
(city)
Cesena
7
19
(city)
Civitella
1
Fitnnara
1
ltlnte Scudolo
Coriano
2
(city)
Ri.mini
73 38
Spadarolo in ltlnte
1
Verucchio
2
2
s. Arcangelo (city)
1
Cattolica
1
Saludecio
ltlntefiore di Ri.mini
1
1
ltlntegridalfo
1
ltlrciano
5
s. Giovanni in Marignano 3 3
(city)
1
3
Savignano
1
s. Mauro
-same-

"Others"
specific but unknown places:
Barbarolo
Piernarco
Vetturato

231
0

x/ P

3

5

1

1
1

2

1

1

5
1

2

1
1
1

3

places outside Papal States
Piedmont
-unspecified
Castel ltlnferrato
San Remo

Torino
Piacenza
Firenze
Pistoja
'lWo Sicilies
Napoli

Panna
Tuscany

no place of origin specified

1
1

1
1
1
1

1
.l

2

7

3

7

19

550 433

6

90

70
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BREAKrX:MN BY PROFESSION

Grouping

Profession (with translation)

x/ p/ o

NOBILITY
- unspecified (nobile}
marquis (marchese)
count (conte)
knight (cavaliere)

6
17
3

UNTITLED GENTRY
man of property (possidente)

36

2

x/

p

1
1

16

1
5
2

8

9

65

40

1
1

1

CLERGY

priest & pastor (parroco)
priest ( sacerdote)
subdeacon ( suddeacono)
religious (religioso)
URBAN COMMONERS
-see next 3 pages for expansion:

1

2

3
1
1

342 123

5

PE'ASANTRY

peasant (contadino)
farm worker (bracciante)
market gardener (ortolano)
shepherd (pastorolo)

MILITARY
colonel (colonello)
captain (capitano)
lieutenant (tenente)
- unspecified officer (ufficiale)
non-cans (sergente, brigatiere, maresciallo)
soldier (soldato, militare)

5
1
1
1
5
7
7
7
4
7

2
1

1
2
4

1

OTHERS

student (studente)
sailor (marinajo)
football player (giocatore di palone)
sports official (bigliardiere)
smuggler (contrabandiere)
NO PROFESSION SP:OCIFIED
G;rand 'l'o:tals

7
1
1

4

3

2

1
1
87 272

0

4

17

550 433

6

90

70
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BR.FAKlXHJ BY PROFESSION

Grouping

Profession (with translation)

x/ p/

0

x/

p

1

1
5

1

1

1
7

BOURGEX)IS

Professionals
doctor (medico)
surgeon (chirurgo)
veterinarian (veterinario)
engineer (inginiere)
lawyer (avvocato, legale, dottore in leggi)
notary (notajo)
university teacher (professore)
Ccmnercial
manufacturer (fabbricante)
shipping agent (spedizioniere)
accountant (contabile, computista)
bookseller (librajo)
money changer (cambiavalute)
dealer (trafficante, canmerciante, sensale)
contractor (appaltatore, impressario)
hotel keeper (albergatore)

15
8
2
1
19
2
3

1
1
2
1
11
2
1

4

1
6
1
1

5
1

1
1
1
3

3

1

3

5

PE'TTY BOURGEOIS
White collar
pharmacist (farmacista)
male nurse (infirmiere, flebotano)
deputy (deputato)
political leader (capo politico)
clerk, inspector (impiegato)
bailiff (cursore)
legal clerk (attuario)
calligrapher (calligrafo)
tutor (istitutore)
copyist (scritturale, copista, emanuense)
Tradesmen
shopkeeper (negoziante)
printer (tipografo, stampatore)
medal seller (medagliaio)
restaurateur (trattore)
coffeehouse keeper (caffetiere)
innkeeper (locandiere, oste)
wineseller (spacciatore di vino)
fU.tistic
painter (pittore)
sculptor (scultore)
writer (scrittore, uamo di lettere)
musician (musicante, suonatore)
singer (artista di canti)
actor (artista dranma.tico)

5
1
1
2
11
1
1
2
2
2
10
3

1
2
9
11
1
7
5

9
1

3

1
1
1
1

1

1
2

5

1
1

2

1

1

4

4

3

5
1
1

1

1
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BREA.l<DCJVN BY PROFESSION

Grouping

Profession (with translation)

x/

p/

1

5
1
7

0

x/ p

ARTISANS

Textiles & Clothing
weaver (tessitore, lanino)
ribbon maker (fettuciario)
tailor (sarto/sartore)
dyer (tintore)
hatter (cappelajo)

36
1
7

Building Trades
bricklayer (muratore, cazionsuole)
carpenter (falegname, legnajuolo)
cabinetmaker (ebanista)
plasterer (gessino)
house painter (verniciatore)

12
17
4
1
1

6
5
3
1

7
7
1
3
1

1
8

1
1
1

30
3

9

1
1

1
4

1
3

2
5
1

3
1
2
1

1

Food Service

baker (fornajo)
butcher (macellaro, pizzicagnolo, beccaio)
miller (mugnajo)
cook (cuoco)
fishmonger (pescivendolo)
leather
shoemaker (calzola jo)
tanner (conciapelli, concitore)
haltennaker (capestraro)
saddler (sellajo)
Other Artisans
barber (barbiere)
blacksmith/ironworker (fabbro, ferrajo)
coppersmith (ramajo)
mechanic (rreccanico)
gunsmith (anna.jolo)
glassblower (vetrajo)
basketmaker (canestraro)
wickel'.WOrker (impagliatore)
upholsterer (tappezziere)
canb maker (pettinajo)
cigar maker (fabbricatore di zigari)
rope maker (cordajo)

2
6
10
1
2
1
1

5

1
1
2
2

2
2

1

1
1
2

1
2
1
1

1

1
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BRFAKDCMN BY PROFESSION
Grouping

Profession (with translation)

x/ p/

0

x/ p

UNSKILLED
Service
domestic servant (servitore, damestico)
waiter/valet {camariere)
coachman {cocchiere)
carter/cat.man {vetturale, birocciaio)
postillion (postiglione)
messenger (corriere)
watchman {sorvegliante)
lamplighter {lampionajo)
Labor
porter {facchino)
second-hand dealer (rigattiere)
hemp-dresser {canapino, gargiolaro)
rice husker {pilaricco)
whitewasher {imbiancatore)
laundryman (lavandajo)

5
1
3
1
1
1

2

1

1
1

2

1

1
1

1
2

1
11
1
1

1

11

2

8

1

1
1

1
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PI.ACES OF EXILE
Country

City or town

France

-unspecified
Algiers (N. Africa)
Angers
Aurel lac
Avignon
Bastia (Corsica)
Batillon-sur-I.Dire
Bordeaux
Bourbon-Vendee
cahors
Cette
Charenton
Chateauroux
Chaumont
Clermont-Ferrand
Epinal
Lesneven
Lille
Limoges
loches
Lyon
Macon
Marseilles
Mende
Montauban
Mont-de-Marsan
Montpellier
Nancy
Narbonne
Neufchateau
Nimes
Paris
Perigueux
Quinper

Rennes
Rodez
Saint Quentin
Saumur
Toulon
Toulouse
Tours
Versailles

x/ p/
4
31
1
2
1
17
1
8
2
3
1
1
30
2
1
1
1
1
16
19
1
5
79
1
2
1
3
1
1
1
6
73
4
1
1
1
1
22
2
4
4
1

Portugal

Lisbon

1

Spain

-unspecified
Barcelona
Burgos
Madrid

1
2
1
1

0

x/ p
1
7
1
2

4
1
3

1
7
4
2
15

2

1
1
14

4
1
1
1

239

PIACES OF EXILE
Country

City or town

x/ p/

Great Britain

-unspecified
Derby
Dublin
Iondon
Taunton

1
1
1
8
1

Netherlands

Amsterdam

l

Belgium

Brussels
Mons

l

Prussia

Aachen

l

Switzerland

Geneva
Lucerne
Vaud

l
l

Austrian Italy

Piedmont

Fil.m'le
Trieste
Venice
Verona
Villafranca

1

l

1

l
l
1
1

Parma

Piacenza

l

Tuscany

-unspecified
Florence
Livorno
Lucca
Pavena
Pistoja
Viareggio

2
26
4
2
1
2
1

-same-

11

Naples

3

Malta

Valetta

3

Ionian Islands

-unspecified
Cefalonia
Corfu
Santa Maura

Sicilies

1

10

4
1
2

1.wo

x/ p

2

cagliari
Genoa
San Retro
'furin

San Marino

0

l

l

3
3
17
3

1
1

3
1

1

3

PI.ACES OF EXILE
Country

City or tam

Greece

Athens
Nostizza
Patras

Ottanan Empire

240

x/ p/
12
1
1

Aleppo
Alexandria
Constantinople
Ioannina

1

Smyrna

4

Russia

Odessa

1

Ceylon

Colanbo

1

Brazil

-unspecified
Bahia (=Salvador)
Rio de Janeiro

2
5
1

Uruguay

.Montevideo

1

Venezuela

Caracas

1

United States

New Orleans
New York

1
2

Unspecified places of exile
Grand Totals

0

x/ p
1
1

1
2
4

21

1

550

90
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PLACE:S OF IMPRISCHmNT
Region

Prison or jail

Iazio

castel Sant'Angelo
Civitavecchia
Civita castellana
Corneto

Umbria
Marches

Legations

x/ p/
(Rana)

21
62
39

x/ p
3

11
8

3

Narni

8

Spoleto

3

Ancona
cagli
Cingoli
Fano
Fbssombrone
Gubbio
Macerata
f.t:>ndolfo
Pergola
Pesaro
San Leo
Senigallia
Urbino

0

l

65

5

3

l
l
l

l
9

1
3
4

2

2
1
10

l
1
1

43
3
3

9

Ferrara
Ravenna
Rimini

43

11

Police request - prison unspecified

80

10

22

2

433

70

No

2

1
3

prison given
Grand Totals
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